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Provenance is a term originating from the work of art. It aims to provide a chain of
information of a piece of arts from its creation to the current status. It records all
the historic information relating to this piece of art, including the storage locations,
ownership, buying prices, etc. until the current status. It has a very similar definition
in data processing and computer science. It is used as the lineage of data in computer
science to provide either reproducibility or tracing of activities happening in runtime
for a different purpose. Similar to the provenance used in art, provenance used in
computer science and data processing field describes how a piece of data was created,
passed around, modified, and reached the current state. Also, it provides information
on who is responsible for certain activities and other related information. It acts as
metadata on components in a computer environment.
As the concept of provenance is to record all related information of some data, the
size of provenance itself is generally proportional to the amount of data processing that
took place. It generally tends to be a large set of data and is hard to analyse. Also, in
the provenance collecting process, not all information is useful for all purposes. For
example, if we just want to trace all previous owners of a file, then all the storage loca-
tion information may be ignored. To capture useful information and without needing
to handle a large amount of information, researchers and developers develop different
provenance recording tools that only record information needed by particular applica-
tions with different means and mechanisms throughout the systems. This action allows
a lighter set of information for analysis but it results in non-standard provenance infor-
mation and general users may not have a clear view on which tools are better for some
purposes. For example, if we want to identify if certain action sequences have been
performed in a process and who is accountable for these actions for security analysis,
we have no idea which tools should be trusted to provide the correct set of information.
Also, it is hard to compare the tools as there is not much common standard around.
With the above need in mind, this thesis concentrate on providing an automated
system ProvMark to benchmark the tools. This helps to show the strengths and
weaknesses of their provenance results in different scenarios. It also allows tool de-
velopers to verify their tools and allows end-users to compare the tools at the same
level to choose a suitable one for the purpose. As a whole, the benchmarking based
on the expressiveness of the tools on different scenarios shows us the right choice of
provenance tools on specific usage.
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Provenance is a term originating from the world of art and soon spread to a wide
range of usage in different domains. The fundamental concept of provenance is to
record all actors’ identity and actions on specific artefacts from their generation to
the current state. The artefacts can be different when we are referring to different
domains. For example, the artefacts can be pieces of artwork where the provenance
records the creator, intermediate owners, ownership transfer and selling transactions.
The artefacts can also be digital files generated by users and the provenance records
all the users who have modified the files and the timestamps of the actions. We can
generalize that the content of the provenance is dependent on its field of usage. In
this thesis, we concentrate on the field and usage of provenance in data science and its
extension to security.
Data provenance is one of the big topics discussed in the research field of data sci-
ence, especially in some fields that need to handle big data analysis like database and
system analysis. The existence of data provenance can help researchers with traceabil-
ity, accountability, and reproducibility of some runtime actions and activities because
it can record all things that happened at runtime and is easily accessible. For example,
in Pasquier et al. [130], the authors mention the usage of reproducing and interpreting
what is happening in runtime by observing and analysing provenance collected in a
runtime session. Besides, the provenance showing the runtime behaviour can help us
ensure things are executing as expected, which provides some level of dependability
checking for the high-level activities, as suggested by Alvaro and Tymon [8]. In short,
data provenance is describing the complete history of the tracing target. It always needs
to be collected at runtime to record all the information. Some early provenance system
like PASS [117] is designed to do this job in the background transparently and bundled
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with existing storage systems. This can ensure provenance is already collected when
it is needed later for problem identification or reproducing incidents. In the context of
this work, we are motivated by using provenance for security auditing and forensics
application. We aim to provide an alternative way for intrusion detection, accountabil-
ity tracing and fault recovery. Thus we are concentrating on provenance information
and systems that are focusing on system-level provenance. Other usages of provenance
information like database or data archival are not in our consideration.
To achieve the advantages of data provenance, it is important to ensure the quality
of provenance information and decrease the cost for generating, storing and querying
it. The quality of provenance is interpreted as the provenance expressiveness while
the cost is interpreted by the effectiveness of provenance related processes. The ef-
fectiveness of the generation process depends on how the provenance is collected and
what information is collected. This topic has already been researched deeply and dif-
ferent automated provenance collecting systems have been produced. There is also
research on the effectiveness of the storing and querying of provenance by filtering,
organizing and limiting the amount of provenance information stored to speed up the
query process. For example, these publications [6, 42, 126] consider provenance result
management and automated filtering to limit the amount of provenance stored to the
necessary level to increase efficiency.
On the other hand, the problems of provenance expressiveness are related to the
goals of provenance collection and are hard to compare across different automated
tools with different perspectives. With the effectiveness consideration in mind, a sys-
tem may filter out some information which may only be necessary for some other uses.
For a general end-user, it is hard to understand the expressiveness of the provenance
data generated by tools for specific applications. This direction has received very lit-
tle attention currently and thus this work aims to provide an automated framework on
top of some provenance recording tools to compare their expressiveness in different
scenarios. We aim to use an automated framework to provide expressiveness bench-
marking for the tools in different scenarios to allow users to compare the tools when
they need them for specific applications.
The original idea for the automated framework came from an information security
perspective. When we try to research some new method of accountability tracking
and intrusion detection for forensic and security usage, we have been introduced to the
idea of data provenance, which is rather new for security analysis. In the preliminary
study, we observed that there are many automated recording tools for provenance and
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it is hard to determine which of them will be adequate for a given purpose. This is
an important factor because in security applications, the expressiveness of provenance
information, together with the integrity of the generated provenance, is needed to pro-
vide a chain of evidence for security and forensic usage. Thus we need to have a way
to compare and assess the expressiveness of the generated provenance and thus it has
become the main focus of this work.
1.1 The ecosystem of data provenance
Since the introduction of the conceptual idea of provenance into the data science field,
the research community has started to engage in research of the practical application
of data provenance. Researchers defined data provenance as a meta-data that contains
information relating to the origin of an artefact (mostly data) and how, why and by
whose actions the data attained the present state and location. This collected meta-
data provides additional evidence about the operation and processing of data including
the accountable parties and source of origin. These data become important when the
usage of a data system is scaling up. The existence of provenance data allows users
to trace accountable parties, diverts deviation for error searching or re-usability of
data. These users benefit from the traceable and reproducible properties of provenance.
From reading or querying on result provenance, the same data processing flow can be
either traced or reproduced to provide the above information.
As there are increasing needs for data provenance to aid the processing of systems
and large scale data sets, researchers are starting to focus on ways to collect this infor-
mation. In general, collecting provenance is almost the same as monitoring all actions
in a system and recording the necessary information as meta-data for future querying
of the action. In a current system, many processes are executing at the same time and
combined to form high-level actions. Recording these actions and all the related in-
formation becomes a troublesome and time/space consuming task. And one question
is, how to determine which information is necessary for an application? There is no
general agreement to determine what should be kept as the provenance information.
Researchers tended to develop provenance recording tools when they had a specific
need for a certain type of data or information. For example, the SPADE tool [64]
originally developed for provenance auditing in distributed systems and CamFlow tool
[129] focuses on security and system auditing in a single system and thus it requires
whole system provenance capture which includes all possible activity records. It con-
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centrates on the provenance management from distributed hosts to a central server
for auditing purposes. As a result, the tools are developed solely for their designated
purpose. In general, there is no common standard or agreement on what a piece of
data provenance should contain or what information should be kept or dropped in the
provenance collecting process.
One of the main problems affecting the efficiency of data provenance applications
is the size of the provenance data. The general definition of provenance aims to col-
lect all information that allows complete traceable and reproducible abilities of the
same set of data operations. In reality, some research directions did not need this com-
plete set of information. Some of them only take advantage of a subset of information
recorded in full provenance trace and does not need the remaining information at all.
In a survey paper, Herschel et el. [77] classify some of the provenance systems into
different groups based on their applications and source of information. By studying
the initiatives of different groups, it demonstrates that some of the groups are targeting
on different applications and types of provenance information, thus they are collecting
different subsets of the full provenance trace from different components and levels.
Some of the systems collect information from the user level and some relay informa-
tion from the kernel. As a result, the current ecosystem of the data provenance includes
many specific tools developed for single or limited purposes and new tools are devel-
oped when new needs arise. Although some provenance tools are starting to consider
general application targets, the development of provenance systems is still receiving
only a little concern in the data science field.
1.2 Challenges and standards
Although there is no general agreement on how provenance is collected and what
should be included in the provenance result, there are still some loose standards in
the research field. Based on the increasing need to understand and develop a stan-
dard of provenance, Moreau [110] summarizes some common applications and defini-
tions of data provenance on the web. The paper gives an overview and foundations of
provenance, including some basic definition of provenance and possible workflow for
provenance collection and application in databases. It also provides some key proper-
ties of data provenance by analysing some of the informal uses of provenance in the
field. Moreover, it generalizes the idea and provides an open vision and understand-
ing of how the provenance data should be formalized for use in the web environment.
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The authors also influence and contribute to the development of the famous model
for data provenance, the Open Provenance Model (OPM) 1.0 [112] and its later up-
dated core specification for version 1.1 [111]. The model provides a great base for
the foundational definition of provenance. It also provides a general understanding of
how provenance can be used directly or extended to provide different properties and
characteristics in different areas.
The Open Provenance Model (OPM) is the first research community-driven stan-
dard that aims to propose a formal specification for how provenance should be repre-
sented. It provides a set of basic design principles for provenance systems and data
provenance researchers to follow. Also, the OPM aims to provide a way of displaying
and representing provenance data in a common standard format. After the introduc-
tion of the OPM, provenance researchers worked towards a common unified standard
for provenance. The unified standard is targeted to support widespread use of prove-
nance that allows different tools to interchange provenance information and under-
stand provenance information generated by other tools. The common standard was
developed and named as PROV [156], standardized under W3C and includes multiple
documents defining different aspects of the interchangeable and interoperable charac-
teristics of provenance. For example, PROV-DM [22] defines the data model for the
PROV standard. With the standard, it is expected that provenance collecting processes
can follow and produce interchangeable provenance information that should be read-
able by all parties that understand the PROV standard. The standard aims not only
at the traditional goals of versioning and reproducibility, but it also provides formal-
izations of other aspects. For example, it defines how to identify an object entity and
represent it in the resulting graph. Although the standard provides guidelines on many
aspects of provenance collecting, it does not define how a given operating system’s
behaviour should be recorded.
The existence of the PROV standard provides a general and formal way for prove-
nance collecting and representation. But there is no guarantee that tools or users must
follow the standard at all. There are still tools in the wild not fully compatible with
the PROV standard. At the end of the day, it is just another community-driven stan-
dard and there is no force to push it to mandatory. Thus there are still challenging
problems to identify and compare provenance results generated and collected from
tools not following the standard. To compare the strengths and weaknesses of different
provenance tools in different application scenarios, it is necessary to have an objective
benchmarking and comparison. This is one of the major goals of this work.
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1.3 Research contribution
The preliminary initiative of this work is the research on new and efficient methods
for identifying the existence of sensitive behaviour at runtime and to provide a chain
of evidence for the behaviour and to identify the accountable parties of the behaviour.
The need for chains of evidence and related accountable parties match closely to what
data provenance is recorded. Thus we focused on studying existing provenance tools
to see if any of them collect provenance information sufficient for the security and
forensic goals. Also, one of the requirements for provenance usage in security is to
ensure the integrity of the provenance information collected. This relates to the secu-
rity of the provenance itself and verifying that the provenance systems did the correct
job to collect provenance relating to an event. One of the identification standards is the
correctness and completeness of the provenance collected by the tools. If the process
is confirmed to be correct and complete, then the provenance collecting process should
be able to reproduce the repeating process result with the same set of provenance in-
formation if we are executing the same set of activities in the same environment.
Following the above initiative and the necessity to prove the reproducibility of
provenance processing, we need to have a standard to measure if the tools match the
requirements in security settings. As mentioned, we aim to measure this by identifying
the correctness and completeness properties of the provenance information. One of the
challenges is how to measure the correctness and completeness and how to compare the
provenance results and collecting/generating processes of different tools to each other.
This is a big question as we mentioned, although there is a W3C standard of PROV
that provides a unified requirement to collect and represent provenance information,
it is not a mandatory standard and tools can have a choice to follow it or not. If
the tools follow the same standard, it is easy to identify and compare their strength
and weakness in terms of correctness and completeness in different applications and
environment. Although the common standard does help to provide a more unified
result, it sometimes underspecifies some relevant runtime behaviour which makes the
resulting provenance incomplete. Also, currently there lack a common agreement that
the tools must follow the standard, thus there is a possibility that the target tools are
not comparable at all.
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This thesis is motivated by the need to have an objective comparison of provenance
collecting tools to assess their correctness and completeness. This allows end-users to
identify the strengths and weaknesses of different tools for different purposes and in
different environments. The thesis concentrate on introducing a fully automated sys-
tem to provide expressiveness benchmarking. The expressiveness benchmarking is
targeting different provenance collecting tools working for different purposes in dif-
ferent environments. The reason for the introduction of the automated approach is
because of the tediousness of the manual benchmarking process. Benchmarks in terms
of provenance entities are given to show how these tools describe an activity sequence
in a specific environment. End-users can compare the benchmarks of each tool with the
same set of action sequences. The comparison result demonstrates which of the tools
gives the closest and richest information that they need for a specific purpose. This
thesis also provides handling of non-deterministic events. The following list shows the
research contribution of this work.
Contribution 1: General benchmarking of provenance tools and system calls The
automated system mainly concentrates on providing a benchmark in terms of
provenance model entities. When we provide a set of action sequences in a
given environment, the automated system will monitor different provenance col-
lecting tools to collect provenance on the execution of this action sequence and
further process their provenance outputs and generate a benchmark for each of
the tools for this specific action sequence. These benchmarks represent what
information is collected by those provenance tools for this specific action. End-
users can compare the generated benchmark results directly to see which of the
tools produce provenance that forms the closest match to their needs. For ex-
ample, providing a set of actions as input and the resulting benchmark shows
the capabilities of the tools in describing different aspects of the actions. Some
tools may be describing more about which channels an artefact passed through.
Other tools may have more detailed descriptions of the processes handling the
artefact and the information of the processes’ owners. These examples show
the strengths and weaknesses of the tools for different purposes. Besides, as
different provenance tools have different purposes and applications, they may
source the information from different layers of the operating system and soft-
ware stack. Some of them may source from the user library in the user layer,
others may choose to go down in the stack and source directly from some of
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the kernel modules like the Linux Audit System or the Linux Security Modules.
Sometimes, it is possible for a provenance system to source from multiple lo-
cations. The benchmarking approach of different provenance systems can help
to reason about the pros and cons of different information sources and collect-
ing approach and provide an objective analysis of the information gathered from
different layers in the operating system.
Contribution 2: General analysis of provenance tools Apart from the consideration
of the perspectives of end-users, this automated system can also benefit the tool
developers. As we understand, data provenance contains a large amount of infor-
mation. In general, recording provenance for a few simple actions already gen-
erates a very large set of provenance entities and relations. This is because most
of the high-level operations in current computers contain a large set of kernel ac-
tivities including privilege checking, memory exchange, and other calculations.
These activities all contribute to the large provenance result. Provenance sys-
tems have to handle, generate and process these large amounts information and
it is hard to check for bugs and errors in these results. Errors could exist in these
systems that may affect the correctness and completeness of the tools. One of
the uses of our proposed automated system aims to eliminate some of the unim-
portant and volatile information (coming from background activities unrelated to
the target action sequence) from the provenance and generate a much-simplified
benchmark to describe the key action sequence. This smaller size of results is
easier for the tools’ researchers and developers to use for checking their tools to
identify errors. It can also reassure us that the tools meet their expectations in
provenance generation. As a whole, the automated approach helps provenance
tool developers to evaluate their tools.
Contribution 3: Approximate isomorphic graph comparison One of the major ob-
stacles that automated systems faces are the comparison of graphs. One of the
steps for the benchmark generation requires filtering the different graph structure
between two provenance graphs. One of the provenance graphs represents the
provenance generated for a set of the target execution activities while the other
graph represents the provenance generated for a subset of the first set of activi-
ties. In this situation, the provenance graph structure representing the common
activities in both sets should be isomorphic to each other. The additional graph
structure in the first graph can be filtered by first matching the isomorphic struc-
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ture among the two graphs. This makes the two graphs an isomorphic sub-graph
pair. As an on-going discussion in graph theory, it is generally believed that
graph isomorphism testing is not known to be tractable nor NP-complete, while
isomorphic sub-graph matching is an NP-complete problem. Indeed, László
Babai has produced proofs in [14] to conclude that graph isomorphism has a
quasi-polynomial solution. The proofs have not been refuted since then. Thus it
shows that these are hard and complex problems to be solved by the automated
system. We adopt the edit-distance algorithm to retrieve an approximate set of
result to shorten the time needed and decrease the complexity of this problem
into an acceptable range. We also make use of Answer Set Programming (which
is a form of logic programming) to help to solve the problems.
1.4 Thesis outline
This work mainly concentrates on developing the expressiveness benchmarking frame-
work for provenance generated by different provenance systems. It starts with manual
classification and then develops a fully automated framework. It also includes some
obstacles overcome when switching the approach from manual to fully automated pro-
cess. We also add in some additional features to make it more realistic towards live
usage. At last, we provide some self-evaluation and testing on the automated frame-
work. The thesis will focus on discussing the full development process and evaluation
done on the automated framework and some statistics and data for real testing results.
We also include some evaluation of the target provenance recording tools, where the
developers have provided us with feedback on the expressiveness benchmarking re-
sults. The feedback helps to improve the framework and to make it more useful not
only for the end-users but also for the tool developers to evaluate their tools. The
following is the structure of the remaining chapters of this thesis.
Chapter 2: Background This chapter includes state-of-the-art for all related research
directions. These directions include provenance, security, formal methods, auto-
mated graph comparison, answer set programming and analysis of non-determinism.
These research directions include technology related to the motivation of our
ideas and the design of the automated framework. This information provides a
basic understanding and shows the foundations of this work
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Chapter 3: Manual analysis of basic system-calls This chapter contains the intro-
duction of System-level provenance benchmarking. It includes details presented
in the workshop paper published in TaPP 2017. The context includes the discus-
sion of the preliminary goal and the motivation of the benchmarking approach.
It also discusses the importance of the existence of such a benchmark approach
for the developers of different provenance collecting mechanisms and how the
benchmark may be used in security analysis. Besides, the original idea for unit
testing and expressiveness analysis of the different benchmark will be discussed.
This chapter explains how the idea of benchmarking is built and how it con-
tributes to provenance and system tracing research. Lastly, the need to make this
approach automatic will be discussed.
Chapter 4: Graph isomorphism with answer set programming This chapter intro-
duces property graph comparison by Answer Set Programming (ASP) with the
edit distance approach. This is one of the key research questions to solve before
we can fully automate the benchmarking approach mentioned in the last chapter.
Part of the work has been presented in a workshop paper published in PADL
2020. This chapter illustrates using ASP to support the edit distance and isomor-
phic graph comparison on property graphs, which are the major types of results
generated by provenance recording. The description will stress the importance
of this comparison in the full automation of the benchmarking process. Finally,
the conversion between ASP graph types to other graph types used by different
provenance collecting mechanisms will be discussed. This chapter also shows
some ASP code to solve the isomorphic graph matching problem on attributed
multigraphs, which directly benefit provenance graph comparison and bench-
marking.
Chapter 5: ProvMark: the automated system This chapter includes the description
of ProvMark, which is the automated system for provenance expressiveness
benchmarking. The context includes the discussion of the full system design
and evaluation. It fulfils the needs mentioned in Chapter 3 and demonstrating
the need for the graph comparison approach mentioned in Chapter 4. In addition
to the system design and evaluation, some of the real provenance benchmark ex-
amples and the illustration of each processing subsystem will be included. The
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content of this chapter is organized around ProvMark, the automated system for
provenance benchmarking, which has been presented in the Middleware Con-
ference 2019. Lastly, some limitations of the ProvMark system and possible
extensions of the resulting benchmarks are discussed.
Chapter 6: Non-determinism This chapter discusses how ProvMark extends to bench-
mark non-deterministic events which have closer proximity to real-life applica-
tions. After extending the benchmarking to non-deterministic events, ProvMark
can, in theory, identify the unique patterns for each of the system call activi-
ties, or system call activity sequences (assuming the non-deterministic events
only have limited number of execution combinations). The development and
extension allow ProvMark to generate sets of provenance benchmarks describ-
ing the same activities from a deterministic or non-deterministic program. The
groups of benchmarks can then be compared and analysed to understand the
completeness and correctness of each provenance tool. Also, it can discover
how non-determinism can affect some of the actions in different execution or-
der. This chapter contains the updated implementation of ProvMark to handle
non-deterministic benchmark programs and a more complete evaluation of the
ProvMark system and its result regardless of the determinism of an input pro-
gram.
Chapter 7: Future work and extensions This chapter provides some suggestions of
possible directions extended from this thesis, including those future work pro-
posed but not able to complete within the PhD scope. This includes how to use
the benchmark for pattern discovery in runtime trace for security purposes, or
how to effectively distinguish obfuscation of an event sequence.
Chapter 8: Conclusion This chapter concludes the thesis and summarizes the contri-




This chapter provides a detailed background that describes the foundation for this the-
sis. Section 2.1 provides a summary of the data provenance research and the state of the
art of this area. It includes the usage of provenance and some existing provenance sys-
tems. This knowledge provides a basic foundation and overview of the provenance re-
search, supporting further enhancement and contribution in this direction. Section 2.2
describes some existing security-related research, including analysis, modelling and
intrusion detection. Also, this section summarizes some of the existing provenance
applications in security research. This knowledge aims to motivate the uses of more
unified and structural data provenance. As not all provenance systems are following the
same set of standards, section 2.3 describes some of the formal modellings of prove-
nance. It aims to build up the foundation for self-evaluation of the completeness and
correctness of provenance data. As a result, it helps to describe the activity sequences,
and thus motivates the need to have a uniform way to compare the expressiveness of the
provenance systems. Section 2.4 describes some hard questions on isomorphic graph
comparison in terms of complexity. These questions form the major obstacle on prove-
nance data comparison because most of them use a graph-based description of system
event sequences. Section 2.5 describes some existing algorithms or heuristics to solve
and approximate hard graph comparison questions, which provides a foundation for
the graph comparison component of our automated approach. Finally, section 2.6 de-
scribes non-deterministic execution in runtime activity sequences which may affect the
provenance collection stage. This also poses one of the obstacles we faced.
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2.1 Provenance
2.1.1 Data provenance
Provenance is a broad topic in Information Science. Although it has already been
used in different settings such as databases, distributed web, and business auditing,
there is not yet a general and unified definition and foundation for provenance. So
it is worthwhile to review some of the literature discussing different definitions of
provenance and their semantic characteristics, including the details of how to record
provenance data, what it is used for, how it is kept and what data should be recorded.
Reviewing these ideas around foundations of provenance helps to build some general
understanding of provenance and help to develop ideas on how it can link up with the
research field of information security or formal modelling.
Provenance is a term used in fine art before applying to Computer and Informa-
tion Science. It is mainly used to describe the history, ownership details and other
annotations of some art objects. In the article Buneman et al. [27] dated back to 2000,
the term data provenance is introduced to refer to the tracing and recording process
of information flows and origins in database environments. It is the first publication
to mention the term “data provenance” to describe the data lineage and data flow in
the information science field. Since then, the research community has started to use
the term provenance to refer to electronic metadata which records the information flow
and data origin in different areas, including the semantic web, information auditing,
forensics, etc.
By the late 2000s, there are already many applications of data provenance in the re-
search community. In Ram and Liu [136], the authors summarize a conceptual model,
the W7 model, to represent the seven key components of data provenance. This model
is the first paper defining a general semantics and structure for data provenance. It
considers what data provenance should record to achieve the original purpose of repro-
ducibility and traceability. After that, the two articles Moreau et al. [113] and Cheney
et al. [35] summarize the state of art for provenance research. The two papers concen-
trate on the importance of provenance data in different areas as there are significant
increases in electronic data handling. Many of the traditional businesses transfer their
physical data handling to electronic systems. This increases the importance of prove-
nance data because it acts as a possible solution to keep track of the origin and change
history of the electronic documents and data to provide change logs and to fulfil some
security requirements. Cheney et al. [35] also mention that most of the provenance
2.1. Provenance 15
usage is ad-hoc and it is better to define some formal structure and foundations of
provenance to make it more suitable for the growing environment of information and
data exchange.
Base on the increasing need to understand and develop foundations of provenance,
Moreau [110] summarizes some common applications and definitions of data prove-
nance on the web. The paper gives an overview and foundations of provenance. It
proposes some key properties of data provenance by analysing some of the informal
uses of provenance in the field. It also generalizes the idea and provides an open vision
of how the provenance data should be formalized for use in web environments. The
author also influences and contributes to the development of the famous model for data
provenance, the Open Provenance Model (OPM) [112, 111], which provides a founda-
tion and understanding of provenance. It also provides a general understanding of how
provenance can be used or extended to provide different properties and characteristics
in different areas.
The term provenance was initially introduced to database and data storage environ-
ment to keep track of the change and flow of data. In Cohen et al. [38], they proposed a
formalized way to keep track of the data changes in scientific workflows, which results
in an easy understanding of the data change progress in some intermediate steps. This
article provides us with a better understanding of the foundational usage and the pros
and cons of provenance. In Anand et al. [9] and Chavan et al. [33], they consider prove-
nance in databases with more concentration on the querying and storage of provenance
data, including the versioning of provenance and data. When the database is increasing
in size and complexity, the provenance data recording the trace and workflow becomes
hybrid and nested (recursive) because of increased versioning information for data.
These papers provide an understanding of solutions for querying and storing those re-
lational provenance data to let users have a chance to review the data flow easily by
using some hybrid queries on the provenance.
Apart from database settings, there is also some usage in other areas. For example,
Factor et al. [49] considered the usage of provenance for the long term digital preser-
vation. The authors proposed ways to preserve the provenance and extra information
of some digital data storage in the case that technology, stakeholders, formats, and
communities are all changed on a large scale. The major task is keeping the data un-
derstandable by new groups of people and technology and also to provide trust transfer
from the original owner to the new handler which may not have the chance to meet.
This direction of provenance application is similar to the one used in fine art which tries
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to keep the creator, past owners and many details of the masterpieces to let the current
owner and audience understand it more thoroughly. It also helps to identify possible
ways of extending provenance to security auditing and forensics which need evidence
of traces to prove some sensitive actions occurred or to understand the behaviour of
some sensitive actions. Apart from digital preservation purposes, Pasquier et el. [132]
proposed other applications of data provenance. They suggest using data provenance
for system and firmware auditing which maintains and checks if certain systems or
frameworks fulfil the requirements and guideline. This can help to maintain security
and specific company regulations to protect the company from data leakage, insider
threats or making sure that the company handles data with care and follows the legal
requirements like privacy protection.
2.1.2 Provenance systems and tools
Provenance is a set of meta-data as mentioned above. This setting makes the construc-
tion and simplifying of provenance data essential before we can analyse or process it.
Also, it is not possible to record this information manually by an outsider. For this rea-
son, an automatic tool is required for the recording, transforming and simplifying steps.
One example of such a provenance system is mentioned in Gehani and Tariq [64].
The authors proposed a tool named as SPADE for the collection and simplification of
provenance data. The tools are proposed based on earlier work by Gehani et al. [65]
which shows that policies can help to limit the overhead for collecting and analysing
meta-data that allows reproducibility. This tool monitors the necessary system-calls
and other important system communication data and tries to transform and plot those
collected provenance data as a graph following the Open Provenance Model (OPM).
It runs as a black box in the underlying system and provides a provenance graph de-
scribing the trace and behaviour of the target systems or applications. It is designed
to work in a distributed platform which allows combining and relating the provenance
data collected from different devices.
SPADE mentioned above is just one example of existing provenance systems and
tools. As we mentioned above, there are many developers that design and implement
specific tools and systems for collecting, managing and analysing provenance to sup-
port needs such as process reproduction or tracing events. Herschel et al. [77] provides
a systematic survey of already published or released provenance systems until the pa-
per publication. It provides a landscape comparison for the characteristics of many
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provenance systems in the provenance research communities. They also classify those
provenance systems into different categories based on their storage types, source of
information and result analysing approach. This paper gives an analysis of the state-
of-art of provenance collecting and existing provenance systems and tools. It provides
a basic analysis of the tools and shows that different provenance systems have different
focus and applications. Thus some of them may adopt different sources of information
and resulting provenance format. This survey demonstrates one of the limitations on
comparing and analysing provenance systems as some of the provenance results from
different systems may not be directly comparable because they are following differ-
ent provenance standard. Also, because of the different initiatives, these provenance
systems may collect different subsets of system execution. Because of this, the result
of certain provenance systems may not be suitable to use in other applications. This
finding supports our initiative for the expressiveness benchmarking approach to com-
pare the capabilities of provenance systems and the quality of resulting provenance
data for different applications. It also supports our choice of candidates with different
characteristics as our targets for expressiveness benchmarking.
Data provenance is a broad topic in the research field. In general, the meta-data
format and its characteristics allow users to capture, trace and analyse many activities
and events for different purposes. As mentioned above, the amount of information
involved in system execution is huge, therefore provenance systems always filter in-
formation and only collect what they need. It is sometimes not enough to only control
the information in the collection stage. The storage and querying of provenance data
are also necessary if large amounts of information are needed for some purpose. In this
situation, how to manage the collected provenance information to preserve efficiency
and correctness becomes another important topic, thus some provenance systems con-
centrate on provenance storage mechanisms. Lastly, the analysis of provenance results
may also require great effort and manual tracing of large data sets is non-effective and
error-prone. It is even worse when the data set size is continually increasing. Thus
some provenance analysis tools aim not on collections and storage of provenance but
concentrate on either auto analysis or visualization of results for easier manual analy-
sis. In Pérez et al. [133], the authors give a systematic review of most of the provenance
tools and summary of surveys about provenance and provenance usage. This paper
provides a general overview of the usage of data provenance in the research field.
From the above understanding, we can roughly separate existing provenance sys-
tems into three main groups. The first group is provenance collecting and recording
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tools, which concentrate on the collection, filtering, and recording of provenance in-
formation. These tools generally execute at runtime by monitoring real-time events
and collect and process provenance information at the same time. The source of infor-
mation can vary, depending on the usage of the resulting provenance information. In
general, they also allow some configuration to filter out necessary provenance informa-
tion for further analysis or storage purposes. Some example of this kind of provenance
tools including PASS [117], Hi-Fi [134], SPADE [64], OPUS [17], LPM [20], Inspec-
tor [155] and CamFlow [129], covering a variety of operating systems from Linux
and BSD to Android and Windows. These tools collect provenance at different levels,
some from the user level and some from kernel modules. Most of them allow simple
configuration for filtering and limiting the range of the resulting provenance through
some criteria.
The second group of provenance systems is provenance management systems and
tools which allow easy and efficient management of provenance data including system-
atic storage and fast querying and tracing of information from provenance collected.
In general, these tools have some specific design to allow more efficient handling of
the large amounts of provenance. Some of them are specially designed storage systems
and some of them are libraries that can be added on top of the provenance collecting
system to allow further processing of the provenance outcome from those tools in the
first group. Examples of this group of provenance systems include ProvStore [84],
the first systems developed for storing and publishing provenance information online
following the W3C PROV standard [156], Core Provenance Library (CPL) [102] and
Dataverse [43]. To provide a more standardized and efficient way to allow users to
query and post-process provenance, these tools generally follow some existing prove-
nance standard like PROV-DM [22] under the W3C PROV family [156].
The last group of provenance systems is automatic analysers and visualizers. These
tools are important because manual effort for analysing a large amount of provenance
data is time-consuming and error-prone. Automatic analysis and visualization can
help to automate some of the analysis processes or to visualize provenance as a graph
to allow easier comparison and analysis. Although it is still a rather new research topic
and generating a fully automated analyser is still a future target, these tools already
provide great help in the research field. Some notable system in this field includes
Prov-O-Viz [78] and Orbiter [101]. Some systems are not limited to the usage in the
data provenance field, there include some tools for chemical and biological structure
visualization [67] which also suitable to visualize and analyse provenance data.
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2.1.3 The three candidates
As mentioned in the above sections, the provenance systems can be divided into three
main groups. This work is concentrating on the provenance recording system only,
which are the first group mentioned in the last subsection. These provenance recording
tools are software systems that provide a broad-spectrum recording service, separate
from the monitored applications, and can have their bugs or idiosyncrasies. To rely on
them for critical applications such as reproducible research, compliance monitoring, or
intrusion detection, we need to understand and validate their behaviour. The strongest
form of validation would consist of verifying that the provenance records produced
by a system are accurate representations of the actual execution history of the system.
However, while there is now some work on formalizing operating system kernels, such
as seL4 [89] and HyperKernel [120], there are as yet no complete formal models of
mainstream operating systems such as Linux. Developing such a model seems a pre-
requisite to fully formalize the accuracy, correctness, or completeness of provenance
systems.
This subsection summarizes some background of three of the provenance recording
systems (SPADE [64], OPUS [17], and CamFlow [129]) which have been chosen to
be candidates for testing our system. Table 2.1 shows the version number for the three
provenance systems that we are using in this work. There exist some newer versions
of the provenance systems that may behave differently because all the three tools are
still expanding and updating after our work has been summarized.
Provenance System Version Number
SPADE v2 (Git tag tc-e3)
OPUS v0.1.0.26 (For Unix)
CamFlow v0.4.5 (dnf 0.7.6-1)
Table 2.1: Version of Provenance Systems
SPADE’s intended use is synthesizing provenance from machines in a distributed
system, so it emphasizes relationships between processes and digital objects across dis-
tributed hosts. Our analysis uses SPADEv2 (tag tc-e3) with the Linux Audit recorder [70],
which constructs a provenance graph using information from the Linux audit system
(including the Audit service, daemon, and dispatcher). In addition to the Linux Audit
recorder, there are also multiple sources of information supported by SPADE, such
as Strace reporter that monitors interactions between processes and kernels, Linux
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Fuse reporter monitors operations on the file system and LLVM reporter monitors the
compilation process. All of these reporters are presented as modules and SPADE al-
lows switching modules to support provenance collection from different sources. We
choose to use the Linux Audit recorder which provides detailed and thorough informa-
tion about all the event and process interactions. SPADE runs primarily in user space
and provides several alternative configurations, including filtering and transforming
the data, for example, to enable versioning or finer-grained tracking of I/O or network
events, or to make use of information in procfs to obtain information about processes
that were started before SPADE.
As discussed, SPADE provides multiple ways to record provenance by treating dif-
ferent reporters as modules. The modularization of SPADE is not only limited to the
reporters. SPADE also allows inserting other types of modules including filters, trans-
formers or storage handlers. All of these modules affect the processing of SPADE and
allow users to choose their combinations to meet their needs for collecting provenance.
Users can also write custom modules for some specific applications such as targeting
sources of information to a certain range or outputting the provenance in a customized
format. But in this work, we are using the baseline configuration to demonstrate and
test our automated benchmarking, so the resulting benchmark of provenance gener-
ated by SPADE should only represent the baseline of SPADE and the behaviour may
be different if other modules are chosen in the SPADE configuration.
OPUS focuses on file system operations, attempting to abstract such operations
and make the provenance collection process portable. There are two versions of OPUS
which collect provenance from two different sources. For older version of OPUS,
it works in the user level only. It wraps standard C library calls and adds activities to
record the call before following the general library execution flow. Most C library calls
perform a combination of kernel system-calls. The developers of OPUS have mapped
most of the C library calls to system-call combinations, based on the PVM model1,2.
When a C library call passes through the additional provenance collection layer, OPUS
can record the corresponding system-calls in the resulting provenance graph without
the need to monitor the underlying kernel operations. OPUS makes use of the ability
offered in some operating systems (such as Linux) to alter the dynamic library linking
process (i.e. LD PRELOAD), which overrides the Global Offset Table (GOT) in the binary




the original call untouched and unaltered. It only provides an additional layer to record
information of the original call before passing it to the lower level. Thus, in a sense,
the additional layer acts as a ‘man in the middle’ able to intercept C library calls and
pass on the requests to the original library. Because it needs to wrap around libraries
and make use of the dynamic library linking process to hook those wrapped libraries to
binaries, it will not work on statically linked binaries which skip the dynamic library
linking process.
The authors and developers of OPUS discussed the advantages and disadvantages
of collecting provenance through system and library call interception in a later publica-
tion [16]. Although it is lightweight to collect provenance in the user-space because no
additional privileges are needed, it also introduces vulnerabilities for adversaries. One
of the big disadvantages the authors mentioned is that adversaries have the same level
of privilege to alter the provenance information and the target binaries. This makes
the provenance information less useful in a security perspective because an attacker
can alter both the binaries and the provenance information to hide its existence. In this
kind of situation, to show the existence of the adversaries, the provenance itself needs
to be secured and separated from the target execution. They first propose the use of
sandboxing for the separation. Later, they develop a new version of OPUS that uses a
different source of information for provenance collection. In the new version of OPUS,
the intrusive way for provenance collection is dropped. Instead, it relies on the kernel
module dtrace for collecting provenance information. This new version makes OPUS
source information directly in the kernel and allow it to work under both statically and
dynamically linked binaries.
The newer version of OPUS is only released after the major work of this thesis
has been completed. Thus, all of the experiments and work presented in later chapters
are based on the old version which collects provenance from the extra layers inserted
in wrapped C libraries. The OPUS system is especially concerned with versioning
support and proposes a Provenance Versioning Model, analogous to models previously
introduced in the context of PASS [116] and later SPADE [65].
CamFlow’s emphasis is sustainability through modularity, interfacing with the ker-
nel via the Linux Security Module (LSM). The LSM hooks capture provenance, but
then dispatch it to userspace, via relayfs [164] (a module relaying collected prove-
nance from LSM hooks to the CamFlow daemon running in user space), for further
processing. It strives for completeness and has its root in Information Flow Control
systems [131]. By default, CamFlow captures all system activity visible to LSM and
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relates different executions to form a single provenance graph; as we shall see, this
leads to some complications for repeatable benchmarking. SPADE can also be con-
figured to support similar behaviour, while CamFlow can also be used as a reporter
module for SPADE. Compared to SPADE and OPUS, which both run primarily in user
space, CamFlow [129] monitors activity and generates the provenance graph from in-
side the kernel, via LSM and NetFilter hooks. This means the correctness of the prove-
nance data depends on the LSM operation. As the rules are set directly on the LSM
hooks themselves, which are already intended to monitor all security-sensitive opera-
tions, CamFlow can monitor and/or record all sensitive operations. CamFlow allows
users to set filtering rules when collecting provenance. CamFlow falls into the ob-
served provenance [25] category, incurs minimal overhead and is not intrusive to any
userspace object and linking like OPUS is. CamFlow’s provenance capture does not
require trust in user space applications like SPADE trusting on the Audit Daemon, and
therefore provides stronger security guarantees. The provenance captured in the kernel
is made available to user-space applications through relayfs [164] pseudo files. The
default CamFlow installation comes with camflowd, a service that performs serialisa-
tion to a W3C PROV format (PROV-JSON), and other services can be implemented,
for example, to perform intrusion detection [73].
2.2 Provenance and security
2.2.1 Security analysis and intrusion detection
One of the objectives of this work is to provide new alternatives for security analysis
and intrusion detection. Thus, it is necessary to go through some of the work that has
been done in this direction and also summarizes the state of the art for this security re-
search to provide an overview and understanding how provenance can help in security
analysis. Besides, it also presents overviews on how we could identify if provenance
generated by these provenance systems is sufficient for security usage. In the book
Chess and West [36], the authors summarize foundational requirements for security
property analysis, which gives a broad overview of the target for this research field.
Security analysis is an important research topic. Researchers are working on dif-
ferent parts of the analysis. Some of them try to analyse the problems in existing
security mechanisms. Some of them try to analyse the properties, behaviours, and
characteristics of adversaries, such as hackers or malware attack patterns. Some of the
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researchers even concentrate on analysing malicious behaviour at a lower level, such
as kernel analysis. Some of these research directions relate to patterns and behaviours,
which is similar to the reproducibility, traceability and accountability properties that
are provided by provenance. This shows the need to study some of the existing security
analyses to understand the pros and cons of existing methods.
Providing security to different systems is not an easy task. Research in this direc-
tion is an ongoing work. In Sabelfeld and Myers [146], the authors provide a survey
on the security challenges and existing solutions for information flow policies. They
also discuss the problems and open challenges on using language-based information
flow policies to secure the end-to-end communications and provide assurance on top of
some security properties like confidentiality. Nowadays, systems are starting to rely on
some of the cloud services, like distributed systems and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS)
consideration. In Ali et al. [5], the author studies the security challenges and vulner-
abilities in the cloud platform, together with some existing security measures and the
problems on those measures. These surveys and summary provide a brief explanation
on some early security analysis and intrusion detection work before adopting prove-
nance to security analysis and further help justifying the need for an alternative way
for security research with provenance support.
One of the goals of this work is to vet the existence of certain malicious or sensitive
behaviour and trace its accountable parties under different circumstances. Adversaries
are always enhancing the technique in the war between security defenders. They con-
tinue to develop malware with different kind of evasion and obfuscation techniques,
trying to get past the security boundaries. Thus studying some of the existing malware
can help to consolidate possible defences and come up with ideas on how to discover
their existence and provide evidence for later forensic usage. By studying the attack
patterns and techniques of malware, it helps to provide understanding on which spe-
cific actions or activity sequences should be noticed in the security analysis. In You
and Kim [163], Marpaung et al. [104] and Saeed et al. [147], the authors summarize
some of the popular attack and evasion techniques used by certain malware to avoid
being noticed by users. This knowledge also provides a reason for using provenance in
vetting malicious and obfuscated actions and tracing the initiator and accountable par-
ties. The main reason for that is provenance information traces all the changes back to
the originator and some obfuscation in the middle is also included in the activity trace
and will not stop or affect what is already recorded. Also, linkage of activities and
actions are still preserved to allow reproducibility and traceability, thus it once again
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provides a rationale for introducing provenance into security analysis as an alternative.
Lastly, the study of the state of the art for existing malware and security analysis
research provides an understanding of the pros and cons of current approaches. This
helps to motivate why this work proposes a way for users to analyse which provenance
systems can help in security analysis, chain of evidence generation and accountability
tracing. One of the hard problems in the analysis and discovery of malware or mali-
cious action is how to determine if a certain action is malicious. In Yan and Yin [161],
Nari and Ghorbani [119] and Egele et al. [48], the authors summarize different kinds
of identification and analysis that discover malicious actions and identify malware in
different platforms. They analyse and summarize the identification methods for com-
mon malicious actions and provide a set of attack patterns and signatures for further
analysis and identification. The suggestion of using provenance to vet malicious ac-
tivities and trace their initiator is an example of behavioural pattern matching through
some machine learning techniques.
There are also some other automated malware analysis approaches using the same
technique but are not obtaining the patterns from provenance. They instead obtain and
learn the patterns by other means. In Forrest et al. [52], the authors introduce an ap-
proach to source information from the audit stream to generate a database of normal
system call activities. Then they use those normal records for abnormal activities and
intrusion detection purposes. Later paper Wager and Soto [157] studies a very similar
approach and point out that the short time window is a big limitation for doing real-
time abnormal and intrusion detection as the introspection with the normal behaviour
may not process fast enough in the short time required by a real-time intrusion detec-
tion system. These approach analyses use certain intermediate data storage to anal-
yse live stream data which may be enhanced by provenance-based intrusion detection
which has better management of data and information flow to allow efficient analysis
of the stream for abnormal behaviour. This supports the need and reasoning for us-
ing provenance-based intrusion and abnormal detection. On the other hand, Firdausi
et al. [51] analyse some of the machine learning techniques for behavioural pattern
matching malware detection and compare different techniques and sources of informa-
tion for this approach. They claimed that most of the existing approaches have a high
rate in detecting malware, but they did not mention providing a chain of evidence to
prove the existence of attacks nor the trace for accountable parties and initiators of such
attacks or malware. Thus it left a gap for us to present provenance as an alternative
way for accountability and traceability purposes.
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With different existing machine learning techniques and behavioural analyses, there
are some automated systems for malware analysis, identification, and classification. In
Aafer et al. [1], they propose a machine learning approach on the Java API running on
top of Java virtual machine, while Isohara et al. [85] propose a kernel-level analysis
which does machine learning and behaviour pattern matching on low-level activities
in the kernel. In Mohaisen et al. [108], the authors propose a full system named as
AMAL that consists of two components that use automated behavioural analysis to
identify malware and label it for further investigation and classification later. Their
system generates the behavioural patterns for malware by comparing malware sample
binaries in the same family and deduce similar patterns by binary analysis. Apart from
obtaining behavioural patterns of malware by static comparison of binaries, Reina et
al. [140] and Hay et al. [76] propose alternative ways to obtain the behavioural patterns.
They suggest monitoring the system-calls and process communications to receive in-
formation about the behaviour patterns of certain malicious action sequences. These
patterns are deduced by real malware execution in sandboxes. Summarizing most of
the analysis research of malware, there is already much research providing a very high
accuracy on identifying the existence of malware or a piece of malicious code. There
is less research considering the chain of evidence and tracing for accountability, which
again provides motivation for using provenance to support this work and thus initiat-
ing the need to benchmark the provenance system to identify which of them are more
suitable for this job, which is the main contribution of this work.
2.2.2 Security application of provenance
Data provenance is useful in collecting meta-data from runtime execution for repro-
ducibility and traceability purposes. These characteristics are useful for debugging
and incident handling. As one of the motivations for this work, we want to find a way
to identify the existence of certain activity sequences at runtime and to provide a chain
of evidence for them and identify the accountable parties for the sequences. In recent
years, researchers have started to make use of data provenance in aid of protection and
analysis of security properties on different platforms, especially in traditional systems,
distributed and mobile environments. In general, data provenance can help to identify
the existence of certain malicious actions, providing referencing patterns for certain
actions for later static and dynamic analysis and also detecting integrity violations of
underlying data by recording all alterations of the data and related accountable par-
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ties for that actions. In some cases, the provenance of provenance information may
be required to ensure the integrity of the underlying provenance describing runtime
executions.
Existing papers in recent years start to consider adopting data provenance into the
above-mentioned security related usage. King and Chen [88] is one of the first papers
mentioning the use of the provenance-based approach for security and intrusion de-
tection. They propose a tool named BackTracker to automatically read the sequences
of system call activities and detect an abnormal sequence of activities. Although they
did not mention the term provenance directly, their application of those system call
sequences can be classified as a kind of provenance information which make their ap-
proach as one of the early research and foundation on provenance-based security. Later
in Husted et al. [82], the authors consider using provenance on the developer side as a
debugging reference for some security features. They propose additional actions in the
mobile application profiling process to collect traces describing the system resource
usage and accountable parties. This information assists the developer to identify mis-
use of system-calls that may open memory leakage, disorders or security loopholes for
other adversaries. In Backes et al. [46] and Dietz et al. [15], the authors consider using
provenance to replace the faulty Android Binder in handling permission decisions for
inter-component communications. In older versions of Android, the Android Binder
just recorded the caller of certain actions and thus can only verify if this caller is per-
mitted for certain sensitive action. If this call is instead initiated by adversaries through
a privileged caller, the security is broken. Introducing provenance in this scenario al-
lows Android Binder to trace back to the initiator of certain actions to avoid privilege
transfer through a faulty Android Binder. In Yang et al. [162], the authors first provided
a provenance pattern library that contains mappings between provenance patterns and
their related sensitive actions and system-calls in the kernel. They also proposed an
automated system that collects provenance patterns from a target mobile application
and uses static analysis to determine if it contains any pre-identified sensitive actions
by comparing the pattern of the mobile application with the library.
The use of data provenance for security is not limited to the mobile platform. There
are also applications in general operating systems. For example, in Han et al. [72], the
authors suggested using data provenance to detect application anomalies and to per-
form intrusion detection. Their system makes use of data provenance information to
model and records legitimate provenance patterns by executing some assumed normal
training examples of activity sequences. Then these legitimate models are used as a
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control to compare unknown executions to detect abnormal actions. This is an example
of data provenance usage on security or fault detection over cloud service platforms.
Similar concepts for intrusion detection in other platforms using data provenance have
been discussed by the same author in Han et al. [73] which also emphasize the chal-
lenges for such an approach. Authors of Hassan et al. [75] also suggested some anal-
ysis of provenance information for malicious action detection and auditing purposes.
They suggest adopting the Deterministic Finite Automata (DFA) approach to build-up
models for legitimate and malicious activities for later process. The authors continue
to work on this approach and build up a tool NoDoze [74] to generate abnormal scores
for the build-up provenance models on abnormal activities. This approach makes use
of a novel network diffusions model and aims to decrease false alarm rate for filtering
out similar but normal activities sequences. This help to decrease the overhead for
abnormality detection. Besides, authors of Berrada and Cheney [24] suggests some
ranking techniques for identifying provenance graphs which are better in describing
the abnormality, which also helps to increase the performance for malicious action de-
tection. In later publication Han et al. [71], the authors introduce a tool UNICORN for
Advanced Persistent Threats which are difficult to detect because of its minimized and
slow attack patterns that are possible to span over a long period. Some existing sys-
tem may already run out of memory and execution time before the full attack has been
completed. The authors adopt a graph sketching technique with the support of a novel
modelling approach to aid the runtime discovery of these attacks with high accuracy
and performance. Comparatively, earlier literature Manzoor et al. [103] also suggests
another kind of heterogeneous graph steaming to allow fast and memory-efficient ab-
normality detection for advanced persistent threats. Their proposed tool SteamSpot are
mostly concerning in the analysis of heterogeneous graphs by introducing a new simi-
larity function to vet the existence of certain low and slow abnormality, their approach
is to discover possibly abnormality offline rather than the Han et al. [71] runtime detec-
tion approach. Also, the literature Milajerdi et al. [107] also suggests a tool HOLMES
for real-time advance persistent threats detection. They use another approach by gen-
erating a simplified digital signal to represent activities happening in real-time and
compare suspicious information flows with known threats signal to discover possible
abnormal information flow with close correlation to the known malicious flow. To aid
the analysts, their tool can also generate high-level graphs summarizing the malicious
flow of activities. The above-mentioned intrusion detection and advance persistent
threats discovery make use of different kind of provenance graphs for history and ac-
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tivity flow tracking for security analysis and intrusion detection purposes. They sum-
marize the state-of-the-art of recent research on provenance-based intrusion detection
and security analysis.
In Tan et al. [153], the authors discuss the need for complete and fool-proof prove-
nance if it is used in systems and network security. They derive a set of minimal
requirements for identifying the existence of security problems and to trace account-
able parties across a distributed environment. It is an important consideration in the
security and forensics field which needs a complete chain of evidence for some inci-
dents and all accountable parties for some security violations. From the viewpoint of
security incident handling and forensics, it is important to keep the whole trace from
the initiator to the actual point of security violation as any broken steps in the evidence
could fail to prove the accountability of certain parties in court or act as a model in-
trusion detection source for future attacks. In Alrajeh et al. [7], the authors provide
minimum evidence preservation requirements for further digital forensic investigation.
The requirements consider what data should be collected for such purposes in both a
local and distributed environment. This can be translated to requirements for the data
provenance for forensic and security usage. The usage of data provenance can apply to
security settings and provide evidence in digital forensic investigation. More examples
for providing reference and evidence traces for auditing and forensic usage are sum-
marized in Wang and Daniels [158], Pasquale et al. [128] and Zhu et al. [166] which
also show that the traceability, dependability and reproducibility characteristics of data
provenance can greatly support forensic usage by providing a chain of evidence and
accountable tracing functionality. In Zhou et al. [165] and Lee et al. [93], the authors
also summarized some uses of data provenance for tracing what has happened and who
is accountable for certain actions in a network and distributed environment. Anderson
and Cheney [10] propose the use of data provenance to ensure the correctness and com-
pleteness of configuration languages across distributed platforms. As configuration
languages are used for mass configuration of many machines and components across a
distributed platform, there exists a chance that the configuration fails or errors in some
of the hosts. These problems may lead to broken access control or opening security
problems in separate hosts. The authors propose using data provenance to query and
validate the configuration process in the hosts to ensure correctness and completeness
of the process. This may limit the security problems resulting from accidental miscon-
figurations. As a whole, these papers show how data provenance helps to answer and
prove what is happening in runtime across the network and distributed environments,
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to find potential problems and provide a chain of evidence for the existence of certain
events, together with the accountable parties of certain events.
There are some other security applications making use of data provenance. In Bates
et al. [18] and Ramane et al. [137] the authors proposed using data provenance as a pol-
icy for access control purposes in cloud environments. They build up policies of legit-
imate actions and user data access using provenance. These policies match the actions
of the user to identify abnormal behaviour, enforce access control, and deny abnormal
behaviour. It also asks users to provide a provenance trace of an action signed by an
authority before completing the actions. The authorities are responsible to verify if the
activity sequences recorded by the provenance information are legitimate following the
predefined policies and sign it only if those actions are allowed. This can help provide
policy-based access control through signature verification on signed provenance infor-
mation. In this case, data provenance is used as part of a digital certificate for access
control or data usage purposes. Thus, the security of provenance itself also needs to be
protected to ensure the integrity of the whole access control model. These applications
treat provenance as a kind of secure token and policies for protecting security in the
underlying layers.
2.2.3 Provenance for algorithm validation
One of the initiatives of this work is to provide the chain of evidence and accountability
tracing for forensic and auditing applications. In the research field for digital forensics,
different researchers have proposed different kind of approaches and algorithms to re-
trieve activities trace and runtime properties from the operating system. To make use of
those retrieved information for forensic and audit usage, those data are required to be
complete and correct to main the validity and authority of the chain of evidence. As the
full trace of runtime activities and all its related properties and meta-data is very large
in size and may include a lot of non-related information, a certain level of abstraction
and optimization is required to retrieve the necessary information for the application.
Provenance post-processing by some of the provenance system may help in the re-
duction of information by capturing only necessary information from a specific source
like the Linux Audit System. Other provenance systems may do some optimization
and reduction on the information retrieved and generate provenance graphs to tell the
story of runtime execution sessions. One of our initiatives is to provide a comparison
of provenance generated by different provenance system in terms of completeness and
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correctness, it is also possible to compare the result processed by different optimization
and reduction algorithm which is used for handling of large scale provenance informa-
tion and system information. These provenance and system information may be used
for forensic and audit application which requires a certain level of completeness and
correctness, or in other words, unambiguous and accurate data for further forensic pur-
pose. In this subsection, we are summarizing certain algorithms and techniques that
are used for provenance and system information optimization and reduction that are
requiring completeness and correctness validity and act as a possible target user group
for the work done in this thesis.
System-level audit logs system like Linux Audit System captures the interaction
between applications, communication channels and the runtime environment. It pro-
vides a good source of information for both provenance tracking and forensic auditing
because it could help to trace the accountable parties and the root cause of certain
activity sequences. By analysing its integrity, it is also possible to discover possible
removal and coverage of malicious activities which the adversaries purposely remove
certain log record to cover their traces. One of the common problems for the direct
analysis of the audit log has been mentioned above, that is the sheer size of log record
generated. It can go up to Gigabytes per day for a busy system. To reduce the amount
of size, certain provenance system configures some filters and choose only part of
the information for provenance generation. Indeed, the operating system itself has also
consist of certain garbage collection features to remove the oldest record to save spaces
for new log records. The garbage collection may remove certain old records and may
reduce the backtrace period of historic events. In Lee et al. [94], the authors proposed
LogGC, an audit log system with special garbage collection service which improves
the effectiveness of the audit system by minimizing certain log record to allow more
space for newer record and increase the length validity of the log record. This allows
possible audit log user to have the ability to trace back to more historic execution trace
for forensics and security analysis purposes. Their approach makes use of certain data
reduction by analysing certain false dependencies in the system calls relationship. This
is a kind of practical application of certain big data reduction techniques.
In later literature Xu et al. [160], Tang et al. [154], Ben et al. [23] and Hossain et
al. [80], the authors also propose certain algorithms to reduce the size of the big data
such as audit logs and system information traces for forensics and security analysis.
The authors of Xu et al. [160] proposes an aggregation algorithm to preserve data de-
pendency during the aggressive data reduction process. They claim that their approach
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can significantly reduce the size of the data log records while preserving high-quality
forensics values. The authors of Tang et al. [154] proposes a different approach by us-
ing access pattern templates to identify certain data for removal to reduce the data size.
Their template is built to identify some patterns which are unrelated to certain sensi-
tive activities. They combine their findings of the template-based data reduction and
propose a NodeMerge tool for the automation of the process. Nonetheless, the authors
of Ben et al. [23] proposes a tool T-Tracker which compress the audit log for intru-
sion detection. With an assumption that all intrusion is coming from external sources,
the T-Tracker builds up a taint model with all external communicating activities and
system calls. Then it follows the path of execution from those sources to extend the
taint model. In theory, when the whole taint model is built, all activities related to the
external source should be covered and those are the only audit log to be analysed for
the intrusion detection process. Thus the remaining activities audit log is considered
as unrelated and removed to reduce the size of audit logs for analysis. This approach
aims to reduce the size of the target audit log needed to be analysed by filtering out
mostly unrelated audit log. Lastly, the authors of Hossain et al. [80] formalize the
notion for data reduction while preserving data dependency. Their formalization pro-
vides certain proves for their novel algorithms to optimize and reduce the size of the
audit log. The above approaches introduce different kinds of data reduction algorithms
and techniques to allow better performance and larger data storage size for audit log
system. As these approaches have done certain post-process to the raw audit data, vali-
dation may be required before trusting the result information for forensics and security
analysis which require high-quality data.
In addition to certain reductions on the audit log records generated by the operating
system audit system, there are also other ways to limit the size and overhead of the
audit log record. Ma et al. [99] proposes an in-kernel log reduction system that aims
to reduce redundant events and log record generated by the audit system. It makes use
of a multi kernel-layer caching scheme to reduce the overhead of log transferring and
processing activities, it also makes use of the cache to reduce the need for certain cache
writing processes. Their cache system reduces the storage and runtime overhead as a
whole for the audit system and its related process. The authors of Milajerdi et al. [107]
use a different approach to optimize the information flow record by generating high-
level graphs to summarise adversaries action. Their approach aims to decrease the false
alarm rate by reducing and ignoring some of the redundant events by comparing each
event flow with a correlation of known adversary activity flow patterns. This approach
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aims to decrease the false-positive rate of similar activity flow, it also decreases the
need to handle large amounts of similar but unrelated false events.
Besides the direct handling of the system audit logging features, there are also some
researchers working on the use of provenance for the handling of large storage and ex-
ecution overhead of audit log recording process. In Hassan et al. [75], the authors
propose the tool Winnower that aims to eliminate the needs to transfer redundant audit
log generated from different hosts across a distributed environment. They make use
of provenance graphs to describe communications and other related data of individual
nodes and generate a behaviour model of the host by a novel grammatical inference
learning technique to reduce the size and overhead of information between distributed
hosts and the central monitoring unit. The central monitoring unit can interpret those
grammatical inferences back into a provenance graph and generate a full provenance
graph describing different host activities. This approach helps to decrease the need
for large audit log record transfer between distributed hosts. On the contrary, the au-
thor of Bates et al. [19] introduces a notion of minimal completeness and implements
a system with this property by exclusively collecting provenance for a target applica-
tion. They apply a policy-based provenance filtering to allow the exclusive collection
of provenance. Their approach aims to identify and isolate sub-domains to limit the
provenance collection to the domains of the target application which allows limiting
unrelated information of a target application. This approach can help to reduce the
size of the provenance generated for analysis and maintain the completeness of the
provenance data for a certain additional application like forensics auditing. Lastly,
Ma et al. [100] propose a tool ProTracer which also aims to reduce space and run-
time overhead of the audit log and provenance tracing activities. Their tool ProTracer
works as a lightweight provenance tracing system that alternate between the audit log-
ging processes and the unit level taint propagation. It will help limit the number of
audit logging processes needed by studying the actual tainting propagation and only
record system log following the propagation and ignore other non-related log record-
ings. This kind of audit logging reduction reduces the size and runtime overhead of
audit logging system and still preserve the record of the tainted activities relating the
adversary attacks and possible intrusion activities.
The above-mentioned literature is some state-of-art algorithms and techniques that
aim to reduce and optimize the audit log recording processes to reduce the overhead
in storage size and execution time. These approaches do need a certain level of valida-
tion and evaluation because they modify the original audit log system or the raw data
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generated by them. The validation and evaluation are mainly used to preserve the high
quality of data, in terms of the completeness and correctness of the data in describing
the real system activities. These requirements of high quality of data are necessary if
that information is used for forensics or security analysis which require a high level of
quality and chain of evidence. The possible provenance benchmarking approach pro-
posed in this thesis can provide help in the validation and comparison of the quality of
those data, which make those optimization and reduction approach become potential
users of our approach.
2.3 Provenance and formal model
2.3.1 Formal modelling
Process calculus is a formal modelling approach commonly used in data science, pro-
gramming language and systems research. It provides an automated symbolic way to
define process communication and message or resources exchange in a concurrent or
distributed environment. When we are mostly concentrating on provenance systems
that are working in different operating systems with many process communications, it
fulfils the characteristics of process calculus that make it a suitable formal modelling
approach in analysing the behaviour of systems, which is one of the major purposes
of most of the provenance systems that we are concerned with. Besides, formal mod-
elling provides references for analysing and verifying if certain security requirements
have been enforced in different systems and environment. This additional use provides
an alternative for security analysis and testing statically.
The book Sangiorgi and Walker [148] summarizes the method and transformation
from raw system behaviour of mobile platforms to a formal modelling language. It
also provides some foundational semantic definitions of different scenarios and some
reasoning and verification technique on the language. This can help to provide formal
modelling on applications and binaries for security analysis. The analysis includes
identifying and discovering of target malicious actions by comparing malicious pat-
terns in process calculus with new execution provenance trace. Also, it helps to iden-
tify and trace the accountable parties of some target actions. More examples can be
found in Chaudhuri [32], Shin et al. [149] and Armando et al. [11] in which the authors
make use of formal modelling on the mobile platform (especially Android) to formally
define the security properties and working behaviour of some of the components, in-
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cluding security sandbox, Android Security Framework, and manifest privilege han-
dling mechanisms. These formal models help to provide a basis for static analysis on
the mobile platforms to determine if possible security violations or loopholes exist and
if some sensitive or malicious actions can pass without notice.
Process calculus is also a major approach used for the formal modelling of system
behaviour in a distributed and cloud environment. Reviewing works of literature in
this topic can provide a foundational understanding of process calculus. It also helps
to summarize what qualities are needed for provenance information uses in different
purpose which provides a reference for the analysing criteria for the expressiveness
benchmarking of the provenance information and the provenance systems working in
the background.
2.3.2 Formal modelling of provenance
The main direction of our research concentrates on the foundations of provenance and
the analysis and comparison of provenance to determine if some provenance tools are
suitable for a specific task, especially in security analysis and intrusion detection which
requires completeness and correctness of data provenance. This part describes some
existing formal modelling of provenance which helps to consolidate the needed criteria
for deciding if the provenance and the provenance systems are suitable for security
usage. It also helps to understand how some properties of the resulting provenance can
be analysed formally in the resulting benchmark and self-evaluation of the result.
Zhou et al. [165] proposed a formal modelling technique for provenance to explain
the trace of data changes in a network environment, or in other words, why the data
is in its current state and what process the data has gone through to reach the current
state. In this case, the provenance is used as evidence for the data alteration history
in a network environment with adversaries. So the integrity of the provenance needs
to be secured to provide a correct trace to explain the needed information about the
data. This is a good example of how formal modelling techniques can help to protect
the security properties of provenance itself to prove some security properties of data
traces.
While Zhou et al. [165] proposed a formal modelling technique for provenance
data in a real network environment, their work shows the need for a formal modelling
and reasoning technique to prove the security properties of the provenance data itself,
because of the benefit provided by a correct trace of provenance, and also because of
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the possible leakage of original data or information through provenance, which is the
privacy issue.
Cheney [34] and Acar et al. [4] propose a different formal framework and mod-
elling technique for provenance data. They are aiming to use mathematical approaches
to prove some security properties of the provenance data, like partial confidentiality
and availability to check if the provenance data leaks some secret information about
the original data, or hides some public data that should be available. This direction
defines a better understanding and consolidation of meaningful provenance-tracking
mechanisms which may help to formalize what, where and how the provenance should
be recorded and what security properties are needed for protecting provenance in dif-
ferent situations. Also, the mathematical approach helps to provide ways to formally
analyse if the mechanisms are good enough to record provenance data correctly and se-
curely for further use, without raising new security problems. Before these two papers,
Souilah et al. [151] also provides a formal model of provenance for distributed sys-
tems. This approach uses Pi-calculus as the base to understand and analyse the system
data flow with a formal tracking semantics. It aims to ensure and prove that all data
changes and data flows have been recorded for all computational processes, includ-
ing communication among distributed servers. This literature describes and illustrates
some semantic properties of provenance data which help to build up understanding and
formal foundations of provenance used later in the research community.
2.4 Graph comparison
As mentioned above, provenance is a kind of meta-data to record how the current state
of the systems or files was reached and who is responsible for it. It records all the in-
formation about actions and actors throughout the execution period and allows a user
to trace back what is happening and who is responsible for certain runtime activities.
As provenance allows reproducibility and traceability of the execution, the order of
the execution trace events must be presented. The most suitable way to describe this
information with precedence and order requirement is using a directed graph with at-
tribution. That is also the reason why most of the provenance systems support graph
representations for the provenance results. Graph representations of provenance infor-
mation not only allows preserving event order and properties, but it also allows easy
interpretations by users. These graphs show and link the orders of events and actors’
attributes by directed edges between nodes which represent the state of certain files or
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processes. As graphs are an important representation for provenance, we need to have
some understanding of basic graph matching and comparison. We want to match and
compare provenance graphs generated by different provenance systems to benchmark
the expressiveness of the system itself and the provenance generated by these systems.
This subsection aims to study some existing graph comparison problems and algo-
rithms that can be used or extended in the expressiveness benchmarking of provenance
and their generating systems.
2.4.1 Definition of graph isomorphism problems
In most operating systems, if we start executing some of the binaries, there are always
some kernel activities done before and after the target executions which may or may
not be related to the binaries or applications. In most cases, provenance systems do
not have the ability to cleanly identify a portion of a process execution which refers
to non-related activities from the activities of the target executions. These non-related
activities may be related to certain preparation and clean-up work is done before and
after the target activities by the same process. Thus graph comparison can be applied to
filter out those non-related activities to avoid obfuscating the target execution patterns.
Another important use of provenance graph comparisons is to identify similarities and
differences among the generated provenance graphs. This can help to debug and profile
the provenance systems which generate the graphs. Also, it can help to understand the
capabilities of the provenance systems for different applications. Besides, we may also
classify and cluster the systems with similar capabilities by clustering their generated
graphs. The classification and clustering are also based on the similarity of the graph
which is also related to graph comparison problems. In general, these problems consist
of matching and comparing graphs with partially similar structure, which is named as
(sub)graph isomorphism matching and comparing problem.
For most provenance systems, the generated provenance graph is a directed multi-
graph which allows multiple directed edges from the same source and destination ver-
texes. This allows the provenance system to efficiently represents continuing com-
munication between processes or artefacts. All the graphs discussed in this thesis is
assumed to be a multigraph unless otherwise specified. Also, there is a label for each
vertex and edge to identify the type of items that the graph elements represent. In gen-
eral, the vertexes and edges in a directed multigraph are identified by a set of unique
identifiers and labels. The definition of a simple directed multigraph is shown below.
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If G is a simple directed multigraph, then
G = (V,E,src, tgt, lab) satisfying:
– V is the set of vertex identifiers of G
– E is the set of edge identifiers of G
– V ∩E = /0
– src : E→V is a function identifying the source vertex of each edge
– tgt : E→V is a function identifying the destination vertex of each edge
– lab : V ∪E→ Σ is a function assigning each vertex/edge a label from some set Σ
The concept of isomorphic (sub)graph relationships for simple directed multigraphs
forms the base for our need to compare and match provenance graphs. Two examples
for illustrating the isomorphic definition are shown in Figure 2.1. Figure 2.1a contains
an isomorphic multigraph pair and Figure 2.1b contains a pair of directed multigraphs
with isomorphic sub-graph relationship. The matching node set of the two graphs in
both figures are shown in Table 2.2. The non-matching node on graph H of Figure 2.1b
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(b) Isomorphic sub-graph pair
Figure 2.1: Example of a pair of isomorphic (sub)graph
Graph G Node A B C D
Graph H Node 2 1 3 4
Table 2.2: Mapping node set of Graph G and Graph H in Figure 2.1
In general, the graph isomorphic relationship of two simple directed multigraphs
can be defined as follows.
Let G and H be two simple directed multigraphs.
G = (VG,EG,srcG, tgtG, labG)
H = (VH ,EH ,srcH , tgtH , labH)
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If G and H is an isomorphic pair, represented by G∼= H,
then there is two bijection functions f and g where
f : VG→VH and g : EG→ EH such that
– ∀v∈VG labH( f (v)) = labG(v)
– ∀e∈EG labH(g(e)) = labG(e)
– ∀e∈EGsrcH(g(e)) = f (srcG(e))
– ∀e∈EGtgtH(g(e)) = f (tgtG(e))
Apart from the general graph isomorphism relationship, the sub-graph isomorphism
relationship can be defined as follows.
Let G and H be two simple directed multigraphs.
G = (VG,EG,srcG, tgtG, labG)
H = (VH ,EH ,srcH , tgtH , labH)
If G and H contain isomorphic sub-graph relationship, represent by G . H then
G∼= H ′ satisfying:
– H ′ = (VH ′ ,EH ′ ,srcH ′ , tgtH ′ , labH ′)
– VH ′ ⊆VH
– EH ′ ⊆ EH
– ∀e∈EH′ ,srcH′∈VH′ srcH ′(e) = srcH(e)
– ∀e∈EH′ ,tgtH′∈VH′ tgtH ′(e) = tgtH(e)
– ∀x∈(EH′∪VH′ )labH ′(x) = labH(x)
As we mentioned above, the graph matching problems are unavoidable in prove-
nance analysis. Although the graph comparison needed in provenance is a (sub)graph
isomorphism problem, there exist some slightly different requirements. First of all,
provenance graphs generally record many different property values with the execu-
tions. These properties include timestamps, process identifiers and other information
that is useful for tracing back for accountability or reproducibility reasons. In most op-
erating system environments, these data are constantly changing. It is expected to get
a different set of these data for the same set of actions while the remaining data should
remain the same. This property makes it different from a general graph isomorphism
matching problem. In general, an attributed directed multigraph contains additional
property key-value pairs attached to the vertexes and directed edges comparing to a
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simple directed multigraph. The additional requirement is defined as follow.
Let G be an attributed directed multigraph, then
G = (V,E,src, tgt, lab, prop)
where prop : (V ∪E)×Γ→ ∆ is an extra function
where Γ is the set of property keys and ∆ is the set of property data values
The isomorphic graph relationship of two attributed directed multigraphs are defined
as follows.
Let G and H be two attributed directed multigraphs.
G = (VG,EG,srcG, tgtG, labG, propG)
H = (VH ,EH ,srcH , tgtH , labH , propH)
If G and H is isomorphic pair, represented by G∼= H,
then the two bijection functions f and g have the following additional requirements:
– ∀v∈VG,k∈Γ propH( f (v),k)v propG(v,k)
– ∀e∈EG,k∈Γ propH(g(e),k)v propG(e,k)
Apart from the general graph isomorphism relationship, the sub-graph isomorphism
relationship can be defined as follows.
Let G and H be two attributed directed multigraphs.
G = (VG,EG,srcG, tgtG, labG, propG)
H = (VH ,EH ,srcH , tgtH , labH , propH)
If G and H contain isomorphic sub-graph relationship, represent by G . H then
G∼= H ′ satisfy the additional requirement as follows:
– ∀x∈(EH′∪VH′ )propH ′(x)v propH(x)
Above is the definition for isomorphic relationship for attributed directed multi-
graphs. It is an extension from the general isomorphic relationship for simple directed
multigraphs. For isomorphic sub-graph mapping, the only thing needed is to add in ad-
ditional consideration of the attributed labels to identify the optimal matching solution,
the remaining non-match labels should be kept to a minimum for the optimal solution
as we want to map as much as we could for all elements in the graphs to identify the
maximum sub-graph in graph H that are isomorphic to Graph G.
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2.4.2 Existing algorithms
There exist some algorithms proposed by different researchers, aiming to either speed
up the (sub)graph isomorphism problem or solve a subset of the problem.
In Gallagher [55], the author surveys existing pattern matching techniques for
graphs. It mentions the sub-graph isomorphism problem and the hardness of it and
provides two options. One option is to use approximation, which may result in non-
optimal solutions. The other option is to find optimal solutions but with smaller data
size by picking a subset of the data. They take the second route and present ways to
filter out part of the graph which is less related to the problem. This also inspires the
need to filter out part of the unrelated trace in the provenance graph. The major reason
why we need to choose between the two options is that sub-graph isomorphic match-
ing problem is known to be NP-Complete, as mentioned in Washio and Motoda [159]
where the authors discussing the graph isomorphism using for graph mining.
As solving graph isomorphism in polynomial time is a known open problem in the
research field, there exist some researchers proposing some algorithm to simplify the
problem or to solve partial problems through approximation or other means to keep the
process within polynomial time. In Cordella et al. [40], the author suggests an algo-
rithm VF2 to solve the graph and sub-graph isomorphism problems for large graphs.
While in Sun et al. [152], the authors suggest alternative algorithms to match graph
structures with billions of nodes. In McKay and Piperno [105], the authors summa-
rize the state of art for the graph isomorphism problem and provide some surveys of
existing algorithms. These publications are suggesting ways to handle graph compar-
ison and matching more efficiently, but the graph isomorphism problems still require
either intensive resources or certain levels of approximations or partial comparison to
decrease the problem by the size of the graph.
In Gamkrelidze et al. [56], the authors suggest an algorithm to compute invariants
of graphs through randomized walk-throughs in polynomial time. They did not prove
successful for large and full graphs. Another paper by Mendivelso and Pinzón [106]
also provided a new way to solve the (sub)graph isomorphism problem, they are aim-
ing to solve graph isomorphism problem in attributed graphs. They wanted to deter-
mine how many combinations of attributes exist when the edges and vertexes of the
attributed graphs form an isomorphic pair. Finally, Lee et al. [92] summarize five of
the algorithms for the (sub)graph isomorphism problem that tries to make the prob-
lem easier and faster to solve. They also provide state of the art for the research on
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this problem. These existing algorithms are all proposing ways for some shorthand or
partial handling of graph isomorphism problems in different types of graphs.
Our need is different from traditional graph isomorphism as provenance graphs
may contain volatile data where the property key is the same but the property value
of the attribute can be ever-changing. If we adopt traditional (sub)graph isomorphism
problem to our case, it will either give no solutions (If we consider property values as
matching criteria) or multiple solutions (If we just consider vertexes and edges only)
and randomly assign one as the answer. But, we want the graph to be as close as
possible because the only difference should be in the value of attributes and all other
parts should be preserved. To achieve this, we need to have some metric to measure
how close the two graphs are when their edges and vertexes match in a certain way.
Then we can choose the closest one as the matching result. There is some research on
algorithms for this problem.
In Bunke and Shearer [29] and Hoffmann et al. [79], the authors propose the need
to have a metric to aid the discovery of maximum common graphs. The metric can
be used in finding the closest graph in a case where the underlying simple graph is
part of an isomorphic pair. Some researchers have proposed edit distance approaches
as the metric to determine how close the two graphs are. This approach has been
mentioned in Riesen and Bunke [142], Bunke [28], Gao et al. [57] and Abu-Aisheh et
al. [3]. Also the book [141] mentions different kinds of edit distance approaches for
attributed graphs, including SimRank [31], Probability learning [122], Self-organizing
maps [123], Binary linear programming [86], Convolution graph kernel [124] and Sub-
graph and super-graph matching [50].
Similar to isomorphic sub-graph matching, computing the graph edit distance be-
tween two graphs (even without labels or properties) is an NP-complete problem. In
general, the metric using edit distance is to determine the differential level between
two graphs. Given a set of basic edit operations (e.g., insertions, deletions or in-place
modifications), we write op(G) for the result of op acting on G where op is any ba-
sic edit operations. More generally, if ops is an ordered list of operations op, then
we write ops(G) for the result of applying all the operations in ops to G in order.
Given two graphs G1,G2 we define the term graph edit distance between G1 and G2
as GED(G1,G2) = min{|ops| | ops(G1) = G2}, that is, the shortest length of an edit
script modifying G1 to G2. The associated costs for each operation may be different
depending on the need to highlight the importance of certain operations. As a result,
the graph pairs with the closest proximity should have a lower graph edit distance
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value. We aim to take the graph edit distance approach for the user to identify match-
ing vertexes, edges and property keys where the property values are not checked. This
allows us to filter out volatile property fields that are not related to the activities in the
key part of the executions. It does not affect the isomorphism on the underlying simple
graph as the bijection relationship would still hold for the edge and vertex sets.
2.5 Answer Set Programming
2.5.1 Solving hard search problems
Answer Set Programming (ASP) is a kind of declarative programming. Its primary
aim is to solve difficult search problems, like problems in the NP-hard range. It wants
to provide a fast and efficient solver for problems specified in logic by using some
logic programming semantics. In Lifschitz [95] and Brewka et al. [26], the authors
give a summary of Answer Set Programming, introducing the semantics, complexity,
applications and other characteristics of Answer Set Programming. They give a general
idea of what problems the Answer Set Programming can solve. In our case, we are
aiming to match isomorphic graph pairs with random property values together. This
requires an intensive search for all possible matches of the vertexes, edges and property
keys and calculating its edit distance in terms of the change needed for the property
values. The problem is NP-hard and the structures of the graphs allow us to transfer
them into logical statements and make use of Answer Set Programming to search for
an optimal choice for the matching solution with least edit distance, or in other words,
maximum common sub-graphs among the pairs.
2.5.2 Potassco framework and Clingo
It is not an easy thing to solve a large set of logical statements with Answer Set Pro-
gramming manually as the scale of proving may be large. There is a need to have some
tools to automate the proving and solving steps. In Gebser et al. [62], the authors pro-
posed Clasp, an answer set solver that aims to solve variable free logical statements and
provide suitable non-monotonic reasoning on top of the solutions. The authors later
summarize the challenge for the solver in Gebser et al. [60], which also mentioned
some possible applications of Answer Set Programming. The authors also proposed
some possible extensions to make their tools and technology more complete. The au-
thors later develop the Potassco framework [61] that bundles various tools that apply
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Answer Set Programming to solve problems. For example, it contains a tool to solve
and handle the package configuration and installation in Linux environments. Besides,
the framework includes a tool named Clingo which is a combination of the grounding
tools and answer set solver provided in the framework. In general, the grounding pro-
cess takes in ASP programs and maps them to propositional logic statements. In other
words, the process transfer general logical statements into variable free logical state-
ments. The grounding tools Gringo (which is formalized in Gebser et al. [58]) provides
the grounding process and the solver Clasp mentioned above solves those variable free
logical statements and provide solutions and reasoning accordingly as results.
The major programming language support by Clingo (or Gringo the grounder) is
Datalog. In general, Datalog is a subset of the Prolog language, which makes it also a
declarative logical language which describes each of the logic criteria one by one. In
traditional usage, Datalog is more likely used in a database as a kind of query language,
which is why it is adopted in Clingo to solve hard search problems. As mentioned in
the book Abiteboul et al. [2], David Maier is credited for the naming of Datalog. Since
then, Datalog is widely used by logic and database field. Until recent years, it spreads
into some newer field like provenance, programming and security analysis, and cloud
computing because of its high expressiveness for representing data in different cir-
cumstances and environments. In Lifschitz [96], the author provides a stable model
for Datalog, aiming to provide a semantic definition for Datalog to adopt its usage in
software development which may include parallel computing. In later paper Huang et
al. [81], the authors provide a basic description of the state of art for Datalog develop-
ment and application. They also provide a summary of the semantics of Datalog and
a tutorial on who should and how to use it. Lastly, in Deutch et al. [44], the authors
even provide an algorithm for querying stored data provenance which is represented
by Datalog statements. This once again shows that the ability of declarative languages
and answer set programming solvers can help to solve some hard search problems in-
cluding the provenance graph matching problem required by our work. In our work,
we transfer the graph and our matching requirements into logical statements and use
Clingo to help us determine the maximum common sub-graph between graphs. The
process helps us to identify the matching elements in the graphs and to filter out volatile
information which is not needed in the benchmarking process. The Potassco frame-
work is under continuing development and the newest version [59] is published when
this thesis is written. Also, some researchers are summarizing their experience and use
in a tutorial of Clingo in Kaminski et al. [87]. It provides an overview of how to apply
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Figure 2.2: Graph coloring example
Clingo in different cases that require solving problems relating to extensive searching
or reasoning.
A standard example of answer set programming is given in this subsection. The
example code in this subsection (and those in later chapters) can be run verbatim using
the Clingo interactive online demo3. This example aims to use Clingo to solve the
graph 3-colouring problem, which aims to colour the nodes of an undirected graph
with the minimum number of colours. Figure 2.2 shows an example graph where edge
relationships correspond to land borders between some countries.
Code Snippet 2.1 defines graph 3-coloring declaratively. The first line states that
the edge relation is symmetric and the second defines the node relation to consist of all
sources (and by symmetry targets) of edges. Line 3 defines a relation color /1 to hold
for values 1,2,3. Lines 4–5 define when a graph is 3-colourable, by defining when a
relation c/2 is a valid 3-colouring. Line 4 says that c/2 represents a (total) function
from nodes to colours, i.e. for every node there is exactly one associated colour. Line
5 says that for each edge, the associated colours of the source and target must be
different. Here, we are using the not operator solely to illustrate its use, but we could
have done without it, writing C = D instead. Lastly, the operator :− and , stands for if
and and respectively. If the statement is started the :− operator, it simply means that
the given condition is met by nothing, that means the given condition should not exist
in all statements, like our definition in Line 5.
1 e (X,Y) :− e (Y,X ) .
2 n (X) :− e (X, ) .
3 c o l o r ( 1 . . 3 ) .
4 {c (X,Y) : c o l o r (Y)} = 1 :− n (X ) .
5 :− e (X,Y) , c (X, C) , c (Y,D) , n o t C <> D.
Code Snippet 2.1: Graph 3-coloring
3https://potassco.org/clingo/run/
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Code Snippet 2.1 is a complete program that can be used with Figure 2.2 to deter-
mine that the example graph is not 3-colourable. What if we want to find the least k
such that a graph is k-colourable? We cannot leave the number of colours undefined
since ASP requires a finite search space, but we could manually change the ‘3’ on line
5 to various values of k, starting with the maximum k = |V | and decreasing until the
minimum possible k is found.
1 c o l o r (X) :− n (X ) .
2 c o s t (C , 1 ) :− c ( , C ) .
3 # min imize { Cost , C : c o s t (C , Cos t ) } .
Code Snippet 2.2: Minimal k-coloring (extending Listing 2.1)
Instead, using minimization constraints, we can modify the 3-colouring program
above to instead compute a minimal k-colouring (that is, find a colouring minimizing
the number of colours) purely declaratively by adding the clauses shown in Code Snip-
pet 2.2. Line 1 defines the set of colours simply to be the set of node identifiers (plus
the three colours we already had, but this is harmless). Line 2 associates a cost of 1
with each used colour. Finally, line 3 imposes a minimization constraint: to minimize
the sum of the costs of the colours. Thus, using a single Clingo specification we can
automatically find the minimum number of colours needed for this (or any) undirected
graph. The 4-colouring shown in Figure 2.2 was found this way.
The above example tries to illustrate the basic usage for the answer set program-
ming solver. It defines the basic operation of the solver. In general, the data set for
the target problem should be attached to the end of the program for the Clingo solver
to find an optimal solution for the given set of data. The dataset format is defined ac-
cording to the actual usage. Thus we will define our kind of graph representation on
attributed multigraphs isomorphic matching in later chapters.
2.6 Non-determinism
2.6.1 Non-deterministic events
In most operating systems and environments, the concept of non-determinism is widespread.
It refers to some uncertainty in the choice of execution processes and the order of some
of the execution statements. The reason for the existence of non-deterministic events
is various, for example, to support efficient execution or provide a more rational use of
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resources without affecting the original execution result. In Mohindra et al. [109], the
authors proposed a way to make use of non-determinism in mobile environments to
capture state change and the computation traces for fault recovery. This paper demon-
strates the advantages of non-deterministic events. In Potop-Butucaru et al. [135], the
authors analyse concurrency issues in synchronous systems which have certain levels
of non-deterministic events which give another example of non-determinism. Later
in Armoni and Gal-Ezer [12], the authors summarize the abstract concept of non-
determinism and provide some additional information about the characteristics and
applications for non-deterministic events. They also provide some description of the
state-of-art of the research on non-determinism. Finally, in Okech et al. [125], the au-
thors study the behaviour of certain system-calls in the kernel level. Their work shows
that even some deterministic events on the user level behave in a non-deterministic way
in the kernel level and this is also a motivation for why we need to include the support
of non-deterministic events in our automated benchmarking approach.
2.6.2 Symbolic execution
In many programming environments, symbolic execution is being used for debugging
and generating test cases automatically. In a general application, it is sometimes not
possible to have one execution path. Most of them contain multiple execution paths
depending on many criteria including user interaction, environments, configurations,
etc. Debugging of these applications is required for each of the paths as we never
know whether a certain path will be executed. Symbolic execution aims to search for
all possible paths in applications and binaries. It can also be used in some executions
containing non-deterministic events. In Ma et al. [98], the authors propose using sym-
bolic execution to aid in the discovery of a certain execution path that reaches a target
end. This is also related to what we want for provenance analysis to trace the initiators
of certain events in multiple execution path situations.
Symbolic execution is no doubt a powerful technique which can help to determine
all possible paths of execution. But it is not scalable enough because extensive search-
ing for execution paths is a complex problem and requires lots of time and resources.
Thus symbolic execution is not feasible on large programs that contain many execu-
tion paths. There are some researchers proposing ways to make it easier to handle large
cases. For example, in Chipounov et al. [37], the authors propose a selective symbolic
execution which only discovers execution paths on a chosen subset of an application
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or binary execution. This reduces the exhaustive searching from the whole application
to the limited part of execution which the users are interested in. But this does not have
much use if the user is interested in retrieving execution paths for the whole applica-
tion. In Kuznetsov et al. [91], the authors propose ways to dynamically merge some of
the similar paths to decrease the total number of results for the work. This may help to
increase the efficiency of the work.
Manual effort is almost impossible for symbolic execution because it requires trac-
ing different paths accordingly. Developers are working on tools for automating this
work. KLEE, proposed in Cadar et al. [30], is a tool aiming for automatic symbolic
execution. In Corin and Manzano [41], the authors propose ways to use KLEE with
additional taint analysis to trace data flow in execution and seek to discover security
problems along the path discovery process. This shows one of the similarities with
our applications to discover provenance in all possible execution paths to cover full
patterns of execution for provenance benchmarking. The characteristics of symbolic
execution are useful for the provenance benchmarking as the target activities may con-
tain non-deterministic events and with the support of symbolic execution, most of the
possible execution paths can be covered in the automatic benchmarking process and
hopefully allow capturing all possible patterns for certain activity sequences.
2.6.3 Fingerprinting and grouping
In our usage of provenance tracing for non-deterministic events, we apply a scheme
of fingerprinting to collect and classify graphs by their execution traces. One way of
fingerprinting is to trace some of the essential information in the kernel which remains
the same for the execution of the same path and different for the execution of a different
path. One possible solution fulfilling this requirement is using the tool ftrace which is
an existing functional tracer in the Linux kernel. In Restedt [143, 144] and Edge [47],
the authors summarize the usage of ftrace and provide some examples of applications
of ftrace. In general, we can distinguish the different execution paths by examining the
order in which the real system-call execution happens in the kernel, which is captured
by ftrace. This order of system-call execution can be used as a fingerprint to identify
and group the provenance graphs of different execution paths for further processing.
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2.7 Summary
This chapter covers most of the related work, background information and knowledge
and some of the building blocks for this thesis. The automated benchmarking system
developed for this work is based on the needs mentioned in this chapter which originate
from different literature around this research field. This chapter also summarizes some
of the techniques that are adopted in the automated benchmarking system, ProvMark,
for the analysing of data provenance and the patterns for certain sensitive actions. The
main work from the concept generation to the full implementation of ProvMark is
introduced starting from the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Manual analysis of basic system-calls
3.1 Motivation
The major target for this project is to evaluate the capabilities of different provenance
collecting tools to distinguish different system-call action sequences. In general, we
do not have a unified formal definition of provenance. Different provenance collecting
tools collect provenance information as different structures to suit their own needs.
So before analysing the capabilities of each of the provenance tools, we need to first
identify how they describe the same set of activities. We start this task by doing some
experiments to understand how different provenance tools describe the basic system-
calls, which are the foundational building blocks for large provenance graphs.
The goal is to identify provenance patterns for a universal unit across different
Unix-based operating system: system-calls operating on the OS kernel. Those system-
calls combine in different permutations to form high-level processes. When we un-
derstand the explicit patterns of provenance for each system-call, we can map each
system-call to its effect on the resulting provenance graph for specific provenance col-
lecting tools. These mappings can help us identify what system-calls have been in-
volved in a runtime process by a simple analysis of its provenance graph generated by
a specific tool. Besides, these mappings can also be used for unit testing by the tool
developers to identify if the result provenance generated match their expected result
and confirm the correctness of their generation process.
Before considering how the system-calls patterns can help in the process, we aim
to develop some building blocks manually for proof of concept. In this first stage of
work, we aim to manually feed some provenance collecting tools with suitable input
and observe the provenance information generated by them. And we will do some
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manual identification, classification and comparison to retrieve the provenance pat-
terns for those system-calls, generated by different tools. This manual work can help
us to build up and consolidate the foundational work, which provides a basic under-
standing of how those system-calls are displayed as provenance patterns. It also helps
to demonstrate the feasibility of this study on a bigger scale.
3.2 Definitions
3.2.1 Expressiveness micro-benchmarking
One of the motivations of this work is to compare the capabilities of the tools in secu-
rity, auditing and forensic usage. In general, the term benchmark is used to define the
point of references which can represent the object at a similar level for general compar-
ison. In our project, we also aim to generate some mapping for different provenance
collecting tools to identify their provenance result for describing the same system-calls.
For easy understanding, we define the system-calls to provenance mapping of each tool
as the micro-benchmark of that tool. These mapping act as the point of references for
the same level general comparison of the tools.
We further define the process of generating micro-benchmark and the same level
general comparison as micro-benchmarking. This process aims to provide a formal
way to describe the foundational building blocks for the provenance data graph gener-
ated by each of the provenance collecting tools. All resulting provenance graphs should
be built by combining these foundational units because they describe the smallest
meaningful unit: system-calls. Each action sequence produced in the resulting prove-
nance graph is simply a combination of different system-calls in some order. By com-
paring the micro-benchmark of different tools, we already cover provenance patterns
for almost all possible action sequences. Thus, the process of micro-benchmarking
helps us to evaluate the capabilities of the tools in different settings.
After that, we define the term micro-benchmark as a set of provenance information.
It describes the kernel action sequence relating to a target system-call which is gener-
ated by a chosen provenance collecting tool. In other words, the micro-benchmark
should have a one to one mapping to a specific high-level system-call which allows
a viewer of the micro-benchmark uniquely identify the existence of the system-call
in a larger action sequence with multiple combinations of system-call execution. The
micro-benchmark is generally presented as a subset of elements in a directed graph.
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Thus the micro-benchmark may not be a completed graph. From above, we further
define the term micro-benchmarking as the process of evaluating the capabilities of the
provenance collecting tools in different settings by comparing the micro-benchmark. In
this context, we further define the term expressiveness benchmarking as a more specific
type of micro-benchmarking that concentrate on the expressiveness of the provenance
tools only. We further define the term expressiveness as the ability for provenance
collecting tools to correctly and completely describe an activity sequence as a prove-
nance graph. As a whole, the expressiveness benchmarking process aims to use the
micro-benchmark to compare the capabilities of provenance collecting tools specifi-
cally identifying whether certain system-call or activity sequences have occurred at
runtime by studying the provenance graph generated for the session.
We further define the terms correctness and completeness as the two main targets
for the evaluation of expressiveness in the expressiveness benchmarking process. Cor-
rectness of provenance refers to the quality of the provenance data of being free from
error. Or in other words, the accuracy of the provenance data describing what is hap-
pening during the runtime execution. The correctness requirement may be different
when analysing the provenance data for different applications. Some applications may
allow a certain level of error while still correctly identifying the needed information.
For example, if someone just wants to understand what system call activities exist dur-
ing the runtime execution, then the other data like timestamp and execution order is not
important in this application. In this situation, possible errors in this meta-data will not
affect the identification of existing system call activities and do not affect the correct-
ness factors of the provenance data. Thus our definition of correctness focuses on the
accuracy of data for a specific application and can vary across different applications
which require different levels of preciseness for the provenance data. On the other
hand, completeness of provenance refers to the quality of the provenance data having
all the necessary data or components. It can also be identified as unambiguity of the
provenance data. Similar to the correcteness factor, the completeness factor may also
be different when analysing the provenance data for different applications. The level
of completeness is determined by analysing if the provenance information contains
enough information for identifying different events correctly. In different applications
of provenance, this requirement may be different. For example, if one application just
wants to understand if a read system call has been executed, then the provenance data
can be less complete because it just needs to contains the system call trace for this
application. If other application wants to know that if there is a read system call ex-
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ecuted before a write system call, then it will require timestamps and execution order
to distinguish the different cases. In the latter situation, it requires a higher level of
completeness because it requires more information recorded in the provenance data to
distinguish ambiguous cases. From the above example, it shows that the correcteness
and completeness quantifiers for provenance expressiveness evaluation can vary across
different applications. Our expressiveness benchmarking approach aims to provide
benchmarks in terms of provenance graph structure for a provenance system. Fur-
ther comparison of those benchmarks from different provenance systems describing
the same runtime execution for the same application are needed to understand which
provenance systems have a higher completeness or correctness level in a specific appli-
cation. Thus, we can also related the completeness quantifier to the false-negative error
rate and the correctness factor to the false-positive error rate. The linkage between the
qualifier and error rate may not be true in some of the application. We only make use of
this two items correctness and completeness as the main quantifiers in the expressive-
ness benchmarking process. The actual analysing and comparing of these qualifiers
and possible error rates requires a further comparison of the benchmark and may be
varied for different applications and may relate to the user expectation on what infor-
mation should be included to correctly and completely identify the needed information
and distinguish between similar cases.
3.2.2 Operating System terminology
Many resources can be managed by a user via kernel activities or system-calls, in-
cluding the file system, input or output stream, hardware drivers or even network pro-
tocols. Many sensitive system-calls can modify these resources and sometimes may
touch multiple of them to finish a job. In general, the term artefact is defined as some
man-made object of historical significance. When we are analysing the provenance
graph, we are studying what is happening to some resources in the past. So, the re-
sources defined in the provenance graph are just artefacts. For easy understanding and
grouping, we borrow this noun and define artefact as all of those resources which can
be controlled, used or accessed by system-calls and processes in runtime.
Last but not least, we further define the term noise as a subset of the provenance
graph result which is not related to the target system-call actions, including random
heartbeat message or mapping of libraries and memories. These data are transmitted
randomly and repetitively in the kernel. Thus the value of these noise are ever-changing
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and can be volatile across different runs. They are the disturbing factor in the result
which we want to extract and avoid. Thus to identify target action sequence by graphs
comparison, we need to generalize the graph across different runs to filter out these
volatile values or property labels. With this understanding, we can use the patterns
to generate rules to identify the existence of high-level actions (containing different
permutations of system-calls) in a large system by analysing the provenance graph
describing its runtime behaviour. This can help to trace the existence and initiator of
certain actions for security and forensic analysis.
3.3 Micro-benchmarking
To create a micro-benchmark for system-calls in the kernel, we choose to create some
sample programs that use minimal system-calls to see those patterns without a large
amount of noise. Although not all system-calls in Linux environment have a one to
one mapping to C library calls, we do prepare these micro-benchmark programs in C
for easier analysis. We do not test all 300+ system-calls in the Linux operating system,
instead, we are using a subset of them which are generally believed to relate to sensi-
tive actions. This subset is mainly gathering from two places. Firstly, we summarize
different pieces of literature in the security research field which we mentioned in the
background section to understand which system-calls are commonly related to sensi-
tive or malicious activities. Then we study the capturing target for some commonly
used provenance collecting tools and summarized their choice. Interestingly, not all of
them are collecting the whole set of system-calls and their choice is also very similar
to those in the security research field. After consulting the literature and tools from the
security and provenance research field, we summarize out a list of system-calls to act
as our starting point which is shown in Table 3.1. It is always extensible if we need to
handle more system-calls in the future.
These preparation works already contribute to the system-call activity in the ker-
nel. Most of them are memory read/write and memory mapping. To avoid and filter
out these kinds of noise from the executing binary and capture the real provenance
patterns for our target system-call action, we provide two types of benchmark program
mentioned above. First, we develop an empty C program which does nothing to act
as the background program. Then we develop a set of C programs for each of the
system-call, each of them contains only the target system-calls statement in the main
function without any additional actions. When we need to do the test, we compile the
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two binaries from the control program and the C program of the target system-call (we
name it as the foreground program). The only difference between the two binaries will
be the execution of the target system-call that we are interested in. By executing the
two binaries and comparing the resulting provenance graph, it is easy to identify in the
trial execution, which part in the graph represents the target system-call action. After
a manual filter, we can easily identify the additional edges and nodes that describe the
additional actions in the two trials, which directly represent the target system-call ac-
tion. Because the only difference between the two compiled binaries is the system-call
executed in the benchmark program, those additional graph elements represent the ba-
sic unit of provenance for a specific provenance collecting tools to describe the target
system-call.
A sample background program is shown in Code Snippet 3.1, while two benchmark
programs for creat and chmod are shown in Code Snippet 3.2 and Code Snippet 3.3
respectively. Those two provenance graphs generated by SPADE on the two bench-
mark programs (Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.4) are compared to the provenance graph
(Figure 3.1) generated by SPADE on the background program separately. The addi-
tional subset from the two comparison describing only the creat/chmod system-call
provenance patterns, which is shown in Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.5. As there are too
many properties label in the graphs and it is impossible to read, we only show the
structure with certain text labels to emphasize the important nodes in the background
and foreground graphs. In the graphs and benchmarks, rectangle nodes are referring to
processes and oval nodes are referring to artefacts, including files or pipes.
Figure 3.1: Abstract background provenance graph generated by SPADE
3.3. Micro-benchmarking 55















Figure 3.3: Benchmark graph for the system-call creat generated by SPADE
Figure 3.4: Abstract Provenance graph for the system-call chmod generated by SPADE














Figure 3.5: Benchmark graph for the system-call chmod generated by SPADE
1 void main ( ) {
2 / / Empty Program
3 }
Code Snippet 3.1: Sample control program
1 # inc lude< f c n t l . h>
2 # inc lude<u n i s t d . h>
3 void main ( ) {
4 c r e a t ( ” t x t . t x t ” , S IRWXU |S IRWXG ) ;
5 }
Code Snippet 3.2: Sample benchmark program for creat system-call
1 # i n c l u d e <s y s / s t a t . h>
2 void main ( ) {
3 chmod ( ” t x t . t x t ” , S IRUSR | S IWUSR ) ;
4 }
Code Snippet 3.3: Sample benchmark program for chmod system-call
From the above program and resulting provenance graph comparison, we can eas-
ily identify the additional part that describes the minimum real patterns for a specific
system-call. But we have also made certain assumptions. First of all, most prove-
nance collecting tools will provide as much information as they can when generating
the provenance information describing what is happening in runtime. In most cases,
some volatile values like timestamps, process ids or identifiers provided by the OS are
recorded. This information may create part of the noise when we do the sample com-
parison because it is possible that the two trials running on the background program
and foreground program can have differences that make them harder to compare. In
our manual approach, it is easy to identify these changing values and manually ignore
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them when doing the graph matching and comparison. In this case, we define the graph
generated by the background program as background graph BG and define the graph
generated by the foreground program of the target system-call as foreground graph
FG. We always assume that BG is an isomorphic sub-graph of FG, which ignores the
changing elements that we consider noise. We further assume that after ignoring this
noise, BG and FG will each remain the same even if the corresponding program is
executed multiple times. It can be illustrated as follows.
BG1 = BG2 = .....= BGN = BG
FG1 = FG2 = .....= FGN = FG
where FGn and BGn represent the foreground/background graph generated for the nth
trial of execution of the control program and the benchmark program for the target
system-call respectively. In this context, we are only considering isomorphism rela-
tionships between the nodes and edges of the graphs. With the existence of noise and
volatile information across different runs, taking into account the property values in
the isomorphism is too strong. Thus the isomorphism considering in our context is
just limited to the skeleton of the graphs, which contains the edges and vertices only.
This makes our work more flexible and less complex in handling the graph general-
ization and comparison. Also, the above-assumed equality is preserved as we are only
considering deterministic events in our manual approach, thus the execution order and
events should be preserved and the generated graphs should be equal (if we ignore the
noise) and isomorphic (on edges and vertices only). In our manual approach, as we
are comparing the graphs and generalizing them manually, it is possible to achieve the
assumed equality. But this may not be possible once the generalization steps are done
by automated approach.
In addition, our manual efforts also ignore the volatile values when comparing the
foreground graph and background graph. With this assumption, we can assume there is
a sub-graph FG′ of the foreground graph FG which is always isomorphic to the back-
ground graph BG. Following the graph definition in Section 2.4, the following defines
the isomorphic sub-graph relationship for the background graph BG and foreground
graph FG.
Let FG and BG be two attributed directed multigraphs,then
BG = (VBG,EBG,srcBG, tgtBG, labBG, propBG)
FG = (VFG,EFG,srcFG, tgtFG, labFG, propFG)
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If BG and FG are isomorphic sub-graph pairs,
then BG . FG and BG∼= FG′ satisfying
– FG′ = (VFG′ ,EFG′ ,srcFG′ , tgtFG′ , labFG′)
– VFG′ ⊆VFG
– EFG′ ⊆ EFG
– ∀e∈EFG′ ,srcFG′∈VFG′ srcFG′(e) = srcFG(e)
– ∀e∈EFG′ ,tgtFG′∈VFG′ tgtFG′(e) = tgtFG(e)
– ∀x∈(EFG′∪VFG′ )labFG′(x) = labFG(x)
– ∀x∈(EFG′∪VFG′ )propFG′(x)v propFG(x)
SP = FG−FG′ = {VFG \VFG′,EFG \EFG′,srcSP, tgtSP, labSP, propSP}
where
– srcSP = ∀e∈EFG′ srcFG[e :=⊥]
– tgtSP = ∀e∈EFG′ tgtFG[e :=⊥]
– labSP = ∀x∈(EFG′∪VFG′ ) labFG[x :=⊥]
– propSP = ∀x∈(EFG′∪VFG′ ),k∈Γ propFG[x,k :=⊥]
where SP is the minimum system-call pattern generated by retrieving the additional part in the
foreground graph, which is the micro-benchmark we are looking for. In other words, we are
aiming the find the set difference between the node-set, edge-set and property-set of the two
graphs. Some provenance collecting tools may return an empty result for some system-calls
because they did not capture them in their generating process or some of them has been filtered
out by settings.
3.4 Results from Micro-benchmarking
For the manual effort of micro-benchmarking, we chose two existing provenance collecting
tools, SPADE and OPUS, as the testing targets. Both of them focus on a similar target on
recording the call trace history for Unix-based system calls which allow us to compare their
resulting provenance graphs easily. Also, both of the tools do not concentrate much on artefact
versioning thus produce comparatively smaller provenance graphs than other provenance sys-
tems. Because we are focusing on demonstrating the feasibility of our proposed provenance
benchmarking approach with manual comparison, thus it is better to take some smaller and
simpler examples as the preliminary target. This is the major reason we are choosing SPADE
and OPUS as our preliminary candidates for the manual benchmarking experiment. Besides,
both of them can output the provenance result in Neo4J graph database format [121] that can
be queried using the Cypher query language. This allows easy access for manual expressive-
ness benchmarking. The unique provenance patterns should identify each of the system-call
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actions. Those results should be enough to generate rules to determine the existence of cer-
tain activities. The resulting provenance patterns are expected to behave the same when the
system-call activity happens in different environments. Last but not least, it is also important
to mention that although both SPADE and OPUS can generate provenance in the same output
format, they collect information from different sources and preserve different levels of detail
for different system-call activities. So their results are quite different. This difference demon-
strates the importance of a systematic way to compare their expressiveness towards malicious
patterns identification.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
creat dup dup2 dup3 clone chmod fchmod pipe
link linkat symlink symlinkat execve fchmodat chown pipe2
mknod mknodat open openat exit fchown fchownat tee
read pread rename renameat fork setgid setregid
truncate ftruncate unlink unlinkat vfork setresgid setuid
write pwrite close kill setreuid setresuid
Table 3.1: System-calls considered in the manual analysis
Table 3.1 displays the system-calls that we are using again. We divided the system-calls
into groups for easy understanding. Group 1 contains system-calls that are related to file and
artefact management. Group 2 contains system-calls that are used for process management.
Group 3 contains system-calls that are used to manage permissions and privileges of processes
of some artefacts. Last but not least, group 4 contains system-calls related to inter-process
communication. We operate SPADE and OPUS to monitor and filter background information
to generate minimum provenance data to describe these system-calls separately and we classify
the results into multiple categories according to the resulting provenance structure. We have
prepared an empty background program and a batch of C programs (foreground programs) for
each of the system-calls mentioned in Table 3.1.
3.4.1 Micro-benchmarking on SPADE
As mentioned above, we classify the results into multiple categories according to the resulting
provenance structure of the target system-call. The detailed description will be given in sub-
section 3.4.3. The classification for SPADE is shown in Table 3.2. When we are compiling the
C programs (control and benchmark programs) to executable binaries, we choose to statically
link the library at compile time to avoid more noise from dynamic linking of the library in
the real-time execution. Both Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.7 shows the abstract provenance graphs
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(property labels are omitted because of readability problem) generated by SPADE on the same
program (with one creat system-call only) with different library linking options. Figure 3.6
shows the provenance graph for the static-linked binary while Figure 3.7 shows the provenance
graph for the dynamic-linked binary. We can see that the graph for dynamic-linked binary
contains more structure than the static-linked binary. Most of the extra structure is referring
to those dynamic linking operations and is not related to the actual execution of the creat
system-call. Thus it justifies that using the static linking option for program compile can help
reduce the noise and allow a better generalization and comparison process.
Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 2a Cat 3 Cat 4 Cat 5
dup dup2 creat fchmod execve link pipe
dup3 kill close truncate fork linkat pipe2
mknod mknodat open ftruncate vfork symlink tee
setgid setregid openat clone
setresgid chown unlink setuid
fchown fchownat unlinkat setreuid
chmod setresuid
fchmodat exit
Table 3.2: System-calls classification for SPADE
Figure 3.6: Abstract provenance graph for the static-linked binary generated by SPADE
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Figure 3.7: Abstract provenance graph for the dynamic-linked binary generated by SPADE
As mentioned in Chapter 2, SPADE retrieves the system activity from many different chan-
nels. As some of them are still not well implemented, we choose the most completely imple-
mented reporter module provided by SPADE, which is the audit reporter which aims to retrieve
kernel activities from the audit daemon (auditd) and dispatcher provided by the operating sys-
tem. The audit daemon acts as a log to record all the events and activities that have happened in
the kernel for system administrators to monitor. SPADE uses this information to form a result
provenance graph as output to describe what has happened in runtime. One of the important
points to mention is, SPADE does not record explicit information about some actions that do
not touch the content of the artefacts, like dup or mknod system-calls. Instead, they just create
or clone the internal path mapping elements. In the viewpoint of SPADE, these actions do not
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affect the content of the artefacts and so they are not recorded explicitly. Nevertheless, they do
indirectly affect the behaviour of subsequent system-calls. For example, dup creates a new file
descriptor of an artefact. This action may have indirect effects on how subsequent system-calls
are recorded since processes can communicate with the same artefact with different file descrip-
tors. This example shows that provenance may not completely reflect all execution at runtime
(completeness problem), thus demonstrating the need for expressiveness benchmarking.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, SPADE provides some features, including partial version in-
formation and filtering mechanisms. For system-calls related to output and operation of files,
SPADE provides additional descriptions in the resulting provenance data that showcase the
version updates of a files or output stream target. This provides additional information about
the version changes and accountable process of the action. On the other hand, the filtering
mechanisms of SPADE are provided at two levels. The lower level is on the Audit reporter
itself. The audit daemon and dispatcher from Unix-like operating system will automatically
record all system activities, but the reporter hook to the audit dispatcher can be configured with
audit rules to filter those dispatcher log records and only receive part of them. This is the first
level of filtering provided by SPADE. The second level of filtering is provided when SPADE
is processing the log from the audit reporter. This level of filtering can allow SPADE to ignore
part of the received audit log according to the group of system-calls configured by the user of
SPADE. For example, SPADE can purposely ignore all I/O related system-call action, or only
concentrate on process communications. This filtering helps to narrow down the noise level
when we are interested in the micro-benchmarking of specific system-call activities only. We
discuss the basic filtering at this point because in our manual approach, we are trying to prove
the feasibility of such approach and we purposely turn on filtering for I/O even though those
I/O related system-calls always contain large amounts of noise because the kernel is reading
and writing at most of the time. This makes our assumption of keeping the same set of results
across different trials more difficult to achieve. For easy testing, we use the filtering mechanism
to ignore those I/O related system-calls at this manual comparison stages.
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3.4.2 Micro-benchmarking on OPUS
As mentioned above, we classify the results into multiple categories according to the resulting
provenance structure of the target system-call. The detailed description will be given in subsec-
tion 3.4.3. The classifications of system-calls for OPUS is shown in Table 3.3. As mentioned in
Chapter 2, OPUS currently cannot operate on statically linked programs because OPUS works
by wrapping dynamically linked libraries. Therefore, we ran the benchmarks using dynami-
cally linked binaries, but this yields larger and noisier provenance graphs. We have manually
inspected the graphs to discern common patterns from the result set. (This is related to the old
version of OPUS when this work is done. When this text is written, there is already a new
version of OPUS which also supports static linking of the library)
Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 2a Cat 3 Cat 4 Cat 5
dup tee chmod setuid symlink rename
dup2 read chown setreuid symlinkat renameat
dup3 write truncate setresuid mknod
fork pread ftruncate setgid mknodat
vfork pwrite creat setregid link
clone fchmod close setresgid linkat
kill fchown open unlink
exit fchmodat openat unlnkat
pipe fchownat
pipe2
Table 3.3: System-calls classification for OPUS
Unlike SPADE, which tries to identify accountability and traceable provenance across
distributed host, OPUS concentrates on the completeness of the provenance information de-
scribing runtime context and version of items. To provide more understanding about the state
changes of objects in the operating system, OPUS maintains a framework for recording object
version changes. When an object has changed and a new epoch of that object is created, the
provenance information of that object splits into two series. The Provenance Versioning Model
(PVM) acts as the backbone for the OPUS tools when collecting provenance in runtime. This
makes OPUS more capable to collect provenance for version changes of an object, providing
detailed information about the history of an object. OPUS groups the provenance around an
artefact and its related epoch.
Consider a situation in which multiple processes access the same artefact concurrently. If
a new system-call action is executed on this artefact, it may affect the artefact’s status from the
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perspective of other processes working on it. If so, then a new version of the artefact should
be created for subsequent actions. Also, the PVM makes it possible to determine ordering
relationships among actions because system-calls executing on the older version of an artefact
always execute earlier than system-calls executing on a newer version. On the other hand,
OPUS does not follow a heavyweight version-on-write model; new versions are only created
when necessary to reflect changes visible to other processes.
3.4.3 Comparison of SPADE and OPUS
The classification is based on the patterns the tools produced in the resulting graph. The pat-
terns of OPUS are similar to SPADE in general but there are two differences. Firstly, the re-
sult of OPUS contains additional elements describing version information. Secondly, both the
system-call activities and general artefacts are described inside vertices for OPUS results and
linked by edges. On the contrary, SPADE only describes artefacts inside vertices and records
the system call information in edges. These two differences make the benchmark graph struc-
ture different in some examples, but they are generally classified following similar rules as
follows. The detailed description of each category is shown in the list below.
Category 1 This category includes all those system-calls with no observable entities from
SPADE or OPUS when they are tested alone.
Category 2 This category includes system-calls involving one artefact (or 1 additional pro-
cess). Example graphs are shown in Figure 3.8a.
Category 2a This category contains special cases of category 2 system-calls that involve ver-
sion information. Example graphs are shown in Figure 3.8c.
Category 3 This category includes system-calls that involve process and inter-process com-
munication only. Example graphs are shown in Figure 3.8b.
Category 4 This category includes system-calls involving one process and multiple artefacts.
Example graphs are shown in Figure 3.8d.
Category 5 This category includes system-calls with irregular provenance patterns that do not
fit any of the other categories. Example graphs are shown in Figure 3.8e.






























































































































































































Figure 3.8: Example graphs for each graph classification category
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We have also checked the classification results with the developers of SPADE and OPUS
and the results mostly match the expectation of their tools e some exceptions, which turn out
to showcase that some problems exist in the tools themselves (which we will discuss later in
this chapter). Last but not least, we also need to discuss the differences between the two tools
in handling and preserving version information. In the classification for SPADE, only system-
calls in category 2a and all the I/O system-calls related to changing of files preserve version
information, while in the classification for OPUS, version information is preserved for cate-
gories 2a, 3, 4, 5. Categories 1 and 2 do not have version information preserved because they
do not change the version of any artefacts. This difference in version handling also demon-
strates the different perspectives of the two tools.
These classifications lay out the foundation for the fully automated expressiveness bench-
marking and pattern discovery for activities sequences. It is also worthwhile to mention when
we are classifying the system-calls into categories, we make use of some cypher queries to
help the process. For example, if a result exists when executing the Cypher query in Code
Snippet 3.5 on a system-call provenance pattern, then this system-call must belong to category
2. More sample cypher queries for category 3 and 4 are shown in Code Snippet 3.4 and Code
Snippet 3.6 respectively. The above mentioned Cypher query is generally targeted to the re-
sult of SPADE. As mentioned above, OPUS treat the nodes and edges differently, thus slightly
modification of the condition matching the nodes and edges will need to be changed, including
the type which is representing by different wording by the tools.
From the classification results, we can see that the provenance generated by SPADE and
OPUS are different because they aim to explain different perspectives of runtime behaviour.
Sample benchmarks for creat, open, chmod and setuid are shown in Table 3.4. When
we look closer to the benchmark structure of the creat, open and chmod which all belongs
to category 2 for SPADE result and category 2a for OPUS result. It clearly shows the different
perspective of the tools. SPADE records the process (in blue rectangles) responsible for per-
forming the system-call action. Then the specific system-call action has been recorded at the
edge which links to the target artefact (which is the target file) in yellow ellipses. This match
the category 2 structure we mentioned above. While OPUS result record both the system-call
action and artefact as nodes in blue rectangles. Notice that these system-call has somehow
touching the file and thus updating the version of the file. Thus there is additional version in-
formation exists in the OPUS result which makes it classified as category 2a. Another example
is the setuid, we can see that in the result of SPADE, the system-call is a circular edge point
back to the same process, representing a system-call initiated by a process and performed on
the process itself, which matches the behaviour of the setuid system-call to change the ef-
fective user id of the process. On the contrary, the result of OPUS contains two sets of separate
events, this is mainly because both the process and system-call activities are recorded as graph
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nodes by OPUS, thus it contains more than one node. Besides, as the process effective user id
has been changed after setuid has been executed and the version information is preserved.
OPUS treat them as two separate processes as they do not have the same user id nor version
number. As a result, the separate structure in the benchmark represents the same process before











































































































































































Table 3.4: Example benchmark results for SPADE and OPUS
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1 MATCH
2 ( n1 :VERTEX)−[ r :EDGE]−>(n2 :VERTEX)
3 WHERE
4 n1 . t y p e = ’ P r o c e s s ’
5 AND n2 . t y p e = ’ P r o c e s s ’
6 AND r . o p e r a t i o n =’< s y s c a l l >’
7 RETURN n1 , n2 , r
Code Snippet 3.4: Cypher query for Category 3
1 MATCH
2 ( n1 :VERTEX)−[ r :EDGE]−>(n2 :VERTEX)
3 WHERE
4 (
5 ( n1 . t y p e = ’ P r o c e s s ’ AND n2 . t y p e = ’ A r t i f a c t ’ )
6 OR
7 ( n1 . t y p e = ’ A r t i f a c t ’ AND n2 . t y p e = ’ P r o c e s s ’ )
8 )
9 AND r . o p e r a t i o n =’< s y s c a l l >’
10 RETURN n1 , n2 , r
Code Snippet 3.5: Cypher query for Category 2
1 MATCH
2 ( n1 :VERTEX)−[ r1 :EDGE]−>(n2 :VERTEX) ,
3 ( n3 :VERTEX)−[ r2 :EDGE]−>(n1 :VERTEX) ,
4 ( n3 :VERTEX)−[ r3 :EDGE]−>(n2 :VERTEX)
5 WHERE
6 n1 . t y p e = ’ P r o c e s s ’
7 AND n2 . t y p e = ’ A r t i f a c t ’
8 AND n3 . t y p e = ’ A r t i f a c t ’
9 AND r1 . o p e r a t i o n =’< s y s c a l l > r e a d ’
10 AND r2 . o p e r a t i o n =’< s y s c a l l > w r i t e ’
11 AND r3 . o p e r a t i o n =’< s y s c a l l >’
12 RETURN n1 , n2 , n3 , r1 , r2 , r3
Code Snippet 3.6: Cypher query for Category 4
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OPUS concentrates on changes in the file system. It maps multiple library calls into lower-
level operations as specified by the PVM. This helps to minimise information since actions
with no observable effect on the resulting provenance graph will be ignored. On the contrary,
SPADE concentrates on communication between processes and artefacts across distributed
hosts, and by default captures these operations without version updates. This setting illustrates
the different goals of the two provenance collection tools, and the resulting provenance graphs
show different information. SPADE’s provenance graph shows processes communications and
actions on artefacts, while OPUS’s provenance graph shows more details on which process has
contributed to which version of each artefact and can answer more detailed questions on the
ordering of actions or which process contributed to each change. On the contrary, OPUS lacks
distributed environment handling and initiator recording so cannot answer questions regarding
accountability of actions if those requests are from another trusted domain.
In addition to general functionality, SPADE and OPUS also provide filtering functionality
that may affect the collecting of provenance information and thus affecting the final prove-
nance benchmark result. In general, the inclusion of all events from the audit log (SPADE) or
intercepting library calls (OPUS) will make the resulting provenance graph large and hard to
analyse. These large set of events always include some information such as background activ-
ities, memory exchanges and some process identifiers and timing elements. This information
may be useful for certain events, but not for us to identify the existence of certain high-level
action. This is because these events are ever-changing in each trial run and are generally not
affected by the target system-calls that we are analysing. Both SPADE and OPUS provides
different ways to handle these kinds of unrelated activities.
SPADE provides two approaches to filter results and narrow down the resulting prove-
nance graph to a suitable size for analysis. These approaches are named as filters as discussed
in Gehani et al. [65] and transformers as mentioned in Gehani et al. [63]. Similar to the two lev-
els of filters, transformers are also operating in different stages within SPADE. The two filters
work at collection time which allows the audit log filter the data sent to SPADE or provide the
full information to SPADE and let SPADE ignore part of them while generating the provenance
graph. Transformers work at the querying stage after the provenance graph has been generated,
and only the parts concerned will be returned when querying for the result. On the contrary,
OPUS handles this volatile information (background activities, memory exchange, identifiers,
etc.) differently. OPUS tries to abstract application behaviour from the underlying operating
system and provides a set of transformations that define every operation. The definition aims
to identify the key parts of each operation which contribute to its version behaviour. Activi-
ties with no effect on the artefact version are ignored. However, the version from PVM may
be inflexible and may lead to false alarms and result in missing information in the resulting
provenance graph.
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We can see the different approaches used by SPADE and OPUS in filtering result in differ-
ent resulting provenance. It shows that difference provenance tools see the world differently
and generate provenance on different perspectives for the same runtime behaviour. This phe-
nomenon demonstrates the need to have a formalized way to compare their effectiveness to
understand and compare the feasibility towards different practical usage, like identification of
the existence of certain malicious activities for intrusion detection, or tracing the accountable
artefacts for certain actions in forensic or auditing usage. In our manual approach, we are aim-
ing to prove the feasibility of the expressiveness benchmarking approach and thus we want to
build up the consolidation with an easier example, so we also make use of the above-mentioned
filtering functionality of SPADE and OPUS to filter out background activities and other unre-
lated actions and some of the complicated system-calls (I/O and heavy version related) to make
the test case easier to compute by manual approach. The existence of the filtering mechanism
decreases the work needed for the manual comparison and micro-benchmark generation pro-
cess and thus we can use these simple test case to prove the feasibility of the approach before
building the automated system for the expressiveness benchmarking.
3.5 Discussion
The above resulting micro-benchmarks are generated by manual effort, which requires a com-
parison of foreground and background graphs of provenance data generated by the two tools for
all the system-calls mentioned above. Apart from understanding the provenance data patterns
for each system-call when they are processed by different provenance collecting tools, it can
also provide a reference for the tools’ developers and researchers to cross-check the correct-
ness of their generation process. The easiest way is to check if the micro-benchmark generated
by our manual approach is fulfilling their expectation. It is worth mentioning that our manual
approach does help the developers discover problems in their provenance generation process
(which they have fixed in a later version). One example is, the setuid system-call group and
setgid system-call group are similar; the only difference between them is that setuid calls
target users and the setgid calls target the user groups. Intuitively, they should be treated
similarly because users and groups are both treated as a single integer identifier in Unix operat-
ing system, but SPADE only records explicit provenance for setuid calls when we are testing
our manual approach in the SPADE version as of early 2017. The documentations of SPADE
mentioned that this is a known limitation and will be implemented later. The developer has now
implemented it when this text is written, and we have confirmed the new implementation when
we run the experiment to test the functionality of our automated system for expressiveness
benchmarking, ProvMark.
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The above is an initial step towards identifying the provenance patterns for basic system-
calls. For more advanced usage, the benchmark programs can contain more than one system-
call or a series of system call actions that form an action sequence. The same logic can help
to identify the minimum patterns for a specific provenance collecting tools to describe such a
sequence. This advanced application will be discussed in later chapters. One major observation
is, by comparing the graph manually one system-call at a time is already time-consuming,
just comparing the foreground graph (Figure 3.2 and background graph (Figure 3.1) for the
creat system-call to generate the corresponding provenance benchmark (Figure 3.5) which
contains very few elements comparing to other system-calls already need to take more than an
hour. Needless to say, it is surely a big project to consider if we need to make the approach
for identifying longer activity sequences or even non-deterministic events. From the example
shown in this chapter, a background graph generated from SPADE from the control program
already contains around 20 edges, 20 nodes, and a hundred properties; while the foreground
graph will only contain more of them because it is generated from the foreground program
which does an additional system-call comparing to the background program. Although we
could manually ignore those volatile values of properties, we still need to compare the graphs
one by one and retrieve the micro-benchmark. A simple manual comparison for the generation
of benchmark of SPADE for creat already takes roughly a few hours to do so, even if we
ignore the time to configure SPADE and launch it to collect the data on the execution of the
background program and foreground program. Although the time need for comparison may
increase a little bit after we get used to it, it does not affect much as it is still a hard job to
compare a large set of properties that are very similar to each other. Last but not least, the
manual comparison may also bear a large error rate which is common in human processes.
These reasons make the manual process very troublesome and are not effective to handle the
whole expressiveness benchmarking given the number of system-calls and tools exist in the
wild. Thus we urgently need to make use of these foundational building blocks to build up a
fully automated system to do the work and extend the system to other provenance collecting
mechanisms and tools beyond OPUS and SPADE.
The above manual effort illustrates the basic foundations for the understanding of differ-
ent provenance patterns generated by different tools describing the same system-calls. These
foundational blocks help us to consolidate the steps needed in a fully automated process and
to demonstrate the feasibility of the expressiveness benchmarking approach. Before trying
to build a whole automated system for expressiveness benchmarking, we manually collected
provenance data for describing system-calls generated by two commonly used provenance
tools, SPADE and OPUS. Also, we provided a simple comparison and classification for those
system-calls to understand the differences between tools describing the same system-call ac-
tivity. This simple comparison demonstrates the needs of creating a tractable approach to
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formalizing correct and complete behaviour for provenance recording systems. Also, this man-
ual effort aims to validate and demonstrate the flexibility of our work before building a fully
automated system for the whole expressiveness benchmark action and self-evaluation.
As a conclusion, this manual work aims to provide qualitative answers to demonstrate the
non-unified standard of different provenance tools and the feasibility of our expressiveness
benchmarking approach. In our manual approach, we first launch the provenance collecting
tools, then execute the control program and benchmark program separately. After that, we
compare the two resulting provenance graph to retrieve the additional part from the foreground
graph as the micro-benchmark for the target system-call patterns generated by these tools.
When we are transforming these steps into an automated approach, there are some challenging
parts, we will consider them one by one.
Launching and configuring the provenance collecting tools seems to be easy at first, but
it also requires efforts to make them function correctly. Some tools like SPADE has provided
a configured and reproducible virtual machine environment through vagrant (which is a util-
ity that allows a developer to auto-build a virtual machine and configure it to a predefined
state according to a set of scripts defined). But not all of the tools provide this kind of pre-
configurations and setting up and configuring those tools is not a trivial task. Part of the time
in the manual process has been spent to correctly configure those tools by finding the correct
combination of commands and arguments for our testing. These steps done can also help us
to understand the tools more thoroughly and this can reduce the time needed to build up the
automated modules to handle these tools later in the automated approach.
Another challenging part is the multiple output format of the tools. When we are comparing
the result of SPADE and OPUS, it is easy because both of them can output as the same Neo4J
graph database format. But in the wild, there is more type of output format used by different
tools. So one of the challenges for the automation process is to provide a unified provenance
format and transferring different type of result into the same format for comparisons. The other
challenge is related to the removal of volatile and unrelated information. As mentioned above,
when we are using the manual approach, we can ignore those volatile background information
and identifiers manually when we read through the nodes, edges and properties. But it is not
a trivial task for an automated process to identify them because the system has no idea how
to match the nodes and edges together and which of them should be filtered. To handle this
problem, we need to add in a generalization process and remove those volatile values which are
constantly changing in multiple executions of the same binary. This additional step can help
to decrease the amount of noise from background activities and identifiers to a minimum. Last
but not least, the most challenging task is the comparison of the background and foreground
graph to identify the additional patterns in the foreground graph. It may seem easy to do it
manually because we can easily spot the differences in the graph structure. But this is only
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limited to identifying the additional edges and nodes, we still need a long time to compare the
property values. In an automated approach, it needs to be done by first matching the nodes,
edges and properties of the two graph together before doing the comparison and identification.
As we are assuming the two graphs must have at least some graph pattern (after ignoring
the noises), we need to find the optimal mapping solution to correctly map the two different
graphs and identify the additional patterns. This is related to graph comparison which is a
hard and complex problem to solve. This becomes the most challenging problem to be solved
for the automation of the expressiveness benchmarking approach. We will discuss this graph
comparison problem in the next chapters.
3.6 Conclusion
Provenance is increasingly being used as a foundation for security analysis and forensics.
System-level provenance can help us trace activities at the level of libraries or system-calls,
which offers great potential for detecting subtle malicious activities that can otherwise go
undetected. However, analysing the raw provenance trace is challenging, due to scale and
to differences in data representation among system-level provenance recorders: for example,
common queries to identify malicious patterns need to be formulated in different ways on dif-
ferent systems. As a first step toward understanding the similarities and differences among
approaches, this chapter describes a manual approach to expressiveness benchmarking. This
helps us to understand the provenance patterns for the smallest meaningful units. system-calls
are interpreted differently by tools, which provide a reason for formalizing them.
In this chapter, we discuss the basic approach and the manual effort taken to build up the
foundation and consolidate the need for a fully automated system to compare the provenance
collecting tools. We also summarize the steps and the lessons learnt from the manual approach.
This helps us to identify some challenges when we need to automate the whole expressiveness
benchmarking approach. Starting from the next chapter, we will be discussing some necessary
bits on graph comparison which is one of the key obstacles in the automation of the framework.

Chapter 4
Graph isomorphism using answer set
programming
This chapter discusses the general isomorphic graph comparison and matching problem, and
how we solve the problem instances using answer set programming. This problem is a key
obstacle in automating the expressiveness benchmarking. Besides, the edit distance approach
for identification of graph similarity is also discussed in this chapter. The graph similarity is an
important factor for the sub-graph isomorphism problem as it helps to find the optimal solution
for the sub-graph mapping. We apply the edit distance approach for solving the graph similarity
problem with the support of answer set programming. This can allow easy modification which
is suitable for rapid prototyping situation. The proof of equivalence between the general edit
distance algorithm and our adopted version using answer set programming is given later in this
chapter. Lastly, some simple evaluations of our graph comparison and matching under different
configuration, scales and settings are described at the end of the chapter.
4.1 Motivation
4.1.1 From manual to automated
From the manual approach, we can observe that it is feasible to retrieve provenance patterns
for the minimum meaningful units, namely system-calls, by comparing the provenance graphs
generated. The result can be used for monitoring two slightly different program executions.
By comparing the resulting provenance graph generated from the execution of the background
program and the target foreground program, we can easily identify the additional patterns from
the foreground graph and extract it as the micro-benchmark. But if we consider the number of
provenance collecting tools that exist in the field and the number of system-calls supported in
a modern operating system, it is not practical to launch the tools one by one and compare them
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manually. If we want to build up a whole framework for the expressiveness benchmarking for
different collecting tools, we need to make the whole benchmarking process automated and
extensible. Considering the scale of the work, it is time-consuming to verify the provenance
systems when some upgrades and enhancement has been made. This step is important to ensure
the new changes do not affect other components and preserve the completeness and correctness
of the resulting provenance graphs. It is valuable to have an overview of changes and allows the
developer of the provenance system to verify if the tools are still functioning as expected. This
is one of the benefits provided by automating the benchmarking process. Also, changes in the
provenance tools may affect how we use and configure them, thus we aim to make the whole
automatic approach modular, allowing switching and modifying modules to support changes
or newly introducing provenance tools and provenance result types.
One of the most important steps we describe in the manual approach is the graph com-
parison. We generate two sets of graphs, foreground graph and background graph from the
control program and the target benchmark program. Two separate provenance graphs will be
generated. In this case, the only difference between the two graphs should be the additional
provenance data which describes the target system-call action. Although the programs are run-
ning in the same environment, there are volatile data in the graph that we defined as noise
which will affect the graph comparison result. In general, the noise is provenance information
that represents background information or identifiers that are not useful for identifying the exis-
tence of specific actions. It can either be some information that exists in almost all system-call
actions, or information that is not related to the specific actions itself. This noise may include
process IDs or timestamps which are assigned to each process and keep changing across dif-
ferent executions of the same programs. Other examples of noise include memory exchange
information which is background activities unrelated to the specific system-call actions and is
constantly changing across different program executions. If we can ignore this noise, the two
graphs should be isomorphic sub-graph pairs. For the manual comparison of the graphs, we
can easily ignore the noise manually and identify the provenance data sub-graph describing
the target system-call. But this is not an easy process for the automated approach, because the
system needs to first match the nodes and edges together one by one to find the matches before
identifying the additional part, there might be multiple possible mappings and the mapping
process may be subject to interference due to noise as it has no way to distinguish between
noise and useful data effectively. The complexity of (sub)graph isomorphism is a hard problem
in graph theory. This is one of the biggest obstacles when approaching a fully automated sys-
tem. So we aim to develop a set of algorithms to make the graph isomorphism problems easier
to solve by some assumption, approximation, and optimization.
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4.1.2 Graph / Sub-graph isomorphism comparison
Graph Isomorphism is a hard problem which is neither known to be tractable nor NP-complete.
On the contrary, sub-graph isomorphism is known to be NP-complete. Both of them are con-
sidered as hard search problems. The hardness appears to be mapping the nodes and edges
together with multiple possibilities and to check if they have the same structure in general.
There may exist some noise in the graph disturbing the comparison which needs to be avoided
by the settings. In our automated approach, we also need something similar. First, we need to
execute the same process multiple times and generalize the resulting provenance graphs into
a single graph. For deterministic input, we assume that the graphs generated by repeating
the same process should be isomorphic to each other. This assumption should be true when
we ignore those volatile variables that distinguish the different executions. To remove these
kinds of variables, we aim to compare these graphs and make a generalization to filter out
those volatile variables to retrieve only the necessary bit representing certain action sequences.
This requires graph comparison to discover similarities and differences between the graphs to
retrieve isomorphic pairs of graphs.
In addition to the traditional graph isomorphism matching problem, we also require sub-
graph isomorphism matching. When we compare the background graph and foreground graph,
we assume the graphs should only differ by the additional system-calls actions in the fore-
ground graph which are the provenance patterns describing the target system action. With this
assumption, we first need to map the remaining part together to understand what to filter out
to identify the resulting benchmark for that target system-call action. The isomorphism rela-
tionship exists between the background graph and a sub-graph of the foreground graph and the
remaining elements from the foreground graph which does not match are the resulting bench-
mark. For example, Figure 3.1 is a background graph generated by SPADE while Figure 3.2 is
a foreground graph generated by SPADE. SPADE monitors the execution of an empty binary
to generate the background graph. On the other hand, SPADE monitors the execution of a fore-
ground program which only contains a single creat system-call to generate the foreground
graph. By matching the background graph to a sub-graph of the foreground graph, we filter out
the matching elements and the result is the provenance benchmark. Sample provenance bench-
mark generated by SPADE to describe the provenance patterns of the creat system-call is
shown in Figure 3.3.
4.1.3 Application of the graph / sub-graph isomorphism
In general, there are many real business processes requires graph representation and process.
For example, a scientific database requires images to have associated provenance graphs to
record alteration history. If we have these (perhaps large) collections of graphs, there are
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several natural questions we might ask that require a notion of “similarity” of graphs. For
example, given graph G of interest, we might want to find the kth most similar graphs G′ with a
similar structure. Given two graphs, for example, provenance graphs tracing different runs of a
process, we might want to highlight the differences, to aid debugging or performance profiling.
Given a collection of graphs, we might want to automatically cluster them so that each cluster
consists of similar graphs. Last but not least, the automation of our expressiveness benchmark
also requires matching some similar graphs to extract general content and additional patterns
as benchmark mapping for high-level action sequences. These usages all require to have a way
to quantify the similarity before we can find the optimal mapping automatically.
These problems all involve computing a suitable “distance” metric between pairs of graphs,
and computing an associated partial matching between the graphs that aligns the common parts.
The graph edit distance is the least-cost sequence of editing steps needed to transform one
graph into the other. Finding the graph edit distance is an NP-complete problem. There are
(approximate or exact) algorithms for this problem, but they do not consider property graphs,
in which nodes and edges may have associated key-value pairs in addition to atomic labels.
Property graphs are in wide-spread use, to represent provenance, business processes, and as a
data model in graph databases such as Neo4j. So we want to extend this similarity comparison
approach to graph structure which the properties on nodes and edges also contribute to the
similarity metrics. This means the graph comparison problems not only consider the structure
of the graph, but also the properties of the graph.
In addition to the above usage, the similarity comparison approach using a suitable “dis-
tance” metric can also help to automate and compare graph for evaluation purposes. One of the
goals of the automated system is to give some end-users an easy answer of which provenance
generated by provenance systems provided the most complete and correct information for a
specific application. Also, another capability of the automated approach is to provide prove-
nance system developers with a reference to the differences between the provenance graph
results from two trial runs before and after some changes to the provenance system. This us-
age requires automatic comparisons of graphs and reporting the similarity level across graphs,
representing by some metric that is possible for users to understand. The usage of the simi-
larity comparison can provide a suitable “distance” metric that allows automated evaluation of
provenance graphs generated by different provenance systems or different trial executions of
the same provenance systems.
4.1.4 Comparing provenance graphs in general
In general graph theory, it is possible to have two graphs appearing as different shapes in
visual layout but are still an isomorphic pair of graphs which logically have the same graph
structure. An example can be found in Figure 2.1a where Graph G and H is an isomorphic
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pair but appearing differently. They should have a matching pair of nodes which preserve the
node adjacency relationship. That is when any node a and b from graph G are adjacent to
each other and node a and b map to node u and v from graph H respectively, then u and v
must also be adjacent to each other. One possible combination of matching nodes that make
Graph G and H an isomorphic pair can be found in Table 2.2. The problem to identify if two
graphs are isomorphic pair is believed to be hard. And the problem that requires to find the
matching pairs of nodes between two isomorphic graphs is also another hard question to solve.
In this project, we aim to use some approximation and support from answer set programming
to help solve the isomorphic graph matching problem. In this case, we assume the target given
must be an isomorphic pair if all edges, vertexes, and labels relating to background information
and identifiers are filtered out. Also, we assume that the property labels attached to the nodes
and edges of the graph are also part of the matching criteria on top of the original isomorphic
(sub)graph matching problems. This assumption allows the isomorphic (sub)graph matching
problem to be edge-preserving and label-preserving as mentioned in the last section.
The method we provide in this chapter requires some level of approximation on the match-
ing process that we try to minimize the number of mismatches through the comparison of the
edit distance metric. In this process, we need to match two graphs which are similar but are
not an isomorphic pair because they contain information that is changing across different exe-
cution of the same program. We consider these kinds of volatile information as noise and one
of our targets is to filter the noise from the graphs. As we assume that the two graphs only
contain a limited amount of differences, thus we try to find the exact solution of mapping by a
certain level of approximation on those unmatched structures and aim to discover the optimal
solution with minimum difference. As a result, the two graphs are still an isomorphic pair after
those unmatched parts are removed from the graph. In this situation, we assume the unmatched
structure in the optimal solutions to be noise and this is filtered out after the matching process.
In addition to the general graph isomorphism problem, we also try to solve the more spe-
cific problem, which is the isomorphic sub-graph matching problem. This is useful to match
a sub-graph to a larger graph and identify the additional elements in the larger graph. This is
another of the necessary components for our benchmark automation process. As mentioned in
the last chapter, one of the key processes is to identify the additional elements when comparing
the foreground and background graph. The major reason is we try to identify the provenance
representing the additional actions executed in the trial which generated the foreground graph.
The additional action executed should correspond to the target system-call. Identifying that
additional part means that we can successfully filter out the provenance for the background ac-
tion (which are represented by the isomorphic sub-graph matched between the two graphs) and
retrieve the key provenance graph elements that represent the target system-call action. Ad-
ditional uses include comparisons of structural formulas in chem-informatics for identifying
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the similar chemical structure of two chemical compounds [139, 53], matching and modelling
of social network or people [138], or even used for some pattern discovery for machine learn-
ing [141]. As a whole, we aim to provide a lightweight and minimum effort to benefit graph
comparison with sets of properties and thus provide a way to analyse the effectiveness of prove-
nance collecting mechanisms and the provenance graph information generated by them. This
may help to fill the gap for traditional solutions on graph comparison in terms of the additional
consideration of property set attached to the graph elements.
Graph comparison is not limited to comparing isomorphic (sub)graphs. It is possible that
the two comparing targets do not contain an isomorphic pair. The general case is to identify
the difference between the two graphs. By setting an acceptable range of difference, we can
determine if we consider the two compared graphs are indeed an isomorphic pair or containing
isomorphic sub-graph relationship. In addition to finding the most optimal mapping of nodes
and edges by getting the least edit distance value, the edit distance algorithm can also act as an
index to showcase how different the two graphs are. The discussion for the edit distance pro-
posal can be found in Section 2.4. In general data science and engineering field, understanding
the level of difference between two property graphs can have many uses. For example, we can
classify and cluster similar operations into groups, or we could easily evaluate the efficiency of
two similar actions using different approaches of intermediate steps. As a whole, edit distance
provides reference information to show the level of difference between two directed property
graphs for further processing in general.
4.2 Definitions
4.2.1 Graph definition
In general, the graph isomorphism problem can be used on both labelled and non-labelled
graphs. If an isomorphism exists between two graphs G and H, then the two graphs form an
isomorphic pair. In this case, the isomorphism of the two graphs is a edge-preserving vertex
bijection no matter if they are labelled graphs or not. If indeed the isomorphic pair is labelled
graphs, then this pair of graphs is also label-preserving in their bijection relationship. We are
concerned with labelled graphs which contain properties attached to vertices and edges. This
is something more deep in the graph isomorphism problems which need to fulfil mapping of
properties, either in the same class of variables or even values of variables. So in our project, we
are more aiming for both label-preserving and edge-preserving isomorphism which concentrate
on label classes (which is the volatile noise that we want to avoid) and values. Lastly, the
sub-graph isomorphism forms a special case which has a complexity of NP-complete. The
sub-graph isomorphism defines a similar relationship to the general graph isomorphism but the
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goal is different. The graphs’ relationships and all the invariants of the (sub)graph isomorphism
problems that are used in our automated approach are formally defined in Section 2.4.
As mentioned above, the generated provenance graphs always contain some noise because
of background activity or random identifiers. If we ignore this information, the remainder of
the graph should be the same across different trial executions. When working on the automat-
ing process, we want to filter out this information as much as possible to make the resulting
benchmark as accurate as possible for describing the target activity sequences. Thus we in-
troduce graph generalization steps before comparing and generating the final benchmark. By
execution the foreground and background program multiple times, we get a set of background
graphs (or BG in short) and a set of foreground graphs (or FG in short). The member graph of
the two sets should be similar to each other and should only be different in those background
activities and random identifiers which are considered as noise. Thus, comparing them and
filtering out the difference should help us deduce a common sub-graph from every member of
the set and produce a generalized graph which filters out most of the noise. This process will
be done on both sets of graphs which are generated from multiple executions of the respective
program. The definitions below show the generalization process of the two graph sets.
BG = {BG1,BG2, ...,BGn−1,BGn}
FG = {FG1,FG2, ...,FGn−1,FGn}
where BGn and FGn is the provenance graph collected and generated by the chosen provenance
system on the nth trial execution of the background or foreground program.
We assume that if we ignore those volatile variables which we call noise, like time-stamp
or process ID which try to distinguish each operation, the graphs should by almost the same as
each other in terms of vertices, edges, and properties. The assumption is defined for the whole
graph comparison problems.
BG1/noise1 = BG2/noise2 = ...= BGn−1/noisen−1 = BGn/noisen
FG1/noise1 = FG2/noise2 = ...= FGn−1/noisen−1 = FGn/noisen
In general, provenance graphs always contain attributes and properties that are volatile. So
it is possible that the property values defined are not the same in different graphs representing
the same execution. Thus, our invariants for the isomorphic (sub)graph problems need to be a
little bit relaxed in the property values, but the property keys still need to match in general. The
looser definition fits the actual behaviour of provenance collection across real executions. It is
a generalization of the existing isomorphic (sub)graph problem as there exist cases where even
if some of the property values do not match, we ignore them and still count them as structural
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matching. For handling this problem, we cannot simply compare the structure, we instead look
for the closest match in terms of property value because we cannot predict if the property value
is the same or different in some compared candidates. Also, most of the existing algorithms
concentrate on attributed graphs with a single attribute exists in edges. In our case for handling
provenance graphs, there always exist a large set of property values attached to both vertexes
and edges. This is one of the problems that are not much discussed in the research field.
4.2.2 Answer Set Programming
In this work, we make use of Answer Set Programming (ASP) [97, 95] to help solve the isomor-
phic (sub)graph comparison and matching problems. Its primary aim is to solve difficult search
problems, like problems in the NP-hard range fast and efficiently by logic programming. As
mentioned in Section 2.5, we are aiming to match isomorphic graph pairs with random prop-
erty values together. This action requires an intensive search for all possible matches of the
vertexes, edges and property keys. Besides, calculating the edit distance in terms of the change
needed for the property values is another example of a hard search problem. With the help of
Answer Set Programming, we turn the graph and the matching criteria into a set of Datalog
logical statements and use Clingo, the ASP solver from the Potsdam Answer Set Solving Col-
lection (Potassco), to help us determine the optimal solutions for the matching more efficiently.
The solutions to the problem then correspond to models of the combined theory and facts. One
of the deciding factors for the graph matching is optimizing the matching of vertices and edges
with properties. In real execution, there exists a lot of noise and unpredictable values such
as timestamps that will affect the optimization results. So, in addition to the consideration of
the graph structure itself, the closest proximity of the properties becomes another optimization
factor that needs to be considered. The closest proximity approach choose the solution with
the least amount of mismatches as the matching solution, which gradually decrease the time to
solve this complex problem by cross-matching all solutions.
Datalog is a Prolog-like syntax used in Clingo, which is often used to represent relational
data or multiple set structure in logic programming (as well as databases [2] and network-
ing [68]). We need to convert the graph into Datalog syntax before we can provide it to Clingo.
This is mainly because most provenance systems use a different format to represent and store
provenance graphs. To make those provenance graphs able to work in Clingo which are only
compatible with Datalog, the process to transform them to Datalog is necessary. Datalog de-
fines the graph structure by defining the nodes (vertexes), edges and labels set of a graph into
multiple lines of logical propositions. Each element from the three sets is represented by one
proposition statement. Thus it is easy and straightforward to transform from common graph
type into Datalog format by identifying the three sets of elements in the graph. Illustration of
the format for those statements is shown in Code Snippet 4.1.
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1 Node n<gid >(<nodeID>,< l a b e l >)
2 Edge e<gid >(<edgeID>,<s rc ID >,< t g t I D >,< l a b e l >)
3 Labe l l<gid >(<nodeID / edgeID>,<key>,<va lue >)
Code Snippet 4.1: Datalog graph format
We assume a fixed string gid used to uniquely identifies a given graph. Each node n is
represented as a fact ngid(nid , lab(nid)) where nid ∈ V is a vertex identifier. Likewise, each
edge e = (n1,n2) is represented as a fact egid(eid ,src(eid), tgt(eid), lab(eid)) where eid ∈ E is an
edge identifier (corresponding to the pair (n1,n2)). Finally, if a node or edge x has property key-
value pair p with value s, we represent this with the fact lgid(xid , p,s) where xid is the identifier
















Figure 4.1: Sample Graphs for Datalog demonstration
1 ng1 ( n1 , ” F i l e ” ) .
2 pg1 ( n1 , ” U s e r i d ” , ” 1 ” ) .
3 pg1 ( n1 , ” Name ” , ” t e x t ” ) .
4
5 ng2 ( n1 , ” F i l e ” ) .
6 ng2 ( n2 , ” P r o c e s s ” ) .
7 pg2 ( n1 , ” U s e r i d ” , ” 1 ” ) .
8 eg2 ( e1 , n1 , n2 , ” Used ” ) .
9 pg2 ( n1 , ” Name ” , ” t e x t ” ) .
Code Snippet 4.2: Datalog representation for Figure 4.1
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As mentioned above, we are focusing on two types of (sub)graph isomorphism problems.
One is the generalization problem, which compares members of provenance graph sets gener-
ated from multiple executions of the same program. In this case, we are assuming that these
graphs should be isomorphic when all the noise in the graph has been ignored. So the optimal
solution to match those very similar graphs should be chosen with the closest proximity so that
the two graphs only differ in a few property values and all other parts in the graphs should be
the same. This approach requires a measurement of proximity which is related to the graph
edit distance problem, which is a general-purpose way to compare two graphs. The graph edit
distance problem is also mentioned in Section 2.4. The calculation of the closest proximity is a
necessary step to map those volatile variables because the graphs generated from multiple trials
should be isomorphic except for the noise. So the target graph pairs should only differ from
the values of those volatile variables which can be mapped with a single in-place modification.
This modification operation should be the only contribution to the cost and it should be mini-
mized when mapping two correct node/edge pairs. In particular, the generalization problem is
a special case of graph edit distance where deletion or in-place modifications of properties have
cost 1, insertions have cost 0, node or edge insertions have cost 0, and node or edge deletions
are not allowed (i.e. have infinite cost). When we limit the associated cost of those properties
to 1, we are calculating how many different values exist in the graph pair, which also shows
how close the two graphs are. As defined above, the graph members from the same set should
be as close as possible and only differ in a small number of property values from noises.
The other problem is the discovery of a sub-graph which is isomorphic to another graph.
As the compared graphs are not the same or having that close proximity as the above case, it
is necessary to have some approximation on top of the matching process. The requirement for
this second problem is to find a sub-graph which forms an isomorphic relationship with the
other graph. As this problem is known to be complex (NP-Complete), we apply some level of
approximation when searching for optimal solutions. We aim to find the matching that has the
fewest mismatches and adopt the result directly. This is another application of the edit distance
metric to identify the closest match between sub-graph of the first graph and the second graph
in the graph pair, which should be nedge-preserving and label-preserving.
4.2.3 Edit distance operations
As mentioned in Section 2.4, the set of basic edit operations includes insertions, deletions
or in-place modifications. As we are mostly considering attributed multigraphs for the graph
comparison, matching and edit distance calculation problems, the edit operations can further
defined for different target elements in the graphs. The set of insertion operations inserting
a node/vertex (addV(v, l)), edge (addE(e,v1,v2, l)), or property key-value pair (addP(x,k,d)).
The set of deletion operations are simliar to the insertion operations, which includes, deleting
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op ∈ ops VG′ EG′ srcG′ tgtG′ labG′ propG′
addV(n, l) V ]{v} E src tgt lab[v := l] prop
addE(e,v,w, l) V E ]{e} src[e := v] tgt[e := w] lab[e := l] prop
addP(x,k,d) V E src tgt lab prop[x,k := d]
delV(v) V −{v} E src tgt lab[v :=⊥] prop
delE(e) V E−{e} src[e :=⊥] tgt[e :=⊥] lab[e :=⊥] prop
delP(x,k) V E src tgt lab prop[x,k :=⊥]
altP(x,k,d) V E src tgt lab prop[x,k := d]
Table 4.1: Edit operation semantics
a node/vertex (delV(v)), edge (delE(e)), or property key-value pair (delP(x,k)). Lastly, the set
of in-place operations only contains one operation which is the alteration of the property key-
value pair (altP(x,k,d)) because both edges and vertexes are either match or not match and
thus can only be deleted or inserted if they are not matched in the two graphs. Following the
graph definition in Section 2.4, we further define the the effect of each of the above operations
which is the only legal operations to be included in ops. Table 4.1 shows the meaning and effect
of each operation op ∈ ops on a graph. We write G = (VG,EG,srcG, tgtG, labG, propG) for the
graph before the edit and G′ = (VG′ ,EG′ ,srcG′ , tgtG′ , labG′ , propG′) for the updated graph after
applying any operation to G (op(G)).
4.3 Isomorphic graph matching by Clingo
In general graph isomorphism problems, the key requirement is to make sure that the two
graphs are isomorphic pairs. But our work includes some approximation by allowing some
unmatched graph structure. The optimal solutions for the mapping should have the least mis-
matched structure among the graphs. After finding the optimal solutions, we consider all the
remaining mismatch part to be noise and will filter it out. In this section, we aim to provide
works on the Clingo coding, trying to find an optimal solution for the pairs of graphs which
have minimum mismatch among them. This can be solved by calculating the edit distance
among all the possible matchings and find the optimal solution by choosing the matching with
the least edit distance value.
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4.3.1 Simple isomorphic graph matching
We first demonstrate the simplest problem with the least constraints. We ignore the property
labels and just consider the nodes and edges of the graph candidates in this problem. The
Clingo code shown in Code Snippet 4.3 demonstrates how to turn the simple isomorphic graph
matching problem into an answer set programming specification.
Consider the code in Code Snippet 4.3, we are simply comparing the nodes and edges of
the graph and try to match them together and preserving the edges. If a solution is found, it
means that the graphs are indeed isomorphic. If no solution is found, it means that the graphs
do not form an isomorphic pair. As a whole, this program checks if an isomorphic relationship
exists among the graphs, ignoring the property labels.
This is a complete program in the Clingo input format; if we combine it with Datalog
serializations of the two graphs and send it to Clingo, it will search for an isomorphism between
G1 into G2. The serialization definition can be found in Code Snippet 4.1 and an example can be
found in Code Snippet 4.2 which contains a sample Datalog serialization for Figure 4.1. These
rules define graph isomorphism matching as a decision problem over graphs with atomic labels
on vertices and edges. The labels have to match exactly, ignoring all other property labels for
all vertices and edges. If a solution is found, the solver prints out the matching relation that
witnesses the solution.
1 { match (X,Y) : n2 (Y, )} = 1 :− n1 (X, ) .
2 { match (X,Y) : e2 (Y, , , )} = 1 :− e1 (X, , , ) .
3
4 { match (X,Y) : n1 (Y, )} = 1 :− n2 (X, ) .
5 { match (X,Y) : e1 (Y, , , )} = 1 :− e2 (X, , , ) .
6
7 :− X <> Y, match (X, Z ) , match (Y, Z ) .
8 :− X <> Y, match ( Z ,Y) , match ( Z ,X ) .
9
10 :− n1 (X, L ) , match (X,Y) , n o t n2 (Y, L ) .
11 :− e1 ( E1 , , , L ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) , n o t e2 ( E2 , , , L ) .
12
13 :− n2 (X, L ) , match (X,Y) , n o t n1 (Y, L ) .
14 :− e2 ( E1 , , , L ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) , n o t e1 ( E2 , , , L ) .
15
16 :− e1 ( E1 , X1 , , ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) ,
17 e2 ( E2 , Y1 , , ) , n o t match ( X1 , Y1 ) .
18 :− e1 ( E1 , , X2 , ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) ,
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19 e2 ( E2 , , Y2 , ) , n o t match ( X2 , Y2 ) .
20
21 :− e2 ( E1 , X1 , , ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) ,
22 e1 ( E2 , Y1 , , ) , n o t match ( X1 , Y1 ) .
23 :− e2 ( E1 , , X2 , ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) ,
24 e1 ( E2 , , Y2 , ) , n o t match ( X2 , Y2 ) .
25
26 #show match / 2 .
27
28 %D a t a l o g s e r i a l i z a t i o n o f t h e two g r a p h s goes h e r e
Code Snippet 4.3: Clingo code for simple isomorphic graph matching
The list below shows more detailed descriptions of the Clingo code:
• Lines 1 and 2 states that for each node and edge in G1, there should be exactly one node
in G2 linked to it by the match predicate. These rules have the effect of defining a search
space for possible solutions: all possible relations matching each node and edge in G1
to a corresponding node and edge in G2. The underscores are wild-cards, indicating that
the additional arguments of the predicates are ignored here.
• Lines 4 and 5 are the opposite of lines 1 and 2, which state that for each node and edge
in G2, there should be exactly one node in G1 linked to it by the match predicate. These
two lines complete the two-way definition to ensure G1 and G2 are isomorphic to each
other.
• Lines 7 and 8 states that it should be impossible to have two different nodes (or edges)
X and Y such that both X and Y are mapped to Z, or vice versa. That is, the matching
relation needs to be a one-to-one function from nodes and edges of G1 to those of G2.
• Lines 10 and 11 say that each node/edge in G1 needs to be matched to a node/edge in
G2 with the same label. That is, line 10 says it is impossible that node X in G1 has label
L and is matched to a node Y and Y does not have label L.
• Lines 13 and 14 are the opposite of lines 10 and 11, which say that each node/edge in
G2 needs to be matched to a node/edge in G1. Similar to lines 10 and 11. These two
lines complete the two-way definition to ensure G1 and G2 are isomorphic to each other.
• Lines 16–19 say that if an edge E1 in G1 is matched by another edge E2 in G2, then the
source and target of E1 should be matched to the source and respectively target of E2.
Again, this has to be formulated as a constraint.
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• Lines 21–24 is the opposite of lines 16–19, which say that if an edge E2 in G2 is matched
by another edge E1 in G1, then the source and target of E2 should be matched to the
source and respectively target of E1. Again, these lines complete the bijection relation-
ship among two directions of the graph isomorphism.
• Line 26 is a directive instructing the solver to print out the definition of the match re-
lation whenever a solution is found. This is what we are interested in, not just whether
such matching exists.
• Finally, line 28 is the end of the main program. The Datalog serialization of the two
target graphs is expected to be inserted here. This is an important step because Clingo
needs the graph data to do the real logical isomorphic matching. This statement exists in
line 28 as just a comment denoting the location for inserting the real graph candidates.
Figure 4.2 shows a sample isomorphic graph pair with their Datalog representation (which
is reusing the example graphs and mappings shown in Section 2.4. The type V and E are
dummy type labels representing Vertex and Edge respectively as we assume all directed multi-











n2(1,"V"). n2(2,"V"). n2(3,"V"). n2(4,"V").
e2(e6,1,4,"E"). e2(e7,2,1,"E"). e2(e8,2,3,"E").
e2(e10,3,1,"E"). e2(e9,3,4,"E").
Figure 4.2: Example of isomorphic graph pair
We try to demonstrate the real execution for Code Snippet 4.3 on the graphs shown in
Figure 4.2. We first attached the Datalog representation of the graph pair to the end of Code
Snippet 4.3 and execute it in Clingo (Clingo code can be executed by Clingo application in
the host machine or through the Clingo online demo webpage1). The result is shown in Fig-
ure 4.3 and are summarized in Table 4.2. We can see that the mapping is in both directions
as isomorphic graph pair means that there is two bijection functions mapping for vertexes and
edges for the two graph involved. The result demonstrates that the given Code Snippet 4.3
does successfully identify the matching pairs of vertexes and edges in the two graphs and thus
is confirmed that the two graphs G and H are indeed an isomorphic pair with a set of matching
1https://potassco.org/clingo/run/
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elements. This proves the correctness of the sample mapping given in Table 2.2 which is shown
in Section 2.4.
match ( 1 , ”B” ) match ( 3 , ”C” ) match ( 4 , ”D” ) match ( 2 , ”A” )
match ( ”D” , 4 ) match ( ”B” , 1 ) match ( ”C” , 3 ) match ( ”A” , 2 )
match ( e7 , e1 ) match ( e8 , e2 ) match ( e6 , e3 ) match ( e10 , e4 ) match ( e9 , e5 )
match ( e3 , e6 ) match ( e1 , e7 ) match ( e2 , e8 ) match ( e4 , e10 ) match ( e5 , e9 )
Code Snippet 4.4: Clingo code for simple isomorphic graph matching
Figure 4.3: Execution result for Code Snippet 4.3 with graph shown in Figure 4.2
Graph G Node Graph H Node Graph G Edge Graph H Edge
A 2 e1 (A→ B) e7 (2→ 1)
B 1 e2 (A→ C) e8 (2→ 3)
C 3 e3 (B→ D) e6 (1→ 4)
D 4 e4 (C→ B) e10 (3→ 1)
e5 (C→ D) e9 (3→ 4)
Table 4.2: Mapping element set of Graph G and Graph H in Figure 4.2
4.3.2 Filtering non-isomorphic graphs
We mentioned that we always assume that the two graphs are isomorphic pair after noise filter-
ing because the provenance graphs are describing the same action sequences. This assumption
is true in most cases. But there exist some scenarios which we want to identify if the two graphs
are isomorphic before the matching process. One example of this can refer to our original moti-
vation which is the expressiveness benchmarking of the provenance collecting tools. To reduce
the amount of noise in the graph, we are aiming to provide some generalization process before
doing the real benchmarking process to identify the additional patterns representing the target
action sequences. But there are some additional considerations needed in the execution pro-
cess of multiple provenance collecting sessions. Most of the provenance collecting tools aim
to be started together with the system and record all activities across the active session until
the system is shut down. Some of them are not meant to collect provenance on a process by
process basis. For this kind of provenance collecting tool, it is sometimes hard to filter out and
divide the collected provenance into chunks to represent executions of the same binary files.
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Forced chunking of this provenance information or continuous turning on and off of the prove-
nance collecting tool may result in some amount of errors for the graph candidates. If there are
some problematic graphs included in the candidates, the assumption of isomorphic pairs for all
graphs cannot be preserved. This may result in wrong processing or waste of a large amount of
time to match graph pairs which are not isomorphic at all. To handle this problem in general,
we provide a way to check if the graph pair is indeed isomorphic and try to filter out as many
error graphs as we could. Although we are aiming to filter out all of those erroneous graphs,
it is not always possible because the isomorphic graph mapping problem is also very complex.
We also add in some rules to filter out those obvious problematic graphs and reduce the chance
for matching pairs of graphs which are not isomorphic and waste time and resources to find a
non-existing optimal solution.
In the above-mentioned case, the correct graph should always preserve the same amount of
edges, nodes, and properties because they are referring to the same execution in a different trial.
The only difference should be some values in the properties, but the whole structure should
keep the same. With this knowledge, we can do some basic filtering before putting them to the
mapping. For example, we could count their numbers of nodes, edges, and properties and only
proceed if their element numbers are matched. The code in Code Snippet 4.5 aims to map the
two target graph together after some basic filtering to check if the two graphs have a chance of
being an isomorphic pair.
The code in Code Snippet 4.5 is very similar to the code shown in Code Snippet 4.3 for
the simple isomorphic graph matching problem. This code can be considered as a more spe-
cific version of the simple isomorphic graph problem. In the original code, it can also help to
solve the isomorphic sub-graph problem in addition to the general isomorphic graph match-
ing problem because, in the scenario of isomorphic sub-graph matching, G1 may have a set of
matching nodes and edges to G2 but not the reverse. Then it is still possible that G1 is isomor-
phic to a sub-graph of G2 which forms a pair of isomorphic sub-graphs. But in our proposed
scenario, the graphs should be almost identical without considering the values in the property
labels. Thus their structure should be the same and their isomorphic relationship should be a
bijection relationship. For this reason, the mapping should be working in both directions to
make the constraint tighter. Also, we add in the mapping for the property label (ignoring the
value) to increase the accuracy of the identification of those erroneous graphs which should
be non-isomorphic to other graphs. As a result, ProvMark makes use of the slightly modified
code from Code Snippet 4.3 to identify possible isomorphic pairs within the set of generated
provenance graphs with edge-preserving and label preserving properties. The graphs that are
not isomorphic to other graphs in the set have a high chance to be erroneous graphs that exist
randomly. These erroneous graphs are filtered out to increase the correctness and completeness
of the generalization process.
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1 { match (X,Y) : n2 (Y, )} = 1 :− n1 (X, ) .
2 { match (X,Y) : n1 (X, )} = 1 :− n2 (Y, ) .
3
4 { match (X,Y) : e2 (Y, , , )} = 1 :− e1 (X, , , ) .
5 { match (X,Y) : e1 (X, , , )} = 1 :− e2 (Y, , , ) .
6
7 :− X <> Y, match (X, Z ) , match (Y, Z ) .
8 :− X <> Y, match ( Z ,Y) , match ( Z ,X ) .
9
10 :− n1 (X, L ) , match (X,Y) , n o t n2 (Y, L ) .
11 :− n2 (Y, L ) , match (X,Y) , n o t n1 (X, L ) .
12
13 :− e1 ( E1 , , , L ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) , n o t e2 ( E2 , , , L ) .
14 :− e2 ( E2 , , , L ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) , n o t e1 ( E1 , , , L ) .
15
16 :− e1 ( E1 , X1 , , ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) ,
17 e2 ( E2 , Y1 , , ) , n o t match ( X1 , Y1 ) .
18 :− e1 ( E1 , , X2 , ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) ,
19 e2 ( E2 , , Y2 , ) , n o t match ( X2 , Y2 ) .
20
21 :− l 1 (X, K, ) , match (X,Y) , n o t l 2 (Y, K, ) .
22 :− l 2 (Y, K, ) , match (X,Y) , n o t l 1 (X, K, ) .
23
24 % D i s p l a y
25 #show match / 2 .
26
27 %D a t a l o g s e r i a l i z a t i o n o f t h e two g r a p h s goes h e r e
Code Snippet 4.5: Clingo code to check if two graphs are pair of isomorphic sub-graphs
The list below shows more detailed descriptions of the Clingo code:
• Lines 1, 4, 7–10, 13, 16–19, 24–27 are the same set of code in Code Snippet 4.3 which
is a general mapping for both the isomorphic graph / sub-graph problem.
• Line 2 and line 5 are the reverse mappings for line 1 and line 4, which state that for
each node and edge in G2, there should be exactly one node and edge in G1 linked to it
by the match predicate. This rule has the effect of defining a search space for possible
solutions: all possible relations matching each node and edge in G2 to a corresponding
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node in G1.
• Line 11 and line 14 are the reverse mappings for line 10 and line 13, which say that each
node/edge in G2 needs to be matched to a node/edge in G1 with the same label. That is,
line 11 says it is impossible that node Y in G2 has label L and is matched to a node X
and X does not have label L.
• Line 14 is the reverse mapping for line 13, which say that each edge in G2 needs to be
matched to an edge in G1 with the same label.
• Finally, Lines 21–22 is the additional mapping for property labels, which say that each
label in G1 needs to be matched to a label in G2 which should be attached to the same
node/edge which is mapped together in G1 and G2, and vice versa. In other words,
if G1 is isomorphic to G2 with optimal matching given by isomorphism relationship
function f , then the specification is satisfiable using match(x,y) defined as f (x) = y,
and if G1 is not isomorphic to G2 then there will be no optimal solution and the result is
”unsatisfiable”
4.3.3 Isomorphic sub-graph matching
As we mentioned above, apart from the simple isomorphic graph matching problem, we also
aim to solve the more complicated isomorphic sub-graph matching problem. It is known that
the simple isomorphic sub-graph matching is NP-complete [39, 45]. One of the key points
is, even if one graph is isomorphic to a sub-graph of another, it is still very hard to find the
matching pairs as the search space for the matching could be huge. This makes this specific
problem seem to be even harder than the general isomorphic graph matching problem. Here we
try to make use of some approximation, together with the additional consideration of the key-
value property labels attached to the nodes and edges to help us to find an optimal matching
solution. An optimal solution should have the least edit distance, following the cost definition
back in Section 2.4. The approximation we applied in this situation concentrates on the key-
value property labels as we assume that the amount of volatile variables is minimum and so
it provides the least noise which will affect the calculation of edit distance. We will keep the
requirement that labels of vertexes or edges need to match exactly, at the same time we allow
vertices and edges to have key-value properties that can match approximately. As in most
scenarios, property values in provenance graphs also show information about the operations
which should be almost the same except for some volatile variables. That matches our need in
handling the large set of provenance properties attached to vertices and edges in a real scenario.
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1 { match (X,Y) : n2 (Y, )} = 1 :− n1 (X, ) .
2 { match (X,Y) : e2 (Y, , , )} = 1 :− e1 (X, , , ) .
3
4 :− X <> Y, match (X, Z ) , match (Y, Z ) .
5 :− X <> Y, match ( Z ,Y) , match ( Z ,X ) .
6
7 :− n1 (X, L ) , match (X,Y) , n o t n2 (Y, L ) .
8 :− e1 ( E1 , , , L ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) , n o t e2 ( E2 , , , L ) .
9
10 :− e1 ( E1 , X1 , , ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) ,
11 e2 ( E2 , Y1 , , ) , n o t match ( X1 , Y1 ) .
12 :− e1 ( E1 , , X2 , ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) ,
13 e2 ( E2 , , Y2 , ) , n o t match ( X2 , Y2 ) .
14
15 # min imize { LC , X,K : l a b e l c o s t (X, K, LC) } .
16 l a b e l c o s t (X, K, 0 ) :− l 1 (X, K,V) , match (X,Y) ,
17 l 2 (Y, K,V ) .
18 l a b e l c o s t (X, K, 1 ) :− l 1 (X, K, V1 ) , match (X,Y) ,
19 l 2 (Y, K, V2 ) , V1 <> V2 .
20 l a b e l c o s t (X, K, 1 ) :− l 1 (X, K,V) , match (X,Y) ,
21 n o t l 2 (Y, K, ) .
22
23 #show match / 2 .
24
25 %D a t a l o g s e r i a l i z a t i o n o f t h e two g r a p h s goes h e r e
Code Snippet 4.6: Clingo code for simple isomorphic sub-graph matching with minimum
mismatch
The code specified in Code Snippet 4.6 is the code considering the property values attached
to nodes and edges when we are handling the graph isomorphism comparison and matching.
As it is possible to have multiple solutions due to the uncertainty of some non-deciding factors
in the provenance graph, this new approach provides an optimization constraint, essentially it
says to search over all of the possible solutions to the first specification and finds a least-cost
one (closest proximity in general). This is accomplished using a general branch-and-bound
algorithm and we are assuming each property value carries an equal weight of importance in
the provenance graph.
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The list below shows more detail description of the Clingo code:
• Lines 1–13 and lines 23-25 are the same set of code in Code Snippet 4.3 which aim to
find the matching nodes and edges. The additional lines 15–21 is the additional code
to provide constraints to match the key-value property labels attached to the nodes and
edges for the calculation of an optimal isomorphic graph and sub-graph matching. It is
worth mentioning that in this code, we did not include the lines for the opposite definition
because the problem we are solving here is a sub-graph isomorphism problem which the
isomorphic relationship is not bi-directional between two graphs.
• line 15 introduces an optimization constraint. It says that we wish to minimize the sum
of all costs C such that cost(X,K,C) holds.
• lines 16–21 define the cost predicate. The cost associated with identifier X and key K
is zero if X has K-value V in G1 and is matched with an identifier Y in G2 that has the
same K-value V . If the keys both exist in the two matched nodes but are different, then
the cost is 1, and likewise, if the key exists in the first graph but not the second, the cost
is 1. As additional property keys may refer to important information related to the target
activity sequence, thus keys that occur only in the second graph do not incur a cost; that
is, it is OK for the second graph to have more key-value pairs (just like it can have more
nodes or edges) as long as it doesn’t conflict with corresponding key-value pairs in the
sub-graph.
4.3.4 Edit distance calculation
The isomorphic (sub)graph matching problem we studied above is related to the graph edit
distance problem, which is a general-purpose way to compare two graphs. Given two graphs,
and a set of basic edit operations (e.g., insertions, deletions or in-place modifications) with
associated costs, the edit distance is the minimum cost of a sequence of edit operations that
transforms the first graph into the second. By definition, if two graphs are isomorphic and they
only differ in some values of the volatile property labels, the optimal solution for the graph
matching should have the minimum mismatch between the graphs. In particular, the isomor-
phic sub-graph matching problem is a special case where deletion or in-place modifications of
properties have cost 1, insertions have cost 0, node or edge insertions have cost 0, and node or
edge deletions are not allowed (i.e. have infinite cost). These special properties help us get the
optimal sub-graph matching and allows us to identify the correct additional elements from the
bigger graph (foreground graph in our approach). Although edit distance can be used for iden-
tifying the optimal solution (with minimum edit distance value) for the isomorphic (sub)graph
matching problem, it can also be used as a metric for showing the level of difference between
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any two graphs. In this subsection, we provide a more general edit distance calculation that is
not limited to the graph isomorphism and matching problem.
In general, graph comparison is not limited to isomorphic (sub)graph pairs. It is possible
that the two targets are not isomorphic. We could identify this when the code from Code Snip-
pet 4.3 and 4.6 returns nothing as result. But it may need to take a long time to try matching all
possibility before answering. In this case, we can simply use edit distance as an index to show
how the two graphs differ. A clear example for the usage of edit distance as a metric can refer
to one of our original motivations for the expressiveness benchmarking. One of the reasons we
want to initiate an expressiveness benchmarking is we want to provide a unified way to com-
pare the capabilities of different provenance collecting tools in different scenarios. Most of the
provenance generated by those tools are displayed in graph format. By comparing those final
provenance patterns (which are not guaranteed to be isomorphic to each other) generated from
different tools, we can quantify on the level of difference among the tools when it is handling
the same set of action sequences. Besides, if we already know that some resulting provenance
is the closest to what we want, then the edit distance quantifiers can help us identify how the
other provenance collecting tools behave compared to the most capable result. In general, edit
distance acts as a numeric quantity to showcase the level of difference of the graphs. It can also
help to classify and cluster graphs generated from the same provenance systems for different
action sequences. This can help to understand how the provenance systems treat different kinds
of system-calls and actions and how they group the actions.
Computing the graph edit distance (and the associated alignment of the two graphs) is
a non-trivial search problem; even though isomorphic sub-graph matching is NP-complete,
in practice it makes sense to use the more specialized code above to solve the (sub)graph
isomorphic matching problems because it imposes further constraints on the search space that
a smart solver can use to improve performance in many cases. However, we also sometimes
want to compare two arbitrary graphs where we do not have any reason to believe that one is
structurally isomorphic to a sub-graph of another. An example is the case mentioned above
when we want to compare the benchmark result patterns generated from different provenance
collecting tools for the same set of action sequences. Another example is the case which we
want to classify and group the benchmark result patterns for different system-calls generated
from the same provenance collecting tools, like the sample classification mentioned in Chapter
3.
Code Snippet 4.7 shows our code for getting the minimum edit distance value itself. As
mentioned above, the general edit distance problem may be used for quantifying the difference
between the two graphs. We do not use any #show directive to display the optimal matching
result; however, it is possible to do so by adding some predicates like the last two examples.
By showing the optimal matching solution like the one mentioned in the last two subsections,
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we could understand which (sub) graph matches the graph pair. By showing the operations
(insertion, modification, and deletion), we can know what action has been done and which
parts are different between the graphs.
1 { match (X,Y) } <= 1 :− n1 (X, ) , n2 (Y, ) .
2 { match (X,Y) } <= 1 :− e1 (X, , , ) , e2 (Y, , , ) .
3
4 :− X <> Y, match (X, Z ) , match (Y, Z ) .
5 :− X <> Y, match ( Z ,Y) , match ( Z ,X ) .
6
7 :− n1 (X, L ) , match (X,Y) , n o t n2 (Y, L ) .
8 :− e1 ( E1 , , , L ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) , n o t e2 ( E2 , , , L ) .
9
10 :− e1 ( E1 , X1 , , ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) ,
11 e2 ( E2 , Y1 , , ) , n o t match ( X1 , Y1 ) .
12 :− e1 ( E1 , , X2 , ) , match ( E1 , E2 ) ,
13 e2 ( E2 , , Y2 , ) , n o t match ( X2 , Y2 ) .
14
15 add node (Y, L ) :− n2 (Y, L ) , n o t match ( ,Y ) .
16 add edge (Y, S , T , L ) :− e2 (Y, S , T , L ) , n o t match ( ,Y ) .
17 add key (Y, K,V) :− l 2 (Y, K,V) , add node (Y, ) .
18 add key (Y, K,V) :− l 2 (Y, K,V) , add edge (Y, , , ) .
19 add key (Y, K,V) :− l 2 (Y, K,V) , match (X,Y) , n o t l 1 (X, K, ) .
20
21 remove node (X) :− n1 (X, ) , n o t match (X, ) .
22 remove edge (X) :− e1 (X, , , ) , n o t match (X, ) .
23 remove key (X,K) :− l 1 (X, K, ) , remove node (X ) .
24 remove key (X,K) :− l 1 (X, K, ) , remove edge (X ) .
25 remove key (X,K) :− l 1 (X, K, ) , match (X,Y) , n o t l 2 (Y, K, ) .
26
27 u p d a t e v a l u e (X, K, V1 , V2 ) :− l 1 (X, K, V1 ) , match (X,Y) ,
28 l 2 (Y, K, V2 ) , V1 <> V2 .
29
30 n o d e c o s t (Y, 1 ) :− add node (Y, ) .
31 n o d e c o s t (X, 1 ) :− remove node (X ) .
32 n o d e c o s t (X, 0 ) :− n1 (X, ) , match (X,Y) , n2 (Y, ) .
33 e d g e c o s t (Y, 1 ) :− add edge (Y, , , ) .
34 e d g e c o s t (X, 1 ) :− remove edge (X ) .
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35 e d g e c o s t (X, 0 ) :− e1 (X, , , ) , match (X,Y) , e2 (Y, , , ) .
36 l a b e l c o s t (X, K, 1 ) :− u p d a t e v a l u e (X, K, V1 , V2 ) .
37 l a b e l c o s t (X, K, 1 ) :− remove key (X,K ) .
38 l a b e l c o s t (Y, K, 1 ) :− add key (Y, K,V ) .
39 l a b e l c o s t (X, K, 0 ) :− l 1 (X, K,V) , match (X,Y) , l 2 (Y, K,V ) .
40
41 # min imize { NC,X : n o d e c o s t (X,NC ) ;
42 EC ,X : e d g e c o s t (X, EC ) ;
43 LC , X,K : l a b e l c o s t (X, K, LC ) } .
44
45 %D a t a l o g s e r i a l i z a t i o n o f t h e two g r a p h s goes h e r e
Code Snippet 4.7: Clingo code for the edit distance calculation
The major idea is shown in Code Snippet 4.7 is that the final edit distance result comparing
for a different group of graphs can showcase how different it is from the others. If the two
graphs have an edit distance lower than a threshold, then it can be classified into the same
group. One example of this usage can be referred to our expressiveness benchmarking of
different provenance collecting tools. If the final provenance benchmark patterns of the two
tools have an edit distance which is lower than a pre-set threshold, we can say that these two
tools behave almost the same in handling certain action sequence or system-call action. We
can then say that the tools similarly handle these two system-calls.
The list below shows more detailed descriptions of the Clingo code:
• Lines 1–2 states that between each pair of nodes (or pair of edges) there can be at most
one matching relationship. This relaxes the constraint that each node/edge in G1 needs
to be matched to a node/edge in G2 which we used in the specifications for isomorphic
sub-graph matching problem.
• Lines 4–13 are exactly as in the previous specification, and ensure that the matching is
compatible with the labels and matching preserves edge relationships.
• Lines 15–19 define when an element is considered to be inserted for a given matching;
Line 15 is related to node insertion, line 16 is related to edge insertion and lines 17–18
are related to property key-value pair labels insertion.
• Lines 21–25 define when an element is considered to be deleted for a given matching;
Line 21 is related to node deletion, line 22 is related to edge deletion and lines 23–25
are related to property key-value pair labels deletion.
• Lines 27–28 define when a property key-value pair label is considered to be updated
in-place.
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• Lines 30–39 define the costs associated with each element, depending on whether the
element is preserved, inserted, deleted or updated; Lines 30–32 are related to node ac-
tions, lines 33–35 are related to edge actions and lines 36–39 are related to label actions.
Preserved elements attract no cost, while updates, inserts, and deletes all have cost 1.
• Lines 41–43 contain a directive that specifies that we wish to minimize the total cost,
resulting from summing the costs of all nodes, edges, and properties induced by the
given matching.
• Finally, similar to the last two problems, the Datalog serialization of the two target
graphs are expected to be inserted at the end of the program marked in line 45.
Formulating edit distance as an answer set programming problem must be possible in prin-
ciple (since it is NP-complete) but is tricky since we cannot easily represent edit scripts of
arbitrary length, and it is non-trivial to compute an upper bound on the maximum length of an
edit script linking two graphs. Instead, the approach we take is to search for partial matching
of the nodes and edges of G1 to those of G2. The matching induces two temporary transition
graphs GT 1 and GT 2 which represents the common substructure of G1 and G2. The two transi-
tion graphs should share the common set of nodes, edges, and key-value property labels. The
transition between GT 1 and GT 2 only includes in-place updates as they share a common set of
elements. In other word, the edit script must be factorizable into a sequence of deletions trans-
forming G1 into GT 1, followed by in-place updates transforming GT 1 into GT 2 and insertions









Figure 4.4: Illustration of our edit script factorization
The edit distance approach aims to find the least cost required to transform one graph
into another. If all insertions, in-place updates, and deletions have the same cost, the edit
distance approach can help to discover the least operations needed for the graph transformation.
There are no constraints to limit the order of the operations when calculating the edit distance
approach. The resulting operations path for the transformation with least edit distance can have
a different order of insertion, deletion, and updates. As a result, there may exist a large set of
results with the same set of operations in different orders. In our scenario, we formulate edit
distance as an answer set programming problems. As it is not trivial to compute an upper bound
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for the length of the edit scripts with uncertain order, we factorize and group the operations as
mentioned above. Following the visualization in Figure 4.4, there are two paths to transform G1
into G2. The path displayed in the dotted arrow represents the edit script for transforming the
graph using the general edit distance approach with no constraints of the orders of operations.
The path in solid arrow represents the edit script factorized specifically for our approach to
formulate with answer set programming. The two transition graphs GT 1 and GT 2 must have the
same structure and the transformation between them should not insert or delete any elements.
This assumption makes GT 1 and GT 2 an isomorphic pair when ignoring all the values of the
property labels.
Following the defined order visualized in Figure 4.4, we further define a canonical form
which has specific order requirements for each set of factorized operations in ops. The defini-
tion assists the reasoning on showing our adoption of edit distance approach using answer set
programming does find the optimal solution with minimum edit distance value.
Definition 1. Edit script canonical form. An edit script is in canonical form if it is of the form
delp;dele;delv;altp;addv;adde;addp, where:
– delp, dele and delv are sequences of property deletions(delP(x,k)), edge
deletions(delE(e)), and node deletions(delV(v)) respectively;
– altp is a sequence of property updates (altP(x,k,d));
– addv, adde, and addp are sequences of node insertions(addV(v, l)), edge
insertions(addE(e,v1,v2, l)), and property insertions(addP(x,k,d)), respectively.
We argue that any valid edit script can be converted to a canonical one by applying a set
of rewrite rules, as shown in Figure 4.5-4.7 for each of the basic operations. We first consider
marked versions op∗ of each edit operation, for example writing delP∗(x,k) for the marked
version of delP(x,k). A marked operation op∗ has the same effect as op when applied to a
graph; the mark is only to indicate which operation is actively being rewritten. The idea here
is that if we have a canonical edit script ops and wish to add a new edit operation, we use the
rewrite rules to “canonicalize” op∗;ops. The rules are applied in order and at each step, the
first matching rule is applied. Essentially, the rewrite rules consider all of the possible pairs
of adjacent operations that can appear in a non-canonical form, with the first element marked.
In each case, they show how to simplify the edit script by either moving the marked operation
closer to the end or removing the mark. Removal can happen as a result of either cancellation
of the marked operation by another operation (e.g. a delete undoing an insert), or by removing
the mark once it has reached an appropriate place for it in the canonical form.
In general, the rewrite rules semantics mentioned in Figure 4.5-4.7 aims to convert an edit
script into the canonical form which each of the seven supported basic operations is grouped
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and performed in the predefined order. During the rewrite process, each of the operations is
first marked and added to the beginning of the edit script that is already in canonical form. The
marked operator will keep moving towards the end of the script until one of the two conditions
is met. First of all, there is a catch-all rule (as mentioned above) to simply remove the marks
from the incoming operation and confirm that the current edit script is in canonical form. This
rule only applies when none of the rewrite rules is applied. In other words, it means that the
current edit script is already in canonical form and did not need a further rewrite. In the general
case, it represents the marked operation is already reached the designated location where all
edit operations in the edit script are grouped. The rewrite will also stop when a cancellation
occurs. It is quite obvious that when an insertion and deletion operations on the same elements
are adjacent to each other, it is safe to cancel each other out to decrease the value of edit
distance because the graph does not change after a set of insertion/deletion operation of the
same elements. The result of the cancellation is an empty string which does not affect the edit
script, thus the edit script remains in canonical form. Apart from cancellation and exchanging
the order of operations to move it towards the end, there are two special rewrite rules for the
update operation of the property key-value pairs. There are no update operations for vertexes
or edges because the mapping result of vertexes or edges is either match or not match and
this limit the operations to insertion and deletion only. When an update operation and a delete
operation of the same property is adjacent to each other, only the delete operation will remain.
This is because if a delete operation of property exists, it means that either the resulting graph
does not have this property or the resulting graph does not have the annotated elements for
this property. Thus the update of the property values is redundant. On the other hand, when an
update operation and an insert operation of the same property is adjacent to each other, only the
insert operation will remain. This is because if an insert operation of property exists, it means








delV∗(v);ops −→ delV(v);ops if no earlier rule applies
(c) Operation delV(v)
Figure 4.5: Edit script rewrite rules for deletion operations
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altP∗(x,k,d);delP(y,k′) −→
{




altP∗(x,k,d);ops −→ altP(x,k,d);ops if no earlier rule applies
Figure 4.6: Edit script rewrite rules for operation altP(x,k,d)
addV∗(v, l);delP(x,k) −→ delP(x,k);addV∗(v, l)
addV∗(v, l);delE(e) −→ delE(e);addV∗(v)
addV∗(v, l);delV(v′) −→
{
ε if v = v′
delV(v′);addV∗(v, l) otherwise
addV∗(v, l);altP(x,k,d) −→ altP(x,k,d);addV∗(v, l)
addV∗(v, l);ops −→ addV(v, l);ops if no earlier rule applies
(a) Operation addV(v, l)
addE∗(e,v1,v2, l);delP(x,k) −→ delP(x,k);addE∗(e,v1,v2, l)
addE∗(e,v1,v2, l);delE(e′) −→
{
ε if e = e′
delE(e′);addE∗(e,v1,v2, l) otherwise
addE∗(e,v1,v2, l);delV(v′) −→ delV(v′);addE∗(e,v1,v2, l)
addE∗(e,v1,v2, l);altP(x,k,d) −→ altP(x,k,d);addE∗(e,v1,v2, l)
addE∗(e,v1,v2, l);addV(v′, l) −→ addV(v′, l);addE∗(e,v1,e2, l)
addE∗(e,v1,v2, l);ops −→ addE(e,v1,v2, l);ops if no earlier rule applies
(b) Operation addE(x,v1,v2, l)
addP∗(x,k,d);delP(y,k′) −→
{






addP∗(x,y,d′) if x = y,k = k′
altP(y,k′,d′);addP∗(x,k,d) otherwise
addP∗(x,k,d);addV(v, l) −→ addV(v′, l);addP∗(x,k,d)
addP∗(x,k,d);addE(e,v,w, l) −→ addE(e,v1,v2, l);addP∗(x,k,d)
addP∗(x,k,d);ops −→ addP(x,k,d);ops if no earlier rule applies
(c) Operation addP(x,k,d)
Figure 4.7: Edit script rewrite rules for insertion operations
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annotated elements for this property. Thus the update operation does not change the value and
become a redundant operation. In both cases there exists a redundant operation that increases
the edit distance value, thus they are simplified and decrease the number of operations.
Lemma 1. 1. If ops maps G1 to G2 and ops−→ ops′ then ops′ maps G1 to G2 and |ops′| ≤
|ops|.
2. If ops is a canonical edit script mapping G2 to G3 and op∗ is an edit operation mapping
G1 to G2 then op∗;ops rewrites to a canonical edit script ops′ mapping G1 to G3 with
|op;ops| ≤ |ops′|.
3. If ops is an edit script mapping G1 to G2, then there is a canonical edit script ops′
mapping G1 to G2 such that |ops′| ≤ |ops|.
Proof. 1. The proof is straightforward for each rule; in most cases, the two operations
commute. The interesting cases are:
– altP∗/delP: If the updated property is immediately deleted, it has the same
effect as just deleting.
– addP∗/altP: If the inserted property is immediately updated, it has the same
effect as just inserting the updated value.
– addV∗/delV, addE∗/delE, addP∗/delP: If a node, edge, or property is
inserted and immediately deleted, the two operations cancel out.
2. Let ops be a canonical edit script mapping G2 to G3, and op∗ a marked edit operation
mapping G1 to G2. Given an edit script with at most one marked operation, define the
*-length of an edit script to be 0 if it contains no marked operation and |op∗1;ops2| if it
is of the form ops0;op∗1;ops2. That is, the *-length is the length of the marked suffix of
the edit script, or 0 if there is no mark. All of the rules in Fig. 4.5-4.7 decrease the *-
length of the edit script, as well as preserving or decreasing the length, so we can rewrite
op∗;ops to a normal form. Moreover, clearly the rewrite rules preserve the order of the
operations aside from the marked one, and in the cases where the mark is removed, the
edit operation is in a position that is allowed in a canonical edit script (because all of
the cases where a marked operation violates canonical form are covered by other rules).
Thus, after rewriting to a normal form, op∗;ops is a canonical edit script.
3. We proceed by induction on the length of ops. If it is empty, there is nothing to prove.
Otherwise, suppose it is of the form op,ops0. By induction, there must exist ops′0 equiv-
alent to ops0 with |ops′0| ≤ |ops0|. Consider the marked edit script op∗;ops0. By part
1, this normalizes to an unmarked edit script ops′ that is equivalent to op;ops′0 with
|ops′| ≤ |op∗;ops′0|= |op;ops′0| ≤ |op;ops0|= |ops|.
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4.4 Configurations and evaluations
In this chapter, we have proposed using ASP and existing edit distance approach to help identify
isomorphic relationships among the graphs. The purpose of the isomorphic matching includes
generalizing graphs, identifying additional graph structure in a sub-graph isomorphic pair and
filtering out erroneous graphs that are non-isomorphic to others which are not expected. These
approaches are all based on using answer set programming to find the least cost for trans-
forming one graph to another. In this section, we provide an evaluation of our approach using
answer set programming and some additional description of the configuration of the answer set
programming tool, Clingo. The purpose for the evaluation is to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the approach and to compare and evaluate our approach on different kinds of graphs to jus-
tify the motivation and usefulness of the approach on solving isomorphic (sub)graph matching
and discovering process on scalable graphs with a large number of property labels. For all of
the test cases mentioned in this section, we are running on a virtual machine of 2 CPU, 8GB
ram and 50GB of free hard disk storage.
4.4.1 Clingo configurations
As mentioned in Section 2.5, Clingo is a combined tool that includes the grounding tools
Gringo and answer set solver Clasp and provides an abstract layer between them to pass the
information internally. With this understanding, the configuration settings of Clingo are passed
to the two underlying working tools. Thus the configuration settings for both the Gringo and
Clasp are allowed for the Clingo tools. The major work for Gringo the grounder is to transfer
those Datalog statements into propositional logic statements accepted by the Clasp the solver.
It is a one to one mapping and not much could be done except for general configurations for
input/output format. On the other hand, Clasp the solver provides many configurations for
different strategies on the searching and look-back process to handle the isomorphic graphs
matching and edit distance calculation. In this subsection, we summarize the different con-
figuration strategies and how they affect the solving of the problems we mentioned in the last
section.
4.4.1.1 Search options
There are three kinds of search options available for the Clasp solver, including the look-ahead
strategy, heuristic solving strategy and random probing strategy. All of these three kinds of
search option aims to provide alternative or additional techniques for the solving process. The
look-ahead strategy considers the usage of failed-literal detection mentioned in Freeman [54].
It proposes to look a few more steps ahead and eliminate paths that are worse than others. This
can eliminate some blocked paths in the result searching process and increase the performance
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of the solver. On the other hand, the random probing strategy and the heuristic solving strategy
are mutually exclusive options. Random probing introduces random decision by a certain fixed
probability to increase the performance, but it will also decrease the probability of finding an
optimal solution. If no random probing strategy is chosen, Clasp solver will choose to use the
default static variable ordering which is a baseline decision heuristic. The solver also support
some different kind of decision heuristic, including BerkMin-like [66], Siege-like [145], Chaff-
like [115] and Smodels-like [150] decision heuristic.
4.4.1.2 Look-back options
The look-back technique is a kind of conflict-driven learning. It can just revert to an earlier
clause when a certain level of conflict occurs and restart from the jump back point to continue
the learning. Using look-back to solve the satisfiability problem (SAT) is once mentioned in
Bayardo and Schrag [21]. For our usage of Clingo, we also aim to solve the SAT problem which
we want to find matching pairs of nodes from the two graphs that make them an isomorphic
pair (isomorphic matching) or with the closest proximity (edit distance calculation). Clingo
provides certain look-back options which allow the users to apply different look back strategy
to the solver when a certain level of conflict is found. The options include restarting the whole
learning after a predefined amount of conflicts, shuffling the data structure before restarting
or even relaxing some constraints temporarily after every restart. These options enable clasp
solver to achieve a better-optimized result with a trade-off of longer processing for some of the
look-back actions.
4.4.1.3 Evaluation settings
In this subsection, we are evaluating the options in solving the two problems of isomorphic
graph matching and edit distance calculation. To have a fair comparison, the graph and Clingo
code used for each test case of the same problem is the same. For the test cases relating to
edit distance calculation, we use two graphs generated by SPADE for monitoring two different
executions of the same binary file. The binary file is generated from a C program which opens
a file, then writes a character to the file 10 times and closes the file afterwards. The resulting
graphs contain around 25 nodes, 30 edges and almost 300 properties. At last, we transform the
two graphs into Datalog format for Clingo to process. For the isomorphic graph matching test
cases, we use the same graph as the edit distance calculation problem. We then transform the
single graph into two Datalog descriptions by renaming the same graphs elements into different
identifiers and randomly rearrange the orders of the Datalog statements to add randomization
for the isomorphic graph matching problem. Basically, the two graphs are exactly the same.
The expected results for all test cases are the exact matching pairs of nodes and edges for the
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isomorphic graph matching problem and the edit distance values between the two graphs for
the edit distance calculation problem.
4.4.1.4 Configuration evaluation
In our proposed uses in previous subsections, it is clear that our target is to compare graphs
with large numbers of property labels. In the ASP solving process, all elements are grouped
and forming a constraint separately. Large numbers of property labels contribute to a large set
of raw data which requires more efforts to match and reach a satisfiable state with the matching
nodes of the isomorphic graph pairs. In this subsection, we are evaluating if the different
search or look-back options can help to increase the performance and accuracy for solving our
isomorphic (sub)graph matching and edit distance calculation problem. The evaluation aims to
compare if these options are helpful when they are configured on top of the default searching
scheme, which provides better effectiveness in solving our hard searching problems. We will
evaluate and compare the two kind of options one by one.
First of all, we compare and evaluate the search options. The test case with different options
is shown in the Table 4.3 and Table 4.4.
Test Case Look-ahead Decision Learning Average Time (in ms)
#S1 No Default static ordering 56
#S3 Yes Default static ordering 117
#S5 No BerkMin-like [66] 60
#S7 No Siege-like [145] 54
#S9 No Chaff-like [115] 55
#S11 No Smodels-like [150] 61
#S13 No Random probing 46
Table 4.3: Test cases for different search options on isomorphic graph matching prob-
lem
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 list all 14 test cases that we have done on the search options. The
test cases in both tables are the same set of configuration on solving different problems. The
first four test cases are using default static variable ordering as the decision heuristic. The
only different is test cases S3 and S4 have turned on the look-ahead options. In general, the
look-ahead option requires to search a few steps ahead and eliminate some bad paths. It can
benefit the performance in some cases but not in our proposed problems. The main reason
is the look-ahead searching will check all branches a few steps ahead and it creates a large
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Test Case Look-ahead Decision Learning Average Time (in ms)
#S2 No Default static ordering 112
#S4 Yes Default static ordering 187
#S6 No BerkMin-like [66] 110
#S8 No Siege-like [145] 104
#S10 No Chaff-like [115] 106
#S12 No Smodels-like [150] 122
#S14 No Random probing 98
Table 4.4: Test cases for different search options on edit distance calculation problem
bottleneck for our problems. When we match the two graphs with large numbers of labels, we
need to consider the labels attached to each node and edge and each of them creates a branch
for checking. This results in a large number of branches in the search space for the look-
ahead process which creates a bottleneck and delays the whole searching process with partially
repeating actions. In general, look-ahead is more suitable for those with fewer branches to
effectively eliminate worse branches. This scenario is illustrated by the result of the test cases.
The remaining test cases in Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 each choose a different decision learning
heuristic and compare their performance. Each test case is repeated with the same set of data
for 10 times, the average time for getting the satisfiable result for each test case is shown in the
last column.
Apart from the clear bottleneck exists for test cases S3 and S4 due to the inclusion of the
look-ahead option, the resulting times for each of the test cases are quite close when choosing
different decision heuristic. As mentioned by the developer of Clingo in their documentations,
the Siege-like, Chaff-like, and random probing learning approach is better for large branches
thus should be more suitable to solve the graph matching with a large set of property labels
that affect the isomorphic graph matching. To show a more obvious difference for the different
configurations, we have used some large sample provenance graph for the execution of the
test cases. We can still see the average time using the above mentioned three approaches is
shorter than the others. When we are processing for the edit distance calculation which is more
complicated as it is an isomorphic sub-graph matching problem, we can see that the average
time needed is longer than the time needed for solving isomorphic graph matching problem.
Next, we compare and evaluate the look-back options. The test cases with different options
are shown in the Table 4.5 and Table 4.6. We are using the default static variable ordering for
the decision learning option for all test cases to have a fair comparison and evaluation.
Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 list all 12 test cases that we have done on the look-back options.
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Test Case Look-back options Average Time (in ms)
#L1 No 68
#L3 Restart 100,1.5 and Shuffle 0,0 69
#L5 Restart 100,1.5 and Shuffle 1,1 63
#L7 Restart 100,1.5 and Shuffle 5,0 67
#L9 Restart 100,1.5 and Shuffle 5,5 61
#L11 Restart 100,1.5 and Reduce-on-restart 62
Table 4.5: Test cases for different look-back options on isomorphic graph matching
problem
Test Case Look-back options Average Time (in ms)
#L2 No 105
#L4 Restart 100,1.5 and Shuffle 0,0 102
#L6 Restart 100,1.5 and Shuffle 1,1 96
#L8 Restart 100,1.5 and Shuffle 5,0 101
#L10 Restart 100,1.5 and Shuffle 5,5 91
#L12 Restart 100,1.5 and Reduce-on-restart 93
Table 4.6: Test cases for different look-back options on edit distance calculation problem
Similar to the search options, the test cases in both tables are the same set of configuration
on solving different problems. To have a fair comparison, the graph and Clingo code used for
each test case of the same problem is the same. The first two test cases are a plain run with
no look-back options enabled. All the remaining test cases have the restart options turned on.
Restart is the most important choice for the look-back options. It enables restart and look-back
when a certain level of conflict occurs in the searching and decision heuristic process. The two
numbers (separated by comma) following the restart option configure the requirements for a
restart. The restart occurs when n1 + n2i conflicts are found where n1 is the first number, n2
is the second number and i is the number of restart actions already performed for this process.
Test cases L3 to L10 include shuffle options that shuffle the data structure before some restart
of the process. This process introduces randomness into the data structure to avoid the restart
look-back process to go into the same dead-end again. The two numbers (separated by comma)
following the shuffle command configure how often the shuffling is done. The shuffle will start
on the nth restart indicating by the first number. A zero means no reshuffle, a one means
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reshuffle on the first restart, a two means reshuffle on the second restart, and so on. The second
number indicating the frequency of reshuffle after the first reshuffle has been done. Similar to
the first number, zero means no reshuffle is scheduled after the first reshuffle, otherwise, the
reshuffle will repeat every nth restart indicating by the second number. As a result, test cases
L3 and L4 will not reshuffle while test cases L5 and L6 will reshuffle on every restart, starting
from the first one. Test cases L7 and L8 will only reshuffle once after the fifth restart and test
cases L9 and L10 will reshuffle every 5 restarts, starting from the fifth restart. Test cases L3
and L4 are the default settings for Clingo and Clasp solver where no reshuffle is enabled. The
remaining test cases L11 and L12 loosen some of the learned constraints temporary after every
restart, which try to find a satisfiable decision with less constraint and map back to tighter
constraint later on to avoid a large number of conflict on the decision path. Similar to the
search options, each test case is repeated with the same set of data for 10 repetitions and the
average timing for getting the satisfiable result is shown in the last column of Table 4.5 and
Table 4.6. When comparing the result, there is a clear difference with or without look-back
options. Although the time difference between different look-back option is not obvious, we
can still observe that infrequent shuffle on restart and relaxing criteria on restart do help to
decrease processing time.
4.4.2 Scalability evaluation
In the last section, we proposed using edit distance approach by answer set programming to find
the optimal matches between two graphs. If the optimal match does exist, the comparing graphs
form an isomorphic (sub)graph relationship. In most of the cases, the graphs involved in the
edit distance approach are labelled graphs. One of the properties of the labelled graph is each
of its elements can be labelled with key-value pairs. What we are proposing in this chapter
and the whole provenance benchmarking automation is the ability to extend the general edit
distance problem to graphs that contain a large number of property labels. Each node and edge
in the graphs can be annotated with multiple labels. The resulting set of graph elements are
larger than the general case. In this subsection, we are going to evaluate the scalability for our
proposal of using edit distance approach by answer set programming to solve graph proximity
calculation for labelled graphs with large numbers of property labels. The major target for this
evaluation is to show this approach using answer set programming solver can scale up to much
larger target graphs without seriously affecting the performance of the process. We separate
the scalability test into two different part. The first part aims to evaluate the approach with
an increasing number of properties, while the second part aims to evaluate the approach with
an increasing number of nodes and edges. Table 4.7 shows test cases for the first part of our
scalability test on using edit distance approach by answer set programming solver, while test
cases for the second part are shown in Table 4.8.
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Test Case # of Property Labels # of Property Labels Average Time (in ms)
(Graph A) (Graph B)
#P1 0 0 6
#P2 50 0 8
#P3 50 50 8
#P4 500 0 11
#P5 500 50 12
#P6 500 500 14
#P7 1000 0 12
#P8 1000 50 14
#P9 1000 500 17
#P10 1000 1000 19
Table 4.7: Test cases for scalability test of increasing property labels
Table 4.7 contains the 10 test cases for the scalability test of increasing property labels. To
focus on the differences and scalability on the property labels, the two testing graphs have the
same graph structure with 4 nodes and 10 edges. The graph pair scales from no property labels
to a thousand property labels. In each test case, the average time needed to find the optimal
isomorphic matching solution is recorded to demonstrate our proposed approach is possible to
scale up to graphs contain a large set of property labels. The graphs are isomorphic pair when
ignoring all property labels. Thus the evaluation shows how the performance of our approach
is affected by an increasing number of property labels. The result is shown in the last column
which each test case is repeated for 10 times. From the average time result, we can see that
not only the total number of properties in the graphs will affect the time needed for the answer
set programming solver to find an optimal solution, the differences in the number of properties
also affect the processing time. For example, comparing test cases P6 and P7. The total number
of property labels are 1000 for both cases, but the average time needed for test case P7 is much
shorter. The major reason is there are no property labels in Graph B for test case 7, which make
the answer set programming almost not necessary to compare property labels when mapping
the isomorphic pair. This is because the only possible operation for transforming Graph A to
Graph B in terms of those property labels is to delete them. On the contrary, the answer set
programming will need much more effort to match the 500 property labels of Graph A and
Graph B in test case P6 which requires slightly longer processing time. Although the time
needed is increasing in these test cases, it is still in a very good shape which requires less than
a second for processing graphs matching for a thousand property labels in each graph. This
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shows that our approach using answer set programming solver to map isomorphic graphs is
possible to scale up to graphs with a large set of property labels and other elements.
Test Case # of Nodes # of Edges Average Time # of Success
#P11 10 10 21 ms 10
#P12 50 50 476 ms 10
#P13 100 100 5.6 s 10
#P14 250 250 62 s 7
#P15 500 500 19 min 2
#P16 750 750 Out of memory 0
#P17 1000 1000 Out of memory 0
Table 4.8: Test cases for scalability test of increasing nodes and edges
Table 4.8 contains the 7 test cases for the scalability test of increasing nodes and edges.
The test uses two graphs in each test case and scale from 10 nodes and 10 edges for each graph
to 500 nodes and 500 edges for each graph. Each of the testing graphs has 1000 property
labels attached randomly to its nodes and edges to have a fair comparison and evaluation. The
test calculates the minimum edit distance value between the two randomly generated graphs
and returns the matching pairs of elements. Again, the average time needed is recorded to
demonstrate our proposed approach is also possible to scale up to graphs contain large elements
set. The average time and number of successful trials of each test case are shown in the last two
columns which each test case is repeated for 10 times. From the average time result, the effect
on performance is more clear when increasing the number of nodes and edges comparing to the
increasing of the number of property labels. The major reason is the additional number of nodes
and edges make the possible mapping option increase exponentially and thus the search space
also increase exponentially and requires much more time to search for an optimal solution with
minimum edit distance values. When comparing the two different scalability evaluation, it is
clear that the number of nodes and edges affect the performance the most, and even using our
approach with answer set programming solver, it still not effective when the graph scale up to
500 nodes and edges. It is worth mentioning that the running of test cases P14 to P17 have
all experience out of memory exception. As mentioned above, we have repeat each of the test
cases for 10 times, test cases P14 and P15 success in some of the cases and receive an out
of memory exception in other trials, while test cases P16 and P17 receive an out of memory
exception for every trial, thus we cannot get a timing result. The average time for P14 and
P15 do not count the fail attempts. This evaluation demonstrates that although our approach
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using answer set programming solver can help to solve the isomorphic matching for attributed
graphs with a large set of property labels, it still cannot scale up to graphs with too many nodes
and edges. In reality, nodes in provenance graphs represent artefacts and processes. If we
are just focusing on certain process behaviour and not focus on the analysis of whole system
provenance, the resulting provenance graph should not contain a large set of nodes as many
of the artefacts and processes are reused and do not require generating new nodes to represent
them. As a whole, the numbers of artefacts and processes related to certain system behaviour
are limited and will not be required to reach the extreme cases we have been evaluating here in
this subsection. Thus our approach can still help and scale up to graphs with a limited amount
of nodes and edges with a large set of property labels.
4.5 Discussion
Isomorphic (sub)graph comparison and matching is a complex question. Although the com-
plexity of the general isomorphic graph comparison and the matching problem is not known, it
is already proved that the subgraph isomorphism problem is an NP-complete problem [39, 45].
Thus it is even harder when the complexity of the directed graph increases and contains a large
set of properties attached to each vertex and edge which form part of the deciding factors for
the isomorphism condition. Recalling the motivation of this chapter, one of the major applica-
tions of this complex isomorphic graph comparison and matching belongs to the field of data
provenance. In most of the cases, due to the need of details and complete information, different
provenance collecting tools will capture as much information as they can and generate detailed
graphs which result in high graph complexity and large numbers of properties. If we need to
extract patterns from the graph for security or benchmarking, we cannot avoid direct compar-
ison of the graphs to find isomorphic sub-graphs and to filter out unique patterns. This is the
main motivation that pushes us to find a fast way to handle the problem.
By making use of the edit distance approach to find the matching with a minimum mis-
match, we aim to develop a fast way to handle the problems and identify an optimal matching
solution. Our original objective is to handle the provenance graph generalization and bench-
marking where we can assume that the comparison and matching target must preserve the
isomorphic (sub)graph relationship. Although these provenance graphs may not be very large,
they may contain large numbers of attached key-value property labels in the nodes and edges.
The main usage of those labels is to keep information relating to the action performed in run-
time to achieve the history of tracing characteristics later on. In general graph comparison,
many ways are proposed for a fast comparison of graphs but very few of them are concerned
about graphs with large numbers of property labels. This allows us to provide a slightly modi-
fied edit distance approach, with the support of the answer set programming and certain levels
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of approximation to help to solve the graph / sub-graph comparison and matching problems
on graphs with large numbers of properties. In addition to the need of graph / sub-graph com-
parison and matching, we also need to have a unified way to identify the level of difference
between the final provenance benchmark for different provenance collecting tool, this allows
us to further extend the modified edit distance algorithm and get a unified quantifier for classi-
fying and grouping the graphs according to their similarity. This approach not only provides us
with a way to compare the results from different provenance collecting tools, but it also allows
us to classify and group the results from the same provenance collecting tool. This allows us
to understand how the tools treat and group different system-call actions.
In our approach, we actually treat every element in the graph as uniformly important. We
weight every elements modification, insertion and deletion actions as the same. This approxi-
mation does help us decrease the processing time and overhead. Also, it does help to maximize
the number of matches in the calculation. But it also creates one of the limitations. Some
of the property values and other graph components may have more significant meanings in
the executions which require higher attention for the analysis. This makes some of the graph
components have a higher weighting in the calculation because they need to exist and certain
deletion actions may not be allowed during the edit distance calculation. Out approach treats
all of them the same and may accidentally perform a deletion action during the edit distance
calculation because it requires lesser actions. This may result in wrong calculations and risk the
fact that certain important activities in the execution will be lost. An example of that includes
certain command-line arguments for the execution of the program for an interpreted language.
Hassan et al. [75] has proposed a different approach named ”Graph Abstraction” which en-
code some semantic meaning of certain properties with a set of manual heuristics. This helps
to treat graph elements with different levels of importance during the graph matching actions.
Although their approach does not provide maximum edit distance faster than ours, they do han-
dle the realistic problem of the existence of different importance level of the graph elements
describing the execution of processes. Last but not least, our approach may be good to solve
graph matching problems and edit distance calculation problems when we are facing the prob-
lems for comparing provenance graphs for the similar executions which we can treat all graphs
elements as equal weight as most of the elements should be preserved in multiple executions.
Unfortunately, this consideration may become a bigger problem when this approach is used in
some generic problems which the comparing targets are no longer guaranteed to be similar and
this creates one of the limitations of our approach.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discuss one of the obstacles in transforming the manual expressiveness
benchmarking to a fully automated system. The obstacle mainly related to the isomorphic
(sub)graph comparison and matching problem which is a very complex problem to be solved.
We summarize the way we propose to identify optimal matching among similar graph for our
automated system. We also provide effort done in introducing ways to quantify the level of
difference by slightly modified edit distance approach. Lastly, we evaluate the proposal with
different graphs and existing approaches to show its capabilities. The contributions in this
chapter not only benefit our automation of the expressiveness benchmarking, but it can also
be used in general graph comparison and matching problems. As the major obstacle has been
solved, we will be discussing the basic design architecture and working logic of the automated
system for the expressiveness benchmarking in the next chapter.

Chapter 5
ProvMark: the automated system
This chapter will discuss the basic design architecture and working logic of the automated
system, ProvMark, for expressiveness benchmarking.
5.1 Motivation
5.1.1 Provenance benchmark and formalization
One of the major research contributions of this thesis is providing expressiveness benchmarking
for different provenance recording tools. The expressiveness benchmarking aims to analyse the
provenance graphs generated by each of the tools when monitoring the same action sequence.
As there are no unified standards, different provenance systems may generate provenance
graphs in different formats. This setting increases the difficulty of comparing and analysing of
the provenance graphs generated from different provenance systems. By viewing and analysing
the benchmark in the same format and structure, we can decrease the difficulty of identifying
the expressiveness of each of the tools in different use case scenarios. The expressiveness is
defined as how correct and complete is the given provenance record in telling the story of what
is happening in runtime. In certain cases, like in security forensics, the audience is more inter-
ested in the full evidence link to the originators and accountable parties for certain actions. In
this case, the identity of the actors across the lifetime of an artefact is mandatory in the prove-
nance information. This can be analysed by the completeness criteria of the expressiveness
benchmarking. For example, if we provide a known action sequence to the provenance systems
as testing input, we summarize the resulting provenance information and compare it with the
known fact for checking. The checking can show us if all information, including but not limited
to relating processes, artefacts and actors, are completely captured. This can demonstrate if the
provenance collecting tools and its resulting provenance information fulfil the completeness
criteria. The provenance collecting tools capable of this forensic usage must be completed on
115
116 Chapter 5. ProvMark: the automated system
actor identity information to provide a full chain of evidence. This example usage identifies the
need to have a unified way to analyse the expressiveness of the generated provenance and also
the capabilities of each of the provenance recording tools in different scenarios. As mentioned
in the last two chapters, although it is possible to do the benchmarking manually, it may be
error-prone and needs a lot of human effort to do so. That is why we aim to develop a fully
automated system for handling the whole benchmarking process. This should benefit both the
provenance recording tools’ developers in understanding, cross-checking and enhancing their
tools and the end-users, including researchers on data science or database analysis, who can
use ProvMark to research which tools are best suited for their use case scenario.
5.1.2 Size of system-level provenance
The error-proneness of the human manual benchmarking process is not the only reason for
developing an automated tool. The other major reason is the size of the system/kernel level
provenance makes it costly to analyse them manually. We understand from the example work
in chapter 3, a simple provenance graph like Figure 3.7 representing the execution of a binary
with a single system call already results in a big provenance graph with around 40 nodes and
edges, together with 100+ property values. This problem will become more serious if we move
to handle real-world program execution which consists of a large set of system calls. If we
continue to use manual effort for handling provenance graphs of increasing size from real-
world programs, the error rate and the resources needed will also be increased. The error rate
and resources needed to handle the graph manually is directly proportional to the size of the
provenance graph. The size of the provenance graph is also directly linked to the number of
system calls involved in the program execution. In this case, if we are aiming to analyse the
correctness of the provenance graph describing a real-world program, we need to face prove-
nance graphs with a large set of vertexes, edges and property labels. It is almost impossible to
validate and check every element and analyse if every piece of information exists and correctly
represents the real execution in a reasonable time. Also, checking large groups of elements
manually increases the chance for errors. Indeed, multiple errors has been raised and corrected
during the manual approach mentioned in earlier chapters. It shows that the manual bench-
marking approach is not scalable to handle large sets of data. This is a clear weakness because
in general, system-level provenance will always contain a very large set of elements in describ-
ing what is happening in runtime. This necessitates developing a fully automated tool to take
over the manual approach and provide automatic analysis and comparison of those provenance
graphs. This automatic transformation can provide automatic expressiveness benchmarking on
real-world programs which make it more useful among the tools’ developers and end-users. In
chapter 4, we also discuss the hard problems on graph comparison which are obstacles to han-
dle large graphs automatically. After providing ways to go around the problem, the automated
5.1. Motivation 117
expressiveness benchmarking should be able to complete in a reasonable time and also main-
tain correctness of the result at a suitable level. This can be measured by evaluating ProvMark
result with some known training set from some security research.
5.1.3 Expressiveness comparison of provenance
In addition to the error rate and the scalability problems of the manual benchmarking approach,
there are also some other minor motivations for adopting the fully automated system to the
expressiveness benchmarking process. As mentioned in chapter 3, the two target audiences of
ProvMark are those provenance recording tools’ developers and the end-users of those tools. In
the viewpoint of the developers, they know how their tools work, but they normally do not know
the working logic of other tools; while the end-users of those tools do not care how the tools
work, they only care about if the tools can help them in accomplishing their tasks. To allow
them to achieve their own goals without knowing every detail and working logic, we provide
an additional automated layer on top of ProvMark and help them to compare the capabilities
of the tools in different situations without the need to understand the provenance results of
the tools and how is it collected. The users can use our automated system as a black box and
the automated system will show the expressiveness comparison of the provenance benchmark
generated by each of the tools for the same action sequences. The user can then judge directly
on how complete and correct is the resulting benchmark by viewing the comparison result.
This layer avoids the need for a user to understand how the tools work in general.
5.1.4 Discovery of unexpected behaviour
In addition to the normal end-users which only need to compare tools capabilities without the
need to know the running logic of each tool, there is another group of target users for the
benchmarking. They are the developers of the provenance collecting tools. The provenance
benchmark results are still generated by different provenance collecting tools. All those tool
developers should have a clear expectation of how the resulting provenance benchmark should
be. With the automated approach of the expressiveness benchmarking, it can provide the tool
developers with a chance to provide large amounts of different benchmark programs with dif-
ferent target action sequences and get a set of provenance benchmarks. By examining the set
of benchmarks, those developers can verify if their tools indeed work as their original expec-
tation. This can help them to discover possible problems, bugs, and idiosyncrasies from their
tools because our automated approach result is based on what the tool originally generates. The
developers can verify those output by comparing some predefined result of their own. In some
of the cases, if the developers aim to verify their tools after some code changing or bug fixing,
they can match the new set of benchmarks with the set generated with the older tools and see if
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there are unexpected changes. This case is similar to regression testing done in systems, with
the support of graph comparison and static analysis. The ability to generate and handle large
amounts of input and generate large sets of provenance benchmarks is one of the reasons for
us to automate the benchmarking approach because it is almost impossible to provide the same
features when it is done manually. Indeed, during the development, testing and evaluation of
our automated approach, we did find some unexpected results and confirmed some were indeed
bugs in the tools after discussing with the original developers.
5.1.5 Practical usage of precise provenance
Last but not least, in some usage of provenance, like auditing or forensic usage, it is important
to have very precise information describing runtime events. For example, the owner change in
an artefact needs to be described clearly. One of the points we mentioned earlier is the fact that
different provenance collecting tools will collect and filter system call event details according
to some rules. This is because it is not possible to capture all the information at once. What
data are collected or filtered out are determined by the design of the tool itself which follows
one or more original purpose of the tool. So in some of the tools, it may not collect enough
information for some precise usage. Some precise usage requires comparing and analysing
each of the elements of the graph, include vertexes, edges and property labels. One missing or
wrong comparison may result in the wrong conclusion. For example, if we mistakenly miss
one of the actor identifications in the provenance results, we may miss an accountable party
for certain action and ruin the analysis result. This precision is not possible to do by manual
approach because of the large error rate and the scalability problems. With the needed precision
in the automated approach, it can help to identify if the benchmark provenance for a specific
tool is complete enough to describe an event or to distinguish it from a similar event. It also
helps to identify if it correctly identifies the real action that is happening at runtime with the
correct accountable parties and other properties. This need for precision in the practical real-life
example shows again the necessity for building up an automated approach of the expressiveness
benchmarking.
5.2 Definitions
5.2.1 The automated system
We name our fully automated system for the expressiveness benchmarking as ProvMark. Prov-
Mark automates all the steps mentioned in chapter 3 and works as a black box. The user just
needs to provide the benchmark programs and choose the target provenance collecting tools.
Then ProvMark will automatically compute and generate provenance benchmark as an output.
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In this report, we sometimes use the term provenance recording tools interchangeably with the
term provenance collecting tools. Both of them refer to the same group of provenance systems
developed by different researchers in the provenance field, aiming to collect provenance infor-
mation in different scenarios and operating systems. Examples of tools are introduced back in
Section 2.1.
In the manual approach, the benchmark programs refer to a pair of background and fore-
ground programs which are very similar to each other. Their only difference is the target action
sequence that we aim to analyse. In general, both the background and foreground program
contains the same code for all the background actions, while the foreground program contains
some additional actions which are the target actions that we want to analyse. When we pro-
vide both of them to a provenance collecting tools and compare their provenance graph result,
the additional part in the provenance graph representing the foreground program describes the
trace for the target actions. This comparison and additional pattern retrieval are included in
the automation process of ProvMark and we defined this resulting graph pattern as provenance
benchmark which demonstrate the expressiveness for the chosen provenance collecting tools
on the target actions.
One of the uses of the provenance benchmark is understanding the patterns of certain action
sequences described in the basic unit of system calls in the kernel. For this reason, we choose
the C language for writing the benchmark programs because it contains libraries that can map
one to one to the kernel system calls which let us easily analyse action sequence differences
down to the base level.
In the manual approach, we separated the benchmark programs into two similar foreground
and background programs. When we move to the automated approach, we want to decrease the
error rate and execution complexity. One of the possible problems in the automated approach
is, it is hard to confirm if the foreground and background programs are a pair of programs
that are very similar and only differ in the target system calls. We have no guarantee that
the input follows the rule which is one of the requirements of the input program if we want
some reasonable benchmark result. To solve this problem, we only accept one benchmark
program as input to ProvMark. We instead use the CPP directive to help identify the target
action sequence. The input benchmark program will be the original foreground program from
the manual approach, with an additional #ifdef TARGET CPP directive statement to enclose
the target action sequences. When ProvMark receives the program, it will compile it into two
versions of binaries which are controlled by the definition of the macro keyword. For the
compilation without the macro keyword defined, the circled target action sequences will be
ignored, and the resulting binary is the same as compiling the background program, while the
other way will result in the same binary as compiling the foreground program. This setting
keeps ProvMark with the pairs of benchmark program to work on and easier to maintain.
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In ProvMark, we aim to automate everything from the collecting of provenance and graph
comparison to generation of the resulting provenance benchmark. As we are collecting system-
level provenance from different provenance collecting tools for further processing, we need to
automate the process for starting the tools and managing their input and output. We defined the
term tool handler as a module in ProvMark which starts and monitors a specific provenance
recording tool. Tool handler also manages settings, configuration and the corresponding in-
put/output of the chosen provenance recording tools throughout the whole automated process.
As different tools operate in different ways, there are separate tool handlers for each of the
supporting tools. Currently, we are only supporting the three target tools SPADE, OPUS and
CamFlow. To make ProvMark easy to expand and handle other provenance recording tools,
the tool handler follows the same set of skeleton interface. All the tool handlers follow the
same input/output format and the only difference is the different configuration values, how to
start the tools and where to retrieve the resulting provenance graph. The choice of tool handler
and corresponding special configuration values are changing in the global configuration files
of ProvMark.
As mentioned above, one major reason for the expressiveness benchmarking is to provide
a more general way to compare the provenance result for different provenance collecting tools
which does not have a formalized standard and tends to generate different type of provenance
result. Some of them generate in Prov-JSON or other Prov format, some of them generate
graph in DOT format. Some of them even generate graphs which are stored in a graph database
like Neo4j. To provide a general way for the comparison, we define the term graph handler
as another module in ProvMark. There are multiple copies of graph handlers but in each
execution of ProvMark, only one of them will be chosen. This is configured by the same global
configuration file mentioned above. Each graph handler turns one format of provenance graph
output into Datalog format which is the language supported by the Clingo which is chosen
as the graph comparison tools used in ProvMark as mentioned in chapter 4. The existence of
graph handlers makes ProvMark able to handle provenance graph results generated by different
tools. Currently, most of the known provenance graph types have been covered by the existing
group of graph handler modules.
5.2.2 Provenance collecting modules
In general, ProvMark works on the user level. If it needs access to a specific service in the
kernel level, it will also call through an existing user-level wrapper that does the job. But,
this is not the case for some of the provenance recording tools. As different tools aim to
collect different types of information which may be recorded in different locations, this may
include some components working in the kernel level. In this subsection, we clarify some of
the working components used by some of the provenance recording tools which sometimes the
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tool handler of ProvMark may need to communicate with.
One of the common targets for provenance recording tools to collect information about a
runtime action sequence is the Linux Security Module or LSM in short. The LSM is a base
framework provided in the kernel level for applying security policies to action sequence re-
quest. In other words, LSM allows or denies action sequence request by a set of mandatory
access control rules. This framework is a standard component since version 2.6 of the kernel
and has different variants in the field. There are different contributed LSM modules which are
accepted by the kernel. Some provenance collecting tools capture information from the LSM
to understand what action sequence has been performed or banned in runtime. To do that, they
implement their LSM hook to register themselves to the notification list of the LSM. Once new
decisions have been made by the LSM, the registered LSM hook will be notified and relay this
information back to the user level where a daemon should be kept waiting and listening to this
information and process them when new information arrives.
Another common target is the audit framework in the operating system. The audit frame-
work captures target action sequence and related information in the kernels. The framework
will then relay the information back to the user level which is received by the audit daemon
module. The audit daemon will distribute the captured information through the audit dis-
patcher. Components or processes can register to the audit dispatcher to receive notification
and an updated copy of the captured record once some new audit records are relayed to the audit
daemon. This allows a provenance collecting tool to retrieve audit events for their provenance
generation purposes.
5.2.3 Operating System coverage
Although we understand there are many different operating systems in the field, ProvMark cur-
rently only supports Unix-like operating system which is supported by most of the provenance
collecting tools in the field as we understand. Although we only test our system in some Linux
distribution, the system call definitions and C compiler used in our development and test should
work in most of the Unix-like operating system, except that some modifications may need for
BSD as they have a slightly different bash script model. The major development language of
ProvMark is Python (version 3) which should be supported by all Unix-like operating system
after installing the correct interpretation modules. The testing and evaluation of ProvMark in
other Unix-like operating systems may be done later as a future work because as far as we
understand, most of the provenance collecting tools already have at least one variant or version
supporting Linux operating system.
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5.2.4 Provenance and graph terminology
In the working of ProvMark, it should take in the benchmark program and the choice of prove-
nance collecting tools and output a set of provenance benchmarks. This process needs to go
through many intermediate steps. In this subsection, we define the terminologies used in the
intermediate steps.
To avoid noises from volatile information in the provenance graph generation, we will need
the generalization of graphs before comparing the background and foreground graph. For this
reason, ProvMark generates a set of background graphs and a set of foreground graphs. The
two sets of graphs will be compared to each other to filter out volatile variables and result in
one graph for each set. The resulting graph is named generalized graph. There should be one
generalized foreground graph and one generalized background graph after the process.
After the above process, the two generalized graphs will be compared to identify the ad-
ditional components in the generalized foreground graph as the generalized background graph
should be isomorphic to a sub-graph of the generalized foreground graph. The remaining com-
ponents in the generalized foreground graph will be the final result, which is the provenance
benchmark. It is worth noticing that as we are trying to compare and remove the isomorphic
part of the two graphs, the resulting provenance benchmark should be a subset of elements
(nodes, edges and properties) of the original graph. It is possible that the provenance bench-
mark itself is not a complete graph at all as some of the components may be filtered out. For
example, the resulting provenance benchmark may contain an edge that only connects to one
of the nodes and the other end connects to nothing because the node in the other end has
been filtered out because it exists in both the foreground and background graph. In order to
make it displayable as a graph, ProvMark purposely adds some dummy elements which make
the provenance benchmark become a full graph again. These dummy elements will be clearly
marked and it should be ignored when viewing because they are not part of the provenance
benchmark. They exist because of the need to make the provenance benchmark displayable
as a graph. An example of provenance benchmark with a dummy node is shown in Figure
5.1. It is the provenance benchmark for the close system call generated by the provenance
collecting tool, SPADE.
Figure 5.1: Example of dummy node in provenance benchmark
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5.2.5 Assumptions
In this chapter, we show the basic design and architecture of ProvMark. We aim to use Prov-
Mark as a black box. We only need to feed in a benchmark program and a choice of the prove-
nance collecting tool to ProvMark and it will execute on its own and generate the provenance
benchmark. In this initial design, we assume that all the benchmark program only contains
deterministic events which keep the same in every execution. This should make the resulting
provenance benchmark the same even if we execute ProvMark multiple times with the same set
of input. This is one of the big assumptions we defined in the basic architecture of ProvMark
because non-deterministic input will create multiple different foreground graph and it will be
more challenging when comparing them to find a generalized foreground graph. The handling
of the non-deterministic input is an enhancement to ProvMark which is described in the next
chapter. In this chapter, we will concentrate on the basic design and architecture of ProvMark
in the deterministic setting first.
5.3 ProvMark design
In this section, we will discuss the design and architecture of ProvMark.
5.3.1 The preliminaries
ProvMark is intended to automatically identify the sub-graph of a provenance graph that is
recorded for the given target activities. Target activities could consist of individual system calls
(like open or close), sequences of system calls, or more general (concurrent) processes.
In this chapter, the examples provided will only cover the simplest case of a single system
call for easy illustration. But ProvMark has the ability and techniques to handle longer target
action sequences of deterministic system calls. Handling concurrency and non-determinism is
an enhancement of ProvMark which will be discussed in the next chapter.
As defined above, one of the required inputs for ProvMark is a benchmark program which
contains #ifdef TARGET CPP directive to enclose the target system calls and action sequence
for analysis. It compiles into two binaries, the background program contains only the back-
ground activities and the foreground program contains the target system calls on top of the
background activities. But what are the background activities? They are activities performed
in the kernel before and after starting an empty binary or a binary with some system call events.
Indeed, in a Unix-like environment, before the execution of a binary, some preparation work,
including memory mapping, is done. And at the end of the binary’s execution, there is also
some finalizing work to clear up the memory. These starting and ending processes such as
(fork or execve), as well as other preparation activities like access to resources (program
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files and libraries) or allocates memory location will create considerable “boilerplate” data
provenance. These are the major contributions to the resulting background graph. The exis-
tence of this noise makes it necessary to distinguish the foreground and background binaries
to help us filter the noise and understand which part in the resulting provenance is describing
the target action sequences.
Furthermore, some target action sequences may depend on some prerequisite calls. For
example, the read, write or close system calls depend on a resources handle. We need
to call the open system call to initialize a file or stream handle before executing these system
calls. Without the corresponding handle, it does not make sense to execute them. If we are
only interested in analysing the read, write or close alone, we need to also filter out the
open system call. In this case, the #ifdef TARGET CPP directive should not be covering the
open system call and leave it as a background activity. As a whole, the above-mentioned
process start, process end and all prerequisite calls form the background activity that we would
like to elide and thus shows the need to use #ifdef TARGET CPP directives to distinguish the
background and foreground binaries. As a result, the two binaries are almost identical; the
difference between the resulting graphs should precisely capture the behaviour of the target
system-call action sequence.
ProvMark includes a script for each system call that generates and compiles the appropri-
ate C executables and prepares a staging directory with any needed setup for the execution.
For example, the script will create and link a file in the stage directory before executing the
unlink system call because a successful unlink system call requests a linked file. We
constructed these scripts manually since different system calls require different settings. Code
snippet 5.1 shows the script to prepare the stage and settings for the unlink system call and
to generate the benchmark program with #ifdef CPP directive surrounding the target system
call. We can see the script also compiles the binary and creates/links file which aim to prepare
the environment for the unlink system call execution. ProvMark will pass in the directive
and other compile options accordingly in different stages of the collecting period to make this
script compile the benchmark program into the foreground and background binaries.
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1 # ! / b i n / bash
2 i f [ ” $ #” − l e 1 ]
3 t h e n
4 echo ” Usage : ” $0 ” <S t a g e Path> [GCC MACRO] ”
5 echo ” Sample : ” $0 ” . / s t a g e −DTARGET −− s t a t i c ”
6 e x i t 1
7 f i
8 cd ” $1 ”
9
10 # Clean d i r e c t o r y
11 l s | g rep −v ’ p r e p a r e ’ | x a r g s rm −f
12
13 # P r e p a r e Benchmark Program
14 CODE=$ ( c a t <<EOF
15 # i n c l u d e <u n i s t d . h>
16 i n t main ( ) { i n t rn =0;
17 # i f d e f TARGET
18 rn = u n l i n k ( ” ‘ r e a l p a t h $1 ‘ / l i n k− t e s t . t x t ” ) ;
19 # e n d i f
20 r e t u r n ( rn ==−1);}
21 EOF)
22 TMPFILE=$ ( mktemp − t tmp .XXXXXX. c )
23 echo ”$CODE”>$TMPFILE
24 gcc −o t e s t $ {∗ : 2} $TMPFILE
25 rm ”$TMPFILE”
26
27 t o u c h t e s t . t x t
28 echo ”TEST” > t e s t . t x t
29 l i n k t e s t . t x t l i n k− t e s t . t x t
30 chown 1000:1000 ∗
Code Snippet 5.1: Staging environment preparation script for unlink system call
5.3.2 The four subsystems
When comparing to the manual approach of the expressiveness benchmarking in chapter 3, we
understand that there are multiple steps to handle in the automated approach. First, we need
to start the chosen provenance collecting tools with certain settings, then we need to execute
the background and foreground binaries. As mentioned above, we want to use a unified format
to analyse the provenance graph, so we need to convert them from different provenance graph
format to the Datalog format. After that, we also need to use generalization to filter out volatile
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variables. Last but not least, we need to compare the generalized foreground and background
graph to filter out the duplicate part and the remaining part in the foreground graph is the
resulting provenance benchmark which will need to pass a check and fixing to include some
dummy elements to make it a displayable graph. This is an abstraction of what the automated
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Figure 5.2: ProvMark system overview
ProvMark groups the above necessary steps into four ranges and is divided into four
subsystems for handling different ranges of activities. The four subsystems are Record-
ing Subsystem, Transformation Subsystem, Generalization Subsystem and Compari-
son Subsystem. The detailed design of the four subsystems will be described in this
section. For a better understanding of the whole system design, there is a brief system
diagram shown in Figure 5.2. The recording subsystem (1) uses one of the provenance
recorders to compute multiple background graphs bg1,bg2, ...,bgn and multiple fore-
ground graphs f g1, f g2, ..., f gn. The transformation subsystem (2) maps these graphs
to a unified Datalog format. The generalization subsystem (3) identifies the common
structure in bg1,bg2, ...,bgn, resulting in bg, and likewise f g1, f g2, ..., f gn are gener-
alized to f g. Finally, bg and f g are compared in comparison subsystem (4); structure
corresponding to bg in f g is removed, yielding the benchmark result.
In general, ProvMark allows a user to choose the target provenance collecting tools,
the benchmark programs that are used for generating benchmarks and other minor con-
figuration settings such as the number of trials and path for the output result. Most of
the settings are done by either command-line arguments or by modifying the configu-
ration file.
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5.3.2.1 Recording Subsystem
The recording subsystem is the first subsystem in the execution life cycle of ProvMark.
It interacts with the corresponding provenance recording tools to retrieve provenance
results for a specific execution of the binaries. This subsystem first prepares a staging
directory that provides a consistent environment for test execution. The recording
subsystem then starts the provenance capture tool with appropriate settings, captures
the provenance generated by the tool, and stops the tool afterwards.
The recording subsystem is the only one to interact directly with the provenance
recording tools. It prepares the execution environments and passes the required inputs
to the target provenance tools and retrieves the result from those tools for further pro-
cessing. For each provenance tool, we implemented a script module that configures
the tool to capture the provenance of specific processes (and child processes) relating
to the execution of the target binary, rather than recording all contemporaneous system
events. For each trial execution of ProvMark, only one of the modules corresponding
to the chosen provenance recording tool will execute as the recording subsystem. The
recording subsystem is used to record provenance graphs for the foreground and back-
ground variants of each target action sequence. Provenance can include transient data
that varies across runs, such as timestamps, so we typically record multiple runs of
each program and filter out the transient information in a later generalization subsys-
tem, described below. Thus, the same script module may be executed multiple times
with similar or different input to record those set of provenance graphs for generaliza-
tion.
Recording multiple runs of the same set of processes using CamFlow was challeng-
ing in earlier versions because CamFlow only serialized nodes and edges once when
first seen. The current version (0.4.5) provides a workaround to this problem that re-
serializes the needed structures when they are referenced later. The original working
logic of CamFlow is to retrieve a provenance graph from the starting of the operating
systems to the shutting down of it, which covers the whole operating session. To avoid
confusion, details of an artefact will only be recorded when it first appeared. All the
later processes and executions related to this artefact may refer to the earlier record.
If we just take a snapshot of the execution, we may miss the detailed information for
the artefact as it may be recorded before the real execution of the target activities. As
a result, we may lose track of this artefact. In the current version, the developers of
CamFlow provide an option for repeat record of the artefact information when it is
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used again to allow the snapshot provenance information complete and contains all the
details of the needed artefacts. This eliminates the need to trace back the provenance
information before execution for certain details and identifiers of the artefact itself.
We also modified its configuration slightly to avoid tracking ProvMark’s behaviour.
We otherwise use the default configuration for each system; we refer to these configu-
rations as the baseline configurations. As we discuss later, ProvMark can also be used
to compare different configurations of the same tool.
This stage may sound straightforward: in fact, it has been the most delicate, es-
pecially for systems that work at the kernel level, because the needs of benchmarking
differ significantly from the expected uses of these systems. We usually obtain re-
peatable results from SPADE by inserting time-outs to wait for successful completion
of SPADE’s graph generation process; even so, we sometimes stop too early and ob-
tain inconsistent results leading to mismatched graphs. Similarly, using CamFlow, we
sometimes experience small variations in the size or structure of the results for reasons
we have not been able to determine. In both cases, we deal with this by running a
larger number of trials and retaining the two smallest consistent results (as discussed
later). For OPUS, any two runs are usually consistent, but starting OPUS and loading
data into or out of Neo4j are time-consuming operations. During the implementation
process, we discussed with the tool developers to check if our benchmark result fulfils
what they are expecting as the output for their tools. Because of the need for gener-
alization to filter out the noise and volatile information, we need to execute the same
binaries multiple times, it does somehow affect the result provenance information as
most of these provenance collecting tools are not designed to repeat the starting and
stopping process frequently. In general, most of them aim to capture whole system
provenance and analyse the execution for the whole section. But starting and stopping
them and retrieving snapshots of provenance does cause some problems in the real
implementation. In addition to the one we mentioned above on the non-repetitive in-
formation of artefacts in the case of CamFlow, we also face some cache flushing delay
in SPADE. This affected the consistency of the result. After some additional discus-
sion with the tool developers and multiple trials, we manage to find a suitable way
to minimize the effect for the repeat execution, including adding a random delay in
between each execution, or completing more trials and filtering out erroneous results
with a high mismatch with other graphs in the same set.
The inputs of this subsystem are the target binaries needed for provenance collec-
tion. We do not need to pass on the choice for provenance collecting tools nor the
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number of execution needed for each execution. The choice of tools and the multiple
executions are controlled by the backbone process of ProvMark which managed the life
cycle for the whole execution. The output of this subsystem is two sets of provenance
graphs generated by the chosen provenance recording tools on the target background
and foreground binaries that are freshly compiled just before passing to the subsystem.
The two sets of provenance graph result are passed on to the transformation subsystem
to handle.
5.3.2.2 Transformation Subsystem
This is the second subsystem of ProvMark. It takes in the two sets of provenance
graphs generated from the recording subsystem (the set of foreground graphs and back-
ground graphs) and transforms them into a unified format. This subsystem also consists
of multiple modules for handling different graph transformation processes.
Different provenance recording tools have different end usages of their provenance,
thus they output their provenance graphs in different formats which is most suitable for
their end usages. For example, SPADE supports Graphviz DOT format and Neo4j stor-
age (among others) output, OPUS only supports Neo4j [121] storage but not the others
at the point of writing, and CamFlow supports W3C PROV-JSON [83] as well as sev-
eral other artefacts or streams processing back-end engines. CamFlow also can be used
instead of Linux Audit as a reporter to SPADE, though we have not yet experimented
with this configuration. There are several standard formats for provenance, but the
lack of common formats used is one of our motivations for providing the expressive-
ness benchmarking in an automated system. This setting allows different tools to have
a unified way to represent their data for benchmarking and further analysis or other
real-life applications. Thus, this subsystem is one of the major parts of ProvMark that
helps to transform different types of provenance graph format into a common format.
Unlike the recording stage, this stage is straightforward. We describe the common
format in detail below.
The common target format is a logical representation of property graphs, in which
nodes and edges can have labels as well as associated properties (key-value dictio-
naries). Specifically, given a set Σ of node and edge labels, Γ of properties, and D
of data values, we consider property graphs G = (V,E,src, tgt, lab, prop) where V
is a set of vertex identifiers and E a set of edge identifiers; these must be disjoint
(V ∩E = /0). Further, src, tgt : E→V maps each edge e to its source and target nodes,
respectively, lab : V ∪E → Σ maps each node or edge x to its type lab(x) ∈ Σ, and
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prop : (V ∪E)×Γ→ ∆ is a partial function such that for a given node or edge x, then
prop(x, p) (if defined) is the value for property p ∈ Γ. In practice, Σ, Γ and ∆ are each
sets of strings.
For provenance graphs, following the W3C PROV vocabulary, the node labels in-
cludes but are not limited to entity, activity and agent, edge labels are typically relations
such as wasGeneratedBy, used and some less common relation like wasDerivedBy,
and properties are either PROV-specific property names or domain-specific ones, and
their values are typically strings. However, our representation does not assume the la-
bels and properties are known in advance; it works with those produced by the tested
system.
We represent property graphs as sets of logical facts using a Prolog-like syntax
called Datalog [2], which is often used to represent relational data in logic program-
ming (as well as databases [2] and networking [68]). The details of the Datalog format
has been defined in chapter 4 where we consider the isomorphic graph comparison as
a standalone problem to be solved. It can also be used in ProvMark as the generaliza-
tion subsystem and comparison subsystem also requires isomorphic graph / sub-graph
matching to get the result. We want to make use of the Answer Set Programming to
help solve the automatic expressiveness benchmarking problem, thus we adopt Datalog
as our unified format for provenance representation.
All the remaining stages, including the final result, work on the Datalog graph
representation, so these stages are independent of the provenance recording tools and
their output format. The Datalog representation can easily be visualized in different
graph formats.
5.3.2.3 Generalization Subsystem
The third subsystem performs graph generalization. Recall that the recording stage
produces several graphs for a given test program and results in two sets of similar
graphs, the foreground graphs set and the background graphs set. We wish to identify
a single, representative and general graph for each test program. We recall the notion
of isomorphic graph matching problem mentioned in Section 2.4 below:
Let G and H be two attributed directed multigraphs.
G = (VG,EG,srcG, tgtG, labG, propG)
H = (VH ,EH ,srcH , tgtH , labH , propH)
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If G and H is an isomorphic pair, represented by G∼= H,
then there is two bijection functions f and g where
f : VG→VH and g : EG→ EH such that
– ∀v∈VG labH( f (v)) = labG(v)
– ∀e∈EG labH(g(e)) = labG(e)
– ∀e∈EGsrcH(g(e)) = f (srcG(e))
– ∀e∈EGtgtH(g(e)) = f (tgtG(e))
– ∀v∈VG,k∈Γ propH( f (v),k)v propG(v,k)
– ∀e∈EG,k∈Γ propH(g(e),k)v propG(e,k)
Moreover, we say that G and H are similar if only the first four conditions hold,
that is, if G and H have the same structure (vertexes and edges) but possibly differ-
ent properties. This is the case for our two sets of graphs as they represent the same
execution in multiple trials. They should differ only by those volatile variables which
are recorded as property values. These volatile values are informative, but at the same
time, this detail may be considered noise when we wish to identify the invariant prove-
nance patterns for target actions. Also, they may differ in each execution because some
of them are process-related and are not shared across multiple trial execution. Keep-
ing these volatile data may affect the correctness of the benchmark generation because
they are not unified across similar graphs. There is a possibility that with extra noise
in the resulting benchmark, there may exist another similar action sequence which is
a closer match to the wrong benchmark. This makes it hard to identify the existence
of the correct pattern because they also contribute to the edit distance cost mentioned
in chapter 4 and increases the difficulty to solve the isomorphic sub-graph matching
problem. That is why we try to minimize the provenance recorded by ignoring them.
The generalization process aims to filter them and leave behind the elements which are
necessary for describing a runtime action sequence.
Before the generalization process, we need to handle and avoid some of the in-
complete or incorrect graphs because of the uncertainty in the recording stage. We
assume that over sufficiently many trials, there will be at least two representative ones,
which are similar to each other after dropping all those incomplete or incorrect graphs.
Identifying two representative runs is complicated by the fact that there might be mul-
tiple pairs of similar graphs. We discuss a strategy for identifying an appropriate pair
below. To obtain two representative graphs, we first consider all the trial runs and par-
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tition them into similarity classes. We first discard all graphs that are only similar to
themselves and consider these to be failed runs because they do not match any other
graph results. Among the remaining similarity classes, we first choose the similar-
ity class with the most number of graphs. We assume that most of the complete and
correct provenance collecting process should result in a similar result, and the incom-
plete and incorrect results are generally leading to different graphs. Thus the similarity
class with the largest number of graphs should contain the best candidates for post-
processing. After that, we choose a pair of graphs whose size are the smallest within
the chosen similarity class. The main reason for choosing the pair of graphs with the
smallest size is because there is a large set of noise and unrelated components exist
in the graphs and we assume that the smallest pair of graphs contains the cleanest re-
sult among the others in the same similarity class. Thus it provides a better source of
graphs for the post-processing of ProvMark.
Empirically, we observed that the probability of failure for graphs resulting from
the recording stage could be as high as 50-65%. There are multiple reasons for the
high failure. One of the reason is believed to be related to the uncontrollable flushing
of the cache. One of the main pitfalls is that we can not control when the cache flush-
ing is happening, this affects the completeness of the result. If we stop the provenance
tools before the flush has been done, then those data that are not been flushed will
be lost and result in incomplete graphs. From our manual approach mentioned back
in Chapter 3, the success rate is much higher when we wait until the cache has been
flushed before further processing the provenance result. This may not be an efficient
way for the automated system because the flushing happens randomly. We choose to
restart the tools and filter out those failure graphs to have higher efficiency. Also, as
CamFlow is retrieving information through LSM hook and this information is passed
to the user level through the relayfs components, there may exist a certain level of
delay. As CamFlow originally aims to record whole system provenance for the full
operating session, it keeps running in the kernel. We can only control a daemon in the
user level to process the provenance received. Some data may be delayed and send
to the CamFlow daemon after we turn off the recorder when we finish a trial execu-
tion. This delay may cause missing of information during the snapshot period and
result in incomplete provenance graph which we considered as failure. Besides, some
provenance source used by those provenance systems, including audit reporter are not
too reliable on the integrity of data. There is some loss experienced when there is a
large number of events happening in the kernel at a similar time which will overflow
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the buffer queue and cause some of the records dropped. To decrease the overhead of
the logging process, the Linux Audit System allows configuration using audit rules.
From the original Linux Audit Daemon configuration manual [69], it has mentioned
a max log file configuration which allows the system administrator to limit the size of
the log file and also use the max log file action to configure how will the Linux Au-
dit Daemon handle the additional log when the log file is full. The key problem here
is how the administrator handles situations in which storage space or communication
buffer space is exhausted. Although the default action of max log file action is to keep
the additional log in buffer, it is possible to configure the Daemon to drop oldest log
record entries or simply ignore new audit log record. Also, the buffer may be full and
fail to store additional log records. These possible settings may result in loss of log
records and make the Linux Audit Daemon an unreliable (and incomplete) source for
system and kernel activities. Morrison [114] provides an analysis of the whole Linux
Audit System and summarizes some standards and mechanisms for the prevention of
audit data loss and the protection of the integrity of those data. Although these meth-
ods do help to reduce the loss rate by different configuration enforcement including the
maximum buffer size settings, some of them still require certain tradeoffs. These trade-
offs include immediate halting of system applications or denial of later activities. Thus
a certain level of integrity detection is still required to detect random loss or altered
audit log records. Although some provenance systems like SPADE do have repairing
mechanisms, there are still some data which cannot be recovered due to random loss.
These different factors affect the error rate in the provenance graph generation process.
As we are aiming to retrieve some similar graphs to find the pair of graphs which
are closest to each other, we need to provide more candidates, the better balance is
to provide double of the graphs needed. When we consider the failing percentage of
around 50-65%, the success case is limited to one-third of chance. Different prove-
nance systems depend on different provenance sources, thus the error rate is different
for each of the tools. We have done some simple experiments to summarize the fail-
ing percentage and how many graphs are adequate to retrieve enough graphs in good
shape. Each of the provenance systems is managed to collect provenance for a sample
benchmark program with only one system call rename. The collection is repeated for
a different number of trials ranging from one trial to twelve trials. The experiments are
repeated for 10 times and an average number of accepted graphs are calculated from
the same number of trials for the same provenance systems. The result of the experi-
ments is shown in Figure 5.3. From these results, it shows the error rate in CamFlow is
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quite high due to the uncertain delay and halts on ProvMark, while SPADE also results
in some level of errors because of the random loss occurring in the queue buffer of
the audit reporter. To ensure we could get at least 4 graph candidates, it is necessary
to multiply the number by 3. So we calculated, observed and tested that 11-12 trials
are sufficed to raise the probability of finding two representative graphs above 99%.
This is the worst-case scenario. Usually, fewer trials suffice. This observation is done
by running multiple trials of testing on the three provenance collecting tools we have
chosen for our testing, which is SPADE, OPUS and CamFlow. The handling of non-






























Figure 5.3: Number of accepted graphs for the three provenance systems
Given two similar graphs, the generalization subsystem identifies the property val-
ues that are consistent across the two graphs and removes the transient ones. It searches
for a matching list of nodes and edges from the two graphs that minimize the number
of different properties. We assume that the differences are transient data and discard
them. We would like to minimize the number of differences, that is, match as many
properties as possible to avoid accidentally removing important properties.
Similarity and generalization are instances of the graph isomorphism problem,
whose status (in P or NP-complete) is unknown as mentioned in Arvind et al. [13].
We have discussed this problem and how we go around it in a separate chapter 4. We
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solve these problems using an Answer Set Programming (ASP) [61] specification that
defines the desired matching between the two graphs. The problem specification is
a logic program defining when a binary relation forms an isomorphism between the
graphs.
As mentioned in chapter 4, the similarity and generalization problem can be solved
using clingo, an efficient ASP solver [61]. We use the resulting matching to deter-
mine which properties are common across both graphs and discard the others. We
perform generalization independently on the foreground and background graphs. Thus
the inputs to this subsystem are the sets of foreground graphs and background graphs.
The final output is the two generalized graphs representing the invariant activity of the
foreground and background programs respectively. It is also worth mentioning that as
this stage is already independent of what provenance collecting tools have been used,
there is only one module for this subsystem to handle the whole generalization pro-
cess. It is also possible to provide an additional module for this subsystem if we later
discover another better way to solve the generalization and isomorphic graph matching
problem.
5.3.2.4 Comparison Subsystem
The fourth and last subsystem is graph comparison. Its purpose is to match the back-
ground graph to a sub-graph of the foreground graph; the unmatched part of the fore-
ground graph corresponds to the target activity which is output as the provenance
benchmark.
In our definition, we defined our foreground and background binaries are compiled
from the same C program with a simple #ifdef CPP directives enclosing the target
action sequence. The foreground binary is compiled with the directives defined while
the background binaries are compiled without the directives defined. As a result, the
background binary performs a subset of the behaviour of the foreground binary. The
remaining action in the foreground binary representing the behavioural pattern of the
target action sequence. It is worth mentioning that the more actions performed by the
two programs, the larger the resulting graphs will be and the more expensive it will be
to compare the graphs. Thus, it is always better to narrow down the testing program to
a minimum, that is only doing the necessary actions in the background graph and add
in the target action on top of it to form the foreground graph. Besides, programs that
exhibit non-determinism or I/O activities might not yield the same provenance graph
shape on repeated trials, which would invalidate our earlier assumption that the test
136 Chapter 5. ProvMark: the automated system
program executions are deterministic. The handling of non-determinism is indeed an
enhancement for ProvMark and is separately discussed in the next chapter.
When we are compiling the two binaries from the same program with or without
the CPP directives, we are expecting the foreground binary only contains additional
actions enclosed by the directives when comparing to the background binary which
represents the target action to be analysed. Thus, the generalized provenance graph for
the background binary is a sub-graph of the generalized provenance graph for the fore-
ground binary. As a result, there should be a one-to-one matching from the nodes and
edges in the background graph to the foreground graph. This graph matching problem
is a variant of the isomorphic sub-graph matching problem mentioned in chapter 4. We
again solve these problems by ASP. The details of the problems are in chapter 4.
Given two graphs, G1 and G2, the solver finds possible matches between nodes and
edges of G1 and a sub-graph of G2 and choose the matches with minimum mismatch
for properties. It is similar to the general isomorphic graph matching problem, the only
difference is the matching target are not the pair of graphs themselves. Instead, the
matching is done between one graph and the sub-graph of the other graph. This makes
the isomorphic sub-graph matching problem more specific than the general problem.
And when we comparing the problem to the real scenario of our benchmark process,
we can recognize their similarity. We are solving the same problem when we aim to
match the background graph to part of the foreground graph and retrieve the unmatched
part from the foreground graph as a result.
This comparison subsystem is similar to the last generalization subsystem, where
the comparison subsystem is aiming to solve a more specific problem. They are both
independent of what provenance collecting tools have been used. Thus only one mod-
ule is developed for this subsystem and it still could be extendible similar to the gen-
eralization subsystem. This subsystem will take the generalized foreground graph and
generalized background graph and compare them to generate the provenance bench-
mark for the target action sequence and the chosen provenance collecting tools. The
result is passed back to the backbone process and it will decide on how to post-process
the result and return to the user. The returned provenance benchmark should remain in
the Datalog format.
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5.3.3 Modular design
The automated system ProvMark automates the expressiveness benchmarking process
mentioned in chapter 3. The target provenance collecting tools are all existing tools
in the field. As mentioned in Section 2.1, there are a large group of tools in the field
collecting provenance information in different levels via different components of the
operating system. They also generate provenance in different formats which are most
suitable for the usage of their target user group. So, to allow easy extension of Prov-
Mark to handle additional tools and provenance format, different components and sub-
systems of ProvMark are designed as modules. For example, the recording subsystem
has several modules to handle different kinds of provenance recording tools. Although
each of them has customized handling for the tools, they follow the same interface
patterns for input and output. To support new tools, the tool developer just needs to
implement the provided interface and add in some starting logic for their tools. It
works as an adaptor to connect the recording subsystem to the provenance collecting
tools. Users of ProvMark only need to specify the tools they choose and the recording
subsystem will automatically find the needed adaptor module to connect to the related
provenance recording tool. This also applies to the handling of different provenance
result formats in the transformation subsystem. This setting demonstrates how Prov-
Mark makes use of the modular design to achieve extensibility. More details will be
discussed in the evaluation section of this chapter.
As each of the components and subsystems is working as modules, it is necessary to
have a backbone control for ProvMark. The backbone controls the overall execution of
ProvMark, including but not limited to the reading of the user configuration and input,
managing the intermediate result and output the final provenance benchmark result.
The backbone control for ProvMark is the centrepiece that arranges and handles the
full execution life cycle. It will follow the basic runtime as mentioned in Algorithm 1.
ProvMark backbone receives the choice for benchmark program, provenance col-
lecting tools and other user settings from the configuration file and command-line in-
put. It will interpret them and arrange for the correct modules for each subsystem. It
is also responsible for relaying intermediate results between subsystems or modules
and provides some final process after the last subsystem has completed. At last, it
will return the provenance benchmark in the format chosen by the user. The whole
backbone process act as a central control for the execution of ProvMark and support
the modularized design that allows ProvMark to be easily extended to more tools and
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Algorithm 1: ProvMark life cycle
Input : Benchmark Program
Input : Choice of Provenance Collecting Tool
Input : User Settings from Configuration File
1 Read configuration and arrange modules
2 for i← 0 to Numbero f Trials do
3 Run Recording Module
4 end
5 for i← 0 to Numbero f Graphs do
6 Run Transformation Module
7 end
8 Filter failure graphs in the background and foreground graphs
set
9 Run Generalization Module
10 Run Comparison Module
11 Final process of Provenance Benchmark
Result: Provenance Benchmark in user-chosen format
provenance formats.
5.3.4 Usage and further applications
This subsection describes some further applications of the provenance benchmark re-
sult generated by ProvMark. Note that the applications we mentioned here are possible
extensions of ProvMark which are not implemented and can be either a future working
direction of ProvMark or possible extensions to the application for the current bench-
mark by other research area or tools for the designated purpose.
As mentioned earlier, the different designs of provenance recording tools affect
whether (and how) they can observe certain activities. We consider a representative
example, calling rename on a file name that does not exist. By default, SPADE in-
stalls Linux Audit rules that only report on successful system calls, so SPADE records
no information in this case. OPUS monitors system calls via intercepting C library
calls, so it knows whether a call is being attempted, and typically generates some graph
structure even for unsuccessful calls. For example, the result of a failed rename call
has the same structure as the successful one, except that the return value property is
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-1 instead of 0. Finally, CamFlow can in principle monitor failed system calls, partic-
ularly involving permission checks, but does not do so in the case of rename failing
due to a missing file.
We do not take a position regarding whether it is desirable to record provenance for
failed calls: a failed call is part of the history of the system, but it may not result in new
dependency information that belongs in the provenance graph. The ability to record
failed system calls also demonstrate how different provenance collecting tools choose
to interpret what information should be collected regarding system action sequences.
Comparison of provenance benchmark results can help to distinguish this difference.
5.3.4.1 Configuration validation
All of the systems we considered have several configuration parameters, to allow
greater or lesser levels of detail, coalescing similar operations (such as repeated reads
or writes), or enabling/disabling versioning which distinguishes the modified artefacts
as separated nodes. Each of these configuration settings may have (potentially surpris-
ing) effects on what provenance is recorded.
We have done some preliminary experimentation with benchmarking alternative
configurations of SPADE. SPADE provides a flag simplify that is enabled by default.
Disabling simplify causes setresgid and setresuid (among others) to be ex-
plicitly monitored. However, enabling this flag also uncovered a minor bug: when
simplify is disabled, one of the properties of a background edge is initialized to a
random value, which shows up in the benchmark as a disconnected sub-graph. This
has been fixed in the current version.
SPADE also provides various filters and transformers which perform pre-processing
or post-processing of the stored provenance respectively. We experimented with one
of SPADE’s filters, IORuns, which controls whether runs of similar read or write oper-
ations are coalesced into a single edge. We found that in the benchmarked version of
SPADE, enabling this filter had no effect. This turned out to be due to an inconsistency
in the property names used by the filter and those generated by SPADE. This has also
now been fixed by the SPADE developers.
It is worth mentioning that this usage of configuration validation provides wider
options to provenance system developers for validating their tools. Currently, the tool
developers can use ProvMark to generate test case results for some features of their
tools and determine if the provenance benchmark result fulfils their expectations. This
usage was considered useful for some of the tool developers because it does help them
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to identify processing problems in their tools. The configuration validation mentioned
in here not only considers the general execution of the tools but also considers config-
uration and specific execution criteria which covers more parts of the tools and thus
provide a stronger validation and wider options for the tool developers.
5.3.4.2 Regression testing
Although ProvMark’s major goal has been to make the system call-level behaviour
of provenance recording tools more transparent to their users, it can also act as an
ingredient in regression testing for the tool developers. Specifically, we can retain the
benchmark graphs (as Datalog) from previous runs, and when a change is made to the
system, the tool developers can rerun all of the benchmarks and compare the previous
results to the new ones. The results should be isomorphic; if not, the differences can
be visualized to help understand how the behaviour has changed and possibly provide
a source of information for bug finding in the new implementation. This is another
usage on top of the tools and configuration validation.
5.3.4.3 Sensitive activity detection
A more ambitious application which is left for future work is activity detection, which
is one of the motivations for this project. If we have an example of a kind of activity
we would like to detect, e.g. a C source code or shell script snippet that illustrates how
to perform an attack, we could use ProvMark to record the attack-specific activity, and
then use the extracted sub-graph to identify patterns that are distinctive to that activity.
However, there are several obstacles to making this practical. A realistic attack (for ex-
ample against a web server) might correspond to hundreds or thousands of provenance
graph nodes, and it is not yet clear whether our approach scales to sufficiently large
graphs. So far we have considered benchmarking deterministic activity only, whereas
realistic attacks may involve concurrency. Finally, even if we successfully identify the
sub-graph corresponding to an attack, it might not match future similar attacks exactly.
Thus, additional work may need to be done on extracting the key features from the
attack graph(s). The future development of ProvMark is aiming to work towards this
direction on identifying large and non-deterministic patterns for future identification
of similar activities. Part of the work on the enhancement list like handling of non-
determinism will be discussed in a later chapter. Other challenges on top of that are
considered as future work and are beyond the scope of this project.
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5.4 ProvMark result analysis
This section discusses the testing result of ProvMark and some preliminary analysis
and comparison of the tools and system call candidates.
5.4.1 Tools and system call candidates
For the manual approach of the expressiveness benchmarking mentioned in chapter 3,
we choose two of the provenance collecting tools OPUS and SPADE for testing be-
cause they create smaller provenance graphs which allow us to analyse them manually.
We only choose two of them because it is not possible to do a large amount of anal-
ysis and adding another tool will be very inefficient. When moving to the automated
approach, we aim to keep the original choice for the manual approach which we are
already familiar with while adding in one more candidate which collects provenance
using a different methodology to widen our experiment and allow us to access broader
result sets for the comparison, analysis and the evaluation of the whole ProvMark sys-
tem. This choice decreases the time needed to study the usage of a brand new set
of tools but still allow us to gather our test candidates working in different method-
ology and applications. To verify and evaluate the performance of ProvMark, we do
need some minor help by the original provenance tools’ developers. We have success-
fully connected with the developers of SPADE, OPUS and CamFlow also support our
choice for using these three candidates as our preliminary testing target to evaluate and
analyse the feasibility and application of ProvMark.
One of the similar characteristics of SPADE and OPUS is their source of infor-
mation. They rely on some existing system components to relay information back to
them. SPADE adopts the audit reporter (or some other modules like Strace or log
record) which captures the information in kernel level and passes it to components that
have registered a receiver. The information can also be filtered manually before send-
ing to the recipient under certain configurations. On the other hand, the initial version
of OPUS intercepts dynamic library calls to receive notification of actions happening in
real-time for provenance recording. Both of them rely on some user-level components,
thus they may miss some information that is not handled by the underlying compo-
nents. Although both of them rely on some existing system components, they source
information from different levels. SPADE retrieves information in the user level which
is relayed from the kernel while OPUS retrieves information by intercepting library
calls which are performed in the user level.
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We have chosen CamFlow as our additional testing candidate. It retrieves prove-
nance information in a different location by a different methodology. It builds up a
customized LSM hook that registers with the LSM directly and monitors every deci-
sion of the LSM and passes it back to the user level by a self-defined relaying compo-
nents. As it is adding functionality in the kernel, CamFlow requires a recompilation of
its custom kernel to include the functionality in the base level around the LSM. Thus
running CamFlow has two prerequisites, the first one is root privilege and the second
one is that capturing must be done in the operating system based on the customized
kernel. On the other hand, it provides a trace for everything happening in the system
since system booting. This is because every system call activity needs to pass LSM for
authorization. The provenance trace collected by the CamFlow LSM hook includes all
the information explaining everything happening in a process or the system itself that
requires LSM authorization or monitoring. The three candidates have different prove-
nance collecting methodology and source of information. Also, they have different
use case scenarios in mind and thus they have done some customization, filtering and
transforming of information before generating the provenance. Their significant differ-
ences make them a good candidate for the automated ProvMark to evaluate its ability
for expressiveness benchmarking and also helps to solve problems and enhance the
tools for those provenance collecting tools developers. The three different approaches
cover most of the range of working for provenance collecting tools, thus we choose
them as our testing candidates to cover more possible cases.
In addition to provenance recording tools, we also need to choose the target system
calls for testing. The chosen target system calls are shown in Table 5.1, similar to the
choice mentioned back in Chapter 3. The chosen group is commonly used for security
and auditing usage and most of them are believed to be related to sensitive action se-
quences [90, 118]. Note that the same system call may display different behaviour us-
ing different parameters and system states; we focus on common-case behaviour here
and discuss failure cases and other call contexts later. Writing benchmark programs is
currently a manual (but not difficult) process as mentioned above. The following is a
comparison of the system calls in the four groups, file (artefact) management, process
management, permission management and pipe/stream management.
Last but not least, there is also an additional group of system calls which are related
to memory, sockets, multiple threads and processes which are all non-deterministic
events. These will be discussed further in the next chapter when we enhance ProvMark
to handle non-determinism.
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5.4.2 Analysis of results
This subsection discusses some of the similarities and differences in the resulting
provenance generated by the three provenance recording tools candidates. The re-
sults are grouped according to the grouping shown in Table 5.1, which is similar to
the grouping we used in the manual approach. In theory, ProvMark should be able to
identify the benchmark for any system calls in the provenance graphs. But we limit our
evaluation test cases to the system calls shown in Table 5.1 because these are the sys-
tem calls handled by the three provenance tools. Other system calls are either ignored
or filtered by one or more of the three provenance tool candidates and those system
calls are not shown in their resulting provenance graphs. The empty result makes the
testing and evaluation useless and thus we ignore those system-calls in our testing
and evaluation. In this evaluation, we are focusing on the effect of each system calls
and are not concentrating on the communication and data exchange between multiple
system-calls in order to have a better understanding on how different provenance tools
on handling a single system call event.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
creat dup dup2 dup3 clone chmod fchmod pipe
link linkat symlink symlinkat execve fchmodat chown pipe2
mknod mknodat open openat exit fchown fchownat tee
read pread rename renameat fork setgid setregid
truncate ftruncate unlink unlinkat vfork setresgid setuid
write pwrite close kill setreuid setresuid
Table 5.1: System calls used for the ProvMark evaluation
5.4.2.1 Artefact management
Group 1 includes system calls which manage artefacts and files. Examples such as
creat, open, close are generally covered well by all of the tools, but they each
take somewhat different approaches to represent even the simplest file open behaviour.
For example, for the open call, SPADE result contains a single node and edge, while
CamFlow creates a node for the file object, a node for its path, and several edges link-
ing them to each other and the opening process, and OPUS creates four new nodes
including two nodes corresponding to the file. On the other hand, reads and writes ap-
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pear similar in both SPADE and CamFlow, while by default, OPUS does not record file
reads or writes. For close, CamFlow records the underlying kernel data structures
eventually being freed, but ProvMark does not reliably observe this.
The dup, dup2 and dup3 system calls duplicate a file descriptor so that the pro-
cess can use multiple descriptors to access the same open artefact. SPADE and Cam-
Flow do not record this call directly, but the changes to the process’s artefact descriptor
state can affect future file system calls that are monitored. OPUS does record dup,
dup2 and dup3 actions specifically. The two added nodes are not directly connected
but are connected to the same process node in the underlying graph. That means that
in the viewpoint of OPUS, the original artefact descriptor and the copied artefact de-
scriptor is treated as two completely different recording targets. Thus, one component
records the system call itself (status of the original artefact descriptor) and the other
one records the creation of a new resource (the duplicated artefact descriptor). This is
also similar to the case of the mknod system call family which has similar usage to
the dup system call family. The mknod system call is only recorded by OPUS, and
mknodat system call is not recorded by any of the systems.
Lastly, the rename and renameat system call illustrates how the three systems
record different graph structure for this operation. SPADE represents a rename using
two nodes for the new and old file names, with edges linking them to each other and to
the process that performed the rename. OPUS creates around a dozen nodes, including
nodes corresponding to the rename call itself and the new and old file name. CamFlow
represents a rename as adding a new path associated with the file object (treat the
rename action as a version update of the file itself); the old path does not appear.
An example provenance benchmark results with rename system call are shown in
Figure 5.4. The property labels of the OPUS result has been removed because of the
readability problem.














































































Figure 5.4: Benchmark for rename by SPADE/OPUS/CamFlow
5.4.2.2 Process management
Group 2 includes process management system calls. The process management opera-
tions start processes (fork, vfork, clone), replace a process’s memory space with
a new executable and execute it (execve), or terminate a process (kill, exit).
These system calls may result in multi-processing or multiple-threading execution
which is non-determinism. We are only focusing on the deterministic part of process
management in this chapter. The target action sequences in the chapter include the
testing of the creation and termination of process or process management within a sin-
gle process. Other action sequences out of this range may result in non-deterministic
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events which are handled after the enhancing of ProvMark. We will discuss them in
the next chapter.
Process creation and initialization calls are generally monitored and captured by
all three tools, except that OPUS does not appear to monitor the clone system call.
Inspecting the results manually shows significant differences, however. For example,
the SPADE benchmark graph for execve is large but has just a few nodes for OPUS
and CamFlow. On the other hand, the fork and vfork graphs are small for SPADE
and CamFlow and large for OPUS. This may indicate the different perspectives of
these tools: SPADE relies on the activity reported by Linux Audit, while OPUS relies
on intercepting C library calls outside the kernel.
Another interesting observation is that the SPADE benchmark results for fork
and vfork differ. Specifically, for vfork, SPADE represents the forked process as
a disconnected activity node, i.e. there is no graph structure connecting the parent
and child process. This is because Linux Audit reports system calls on exit, while the
parent process that called vfork is suspended until the child process exits. SPADE
sees the vfork child process in the log executing its system calls before it sees the
vfork that created the child process. This may relate to the order handling of the
audit manager in the kernel which only records an event when the process finishes.
If process A starts earlier than process B and ends after the termination of process B,
then the audit reporter will give a smaller event id to process B and relay process B
information before process A. Thus, it may affect the ordering. But it may be fine-
tuned by ordering by timestamps of process start.
The exit and kill calls are not detected because they deviate from the assump-
tions our approach is based on. A process always has an implicit exit at the end,
while killing a process means that it does not terminate normally. Thus, the exit and
kill benchmarks are all empty.
Figure 5.5 shows provenance benchmark results for execve system call.
















Figure 5.5: Benchmark for execve by SPADE/OPUS/CamFlow
5.4.2.3 Permission management
Group 3 includes permission related system calls. These system calls aim to change
artefact or process owners or permissions (chown, fchown, fchownat, chmod,
fchmod, fchmodat). According to its documentation, SPADE currently records the
chmod family but not chown family. OPUS does not monitor fchmod or fchown
because from its perspective these calls only perform read/write activity and do not
affect the process’s file descriptor state, so as for other read/write activity OPUS does
not record anything by default. CamFlow records all of these operations.
Apart from general owners or permissions management, there are also a set of sys-
tem calls managing the (effective) identity of an user executing a binary (setuid,
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setreuid, setresuid, setgid, setregid, setresgid). In its default con-
figuration, SPADE does not explicitly record setresuid or setresgid, but it
does monitor changes to these process attributes and records observed changes. Our
benchmark result for setresuid is non-empty, reflecting an actual change of ef-
fective user id, while our benchmark for setresgid just sets the effective group id
attribute to its current value, and so this activity is not noticed by SPADE. OPUS also
does not track these two calls, while CamFlow again tracks all of them.































































































































Figure 5.6: Benchmark for setreuid by SPADE/OPUS/CamFlow
These permission management system calls are important for accountability be-
cause they keep track of the permission changes of artefacts and processes and also
the changes of privilege level of a user in runtime. The resulting provenance of these
system calls shows the detailed process of privilege escalation of a user for accessing
a specific resource. These details help to identify the processes or users who are re-
sponsible for certain actions. This may help to fix problems in those processes which
accidentally give the user the chance to escalate privileges. As a result, the benchmark
in these system calls can identify if the candidate tools are capable of this security and
auditing usage.
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5.4.2.4 Pipe Management
Last but not least, group 4 includes system call management piping communication.
Similar to the system calls managing processes, piping system calls are related to in-
terprocess communication which may also involve non-determinism. We are still fo-
cusing on the deterministic part which involves pipe creation and passing information
through two processes. The remaining action sequences are also left to discuss later in
the next chapter.
An example provenance benchmark result with pipe system call recorded by
OPUS is shown in Figure 5.7. An additional example provenance result with tee





































































Figure 5.7: Benchmark for pipe by OPUS
Figure 5.8: Benchmark for tee by CamFlow (Abstract)
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Pipes provide efficient interprocess communication. The system calls (pipe and
pipe2) creates and opens a pipe in different ways, which can be read or written using
standard file system calls, and tee duplicates information from one pipe into another
without consuming it. That is, it passes output from one pipe as input to another pipe.
Of the three systems, only OPUS records the pipe family (pipe and pipe2), while
only CamFlow currently records tee.
5.4.2.5 Summary
This subsection discusses comparisons of the benchmark results generated by Prov-
Mark with the chosen system calls and provenance collecting tools candidates. It
shows the differences and similarities in the resulting benchmarks of different tools
on the same system call actions. It demonstrates large differences in some of the
cases which once again show the necessity of building up the automated approach
for the expressiveness benchmarking for helping tools developers and end-user to have
a standardized and unified way to analyse the capabilities of different tools in differ-
ent circumstances. Table 5.9 summarize the result status of the provenance generation
process of ProvMark, working with each of the three provenance systems on all sys-
tem calls mentioned in Table 5.1. Table 5.9 gives an overview of whether a system
call is explicitly handled by a provenance system and representing in the resulting
provenance graph and benchmark. It also gives an overview of the expressiveness of
the provenance benchmark, which is verified by the original developers of the prove-
nance systems. It is worth mentioning that the summary given in Table 5.9 is recorded
by using specific version of the provenance systems mentioned in Table 2.1, back in
Section 2.1.3.
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System Call SPADE OPUS CamFlow
close OK OK LP
creat OK OK OK
dup SC OK NR
dup2 SC OK NR
dup3 SC OK NR
link OK OK OK
linkat OK OK OK
symlink OK OK NR
symlinkat OK OK NR
mknod NR OK NR
mknodat NR NR NR
open OK OK OK
openat OK OK OK
read OK NR OK
pread OK NR OK
rename OK OK OK
renameat OK OK OK
truncate OK OK OK
ftruncate OK OK OK
unlink OK OK OK
unlinkat OK OK OK
write OK NR OK
pwrite OK NR OK
Group 1
Note Meaning
NR Behavior not recorded (by default
configuration)
SC Only state changes monitored
LP Limitation in ProvMark
OK Validated by developer
Key definition
System Call SPADE OPUS CamFlow
clone OK NR OK
execve OK OK OK
exit LP LP LP
fork OK OK OK
kill LP LP LP
vfork OK OK OK
Group 2
System Call SPADE OPUS CamFlow
chmod OK OK OK
fchmod OK NR OK
fchmodat OK OK OK
chown NR OK OK
fchown NR NR OK
fchownat NR OK OK
setgid OK OK OK
setregid OK OK OK
setresgid SC NR OK
setuid OK OK OK
setreuid OK OK OK
setresuid OK NR OK
Group 3
System Call SPADE OPUS CamFlow
pipe NR OK NR
pipe2 NR OK NR
tee NR NR OK
Group 4
Figure 5.9: Summary of validation results
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5.5 ProvMark evaluation
This section evaluates the basic functionality of ProvMark. We first consider the actual
overhead of the ProvMark components and subsystems, then we have provided a sim-
ple self-evaluation of the correctness and completeness of the benchmark. Full scale
automated evaluation is considered as future works. As we are claiming ProvMark
as an all-around expressiveness benchmarking automation system for provenance col-
lecting tools, we also demonstrate how easy it is to extend ProvMark to other tools,
system calls and provenance formats which are not included in our candidate list. For
a fair comparison, all the experiments are done in a virtual machine with 1 virtual CPU
and 4GB of virtual memory. The common operating system for the virtual machine
is Ubuntu 16.04 which is auto set-up by a Vagrant file for each of the tools. Depen-
dencies for all three provenance collecting tools, including Neo4j and some needed
Python libraries, are also installed automatically by the Vagrant engine according to
the configuration in the Vagrant files. Vagrant [127] is an open-source engine/tool for
building and managing virtual environments and virtual machines. Users can build
up their vagrant files which instruct the Vagrant engine to build up customized vir-
tual environments. The Vagrant files include but not limited to the choice of operating
systems, virtual hardware configuration, user management, software package manage-
ment and initialization script after the building of the virtual systems. Also, the Vagrant
engine can help the user connect to the virtual machine and provide an abstract layer
for the user to manage the environments through direct or network connections. In
our evaluation, all virtual machines were hosted on an Intel i5-4570 3.2GHz with 8GB
RAM running Scientific Linux 7.5.
5.5.1 Performance
We first discuss the performance of the ProvMark system. Some performance over-
head is acceptable for a benchmarking or testing tool; however, we need to establish
that ProvMark’s strategy for solving NP-complete sub-graph isomorphism matching
problems is effective in practice (i.e. takes minutes rather than days). In this section,
we will show that the extra work done by ProvMark to generate benchmarks from the
original provenance result is acceptable.
We first give some sample sizes of the graphs produced by different stages, to aid
in interpreting the timing results. Table 5.2 presents the sizes of the graphs resulting
from different stages for the open and setuid system calls. The table shows the size
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of the generalized background graph, generalized foreground graph and the resulting
provenance benchmark of the two sample system calls. Each cell contains |V | / |E| / |P|
where |V | is the number of vertices, |E| is the number of edges, and |P| is the number
of properties in the graph.Thus, we can see that for SPADE, the background graph
has around 20 nodes and 30 edges, with around 260 properties, while the foreground
graphs for these two calls have just a few additional nodes and edges. For OPUS
the graphs are larger and sparser (around 80 nodes and edges) but with many more
properties; the difference is mostly due to OPUS creating many nodes to record initial
environment variables. Finally, for CamFlow, the graphs have fewer nodes and edges
than SPADE, but more properties (over 300). Again, the target graphs include only a
few nodes and edges but over 40 properties.
Graph SPADE OPUS CamFlow
Background (open) 20 / 28 / 268 78 / 78 / 461 12 / 15 / 337
Background (setuid) 20 / 28 / 270 77 / 78 / 457 12 / 15 / 337
Foreground (open) 21 / 30 / 270 79 / 79 / 471 14 / 19 / 396
Foreground (setuid) 20 / 30 / 273 80 / 79 / 477 14 / 18 / 424
Target (open) 1 / 1 / 10 1 / 1 / 7 3 / 4 / 45
Target (setuid) 1 / 1 / 3 3 / 2 / 13 2 / 2 / 45
Table 5.2: Number of nodes/edges/properties in provenance graph of tools/system calls
Next, we report measurements of the recording time. Since the number of trials
varies, we report the average time needed per trial. For SPADE, recording took ap-
proximately 20s per trial. For OPUS, the recording time was around 28s per trial, and
for CamFlow each trial took around 10s. We wish to emphasize that the recording
time results are not representative of the recording times of these systems in normal
operation — they include repeatedly starting, stopping and waiting for output to be
flushed, and the waiting times are intentionally conservative to avoid garbled results.
No conclusions about their relative performance, when used as intended, should be
drawn. As a result, we only consider the overhead from ProvMark, so we only eval-
uate the time performance on the transformation subsystem, generalization subsystem
and comparison subsystem.
In Figures 5.10–5.12, we summarize the time needed for ProvMark to execute each
of our system call candidates using SPADE, OPUS, and CamFlow respectively. The
bars are divided into three portions, representing the time needed for the three subsys-
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Time (s)
Figure 5.10: Processing time for system calls by SPADE
tems. Note that the x-axes are not all to the same scale: in particular, the transforma-
tion, generalization and comparison times for OPUS are much higher than for the other
tools. It is because of the large overhead for transforming Neo4j graph data structure
to Datalog format.
From the data in Figures 5.10–5.12, we can see that the transformation stage is
typically the most time-consuming part. The transformation stage maps the different
provenance output formats to Datalog format. The transformation time for OPUS is
much longer than for the other two systems. This appears to be because OPUS pro-
duces larger graphs (including recording environment variables), and extracting them
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Time (s)
Figure 5.11: Processing time for system calls by OPUS
involves running Neo4j queries, which also has a JVM warm-up and database initial-
ization cost which generates large time overhead.
The time required for the generalization stage depends mainly on the number of
elements (nodes, edges and properties) in the graph since this stage maps elements in
pairs of graphs to find an isomorphic matching pair. As we can see from the results,
the generalization of OPUS graphs again takes significantly longer than for SPADE
and CamFlow, probably because the graphs are larger. For SPADE, the generalization
of the execve benchmark takes much longer than for other calls (though still only a
few seconds) because this system call generates much larger graphs then other system
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Figure 5.12: Processing time for system calls by CamFlow
call candidates.
The time required for the comparison stage is usually less than for generalization
(recall that in generalization we process two pairs of graphs whereas in comparison
we just compare the background and foreground graph). Comparison of OPUS graphs
again takes longest, while the comparison of CamFlow graphs again takes slightly
longer than for SPADE, perhaps because of the larger number of properties.
In general, we can conclude that the time needed for ProvMark’s transformation,
generalization, and comparison stages are relatively shorter compared with the time
needed for recording. Most benchmarks complete within a few minutes, though some
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that produce larger target graphs take considerably longer; thus, at this point running all
of the benchmarks is an overnight activity. This seems like an acceptable price to pay
for increased confidence in these systems, and while there is room for improvement,
this compares favourably with manual analysis, which is tedious and would take a
skilled user several hours. Besides, we have monitored the memory usage and found
that ProvMark never used more than 75% of the 4GB virtual memory on a virtual
machine, indicating memory was not a bottleneck. As a whole, the general overhead
for ProvMark in both time and memory overhead is acceptable.
5.5.2 Scalability
Our experiments so far concentrated on benchmarking one system call at a time. The
design of ProvMark allows arbitrary activities as the target action, including sequences
of system calls. As mentioned above, we can simply identify a target action sequence
using the #ifdef TARGET CPP directive statement to let ProvMark generate back-
ground and foreground programs respectively.
Of course, if the target activity consists of multiple system calls, the time needed for
ProvMark to process results and solve the resulting sub-graph isomorphism problems
will surely increase. The generated provenance graph will also increase in size and
number of elements. The NP-complete complexity of sub-graph isomorphism means
that in the worst case, the time needed to solve larger problem instances could increase
exponentially. This section investigates the scalability of ProvMark when the size of
the target action increases. We have included a set of benchmark programs with the
same set of system calls repeating for different times. The resulting time performance
demonstrates the scalability of ProvMark in handling a bigger set of target action se-
quences that are more realistic and closer to those real-world applications. In reality,
if we repeat a certain system call for multiple times, the resulting provenance graph
is more likely contains fewer vertices by reusing certain vertices for representing the
same processes or artefacts. This helps to create a smaller graph result for analysing
the scalability of ProvMark on processing graphs with larger numbers of components.
In figure 5.13-5.15, the charts show the time needed for the three processing sub-
systems of ProvMark in handling some scalability test cases on SPADE, OPUS and
CamFlow respectively. Note that the x-axes are not all to the same scale: in particular,
the transformation, generalization and comparison times for OPUS are much higher
than for the other tools. It is because of the large overhead for transforming Neo4j
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graph data structure to Datalog format. The scalability test cases range from scale1
to scale8. In test case scale1, the target action sequence is simply a creation of a file
and another deletion of the newly created file. In test case scale2, scale4 and scale8,
the same target action is repeated twice, four times, and eight times respectively. The
results show that the time needed initially grows slowly for SPADE, but by scale8 the
time almost doubles compared to scale1. For OPUS, the time increases are dwarfed
by the high overhead of transformation, which includes the one-time Neo4j startup and
access costs as discussed above. For CamFlow, the time needed approximately doubles
at each scale factor. These experiments do demonstrate that ProvMark can currently
handle short sequences of system calls without problems.









Figure 5.13: Scalability results: SPADE+Graphviz









Figure 5.14: Scalability results: OPUS+Neo4J









Figure 5.15: Scalability results: CamFlow+ProvJson
5.5.3 Modularity and extensibility
ProvMark was designed with extensibility in mind. Only the first two stages (record-
ing and generalization) depend on the details of the provenance recording tools being
benchmarked. To support a new tool, it suffices to implement an additional record-
ing module that uses the new tools to record provenance for a test executable, and (if
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Module SPADE OPUS CamFlow
(Format) (DOT) (Neo4j) (PROV-JSON)
Recording 171 118 192
Transformation 74 122 128
Table 5.3: Recording and transformation module sizes (Python lines of code)
needed) an additional translation module that maps its provenance output format to
Datalog. ProvMark provides a configuration file in which one can select the needed
recording and transformation modules.
As discussed earlier, it was non-trivial to develop recording modules for the three
provenance recording tools that produce reliable results. In particular, supporting Cam-
Flow required several iterations and discussion with its developers, which have resulted
in changes to CamFlow to accommodate the needs of benchmarking. This architec-
ture has been refined through experience with multiple versions of the SPADE and
CamFlow systems, and we have generally found the changes needed to ProvMark to
maintain compatibility with new versions to be minor. Developing new recording mod-
ules ought to be straightforward for systems that work in a similar way to one of the
three we considered. It is also worth mentioning during the development of ProvMark,
the three candidate tools have been updated. When their respective recording modules
are done, it is easy to update to suit the new version of the tools. This also shows the
extensibility for supporting provenance collecting tools candidates.
If a provenance tool generates data in a format not currently supported by Prov-
Mark, an additional module for handling this type of provenance data is needed. But
the need for new transformations should decrease over time as more tools are intro-
duced to ProvMark since there are a limited number of common provenance formats.
Developing a new module for supporting a new provenance format should be easy.
There are already a set of templates. The only necessary thing to do is to identify the
edges, vertices and properties of data in the new format and the transformation code
should be easily done on top of that. Some provenance recording tools support gener-
ating provenance in multiple formats, for example, SPADE can generate provenance
in both Graphviz graph and Neo4j graph database format. The user of ProvMark only
needs to specify which tools module and graph format modules they want to use and
specify it in the command line arguments or configuration file, then ProvMark will
automatically use the needed module for each subsystem.
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As shown in Table 5.3, none of the three recording or transformation modules
required more than 200 lines of code (Python 3 using only standard library imports).
We initially developed ProvMark with support for SPADE/DOT, SPADE/Neo4j and
OPUS/Neo4j combinations; thus, adding support for CamFlow and PROV-JSON only
required around 330 lines of code.
5.5.4 Simple expressiveness evaluation
After demonstrating the performance and different properties of ProvMark, we un-
derstand that ProvMark is theoretically capable of scaling up to some real system be-
haviour analysis. One of the key points for the expressiveness benchmarking proposed
in Chapter 3 is to provide a unified way to analyse the expressiveness of a specific
provenance system on several system call action sequences. The expressiveness is
composed of two factors, completeness and correctness. Completeness of provenance
ensures all the core elements for identifying an activity sequence have been included in
the result which minimizes the false-negative rate. On the other hand, the correctness
of provenance ensures no ambiguous or wrong elements that affect the correct map-
ping between provenance and action sequence have been included in the result which
minimizes the false positive rate. As a result, completeness and correctness factors
ensure a one to one mapping between a specific action sequence and its corresponding
provenance benchmark without ambiguity.
Apart from the basic performance, evaluation of the expressiveness of the prove-
nance benchmark result is also necessary to ensure ProvMark is possible to handle real
system behaviour and activity sequence analysis. It is the most important property to
be evaluated as the key motivation provided by ProvMark is the expressiveness bench-
marking which acts as a base for different applications of the resulting provenance and
most of the use cases we suggested in early chapters. In the development of ProvMark,
there is an additional module implemented for a simple expressiveness evaluation to
ensure ProvMark does complete its job correctly and the resulting provenance bench-
mark does correctly and completely describe the specific action sequence for further
application and analysis. This subsection describes the details of the self-evaluation
module of ProvMark, together with some evaluation process and result of provenance
benchmark by the self-evaluation module.
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5.5.4.1 Expressiveness evaluation module
One of the simple ways for the expressiveness evaluation of the generated provenance
benchmark is to put them into real use, for example, by feeding them together with
some random binary files to see if it can help recognize the existence of the cor-
responding action sequence. To test both completeness and correctness factors, the
self-evaluation should be executed multiple times with different kinds of testing bina-
ries. The expressiveness of the provenance benchmark (and the generating provenance
systems) are evaluated by the number of correct judgments on the simple evaluation.
The correct judgment should be positive if the specific activity sequence is found in
the binary and a negative if the specific activity sequence is not found in the binary.
A correct and complete provenance benchmark should be able to help discover the
existence of the specific activity sequence and distinguish between similar activity se-
quences. This follows the correctness and completeness definition in the earlier text.
Some general test cases with different binaries are shown in Table 5.4. These test cases
are designed based on different numbers of activity sequences included in the binary
for all marginal cases. The major idea is to demonstrate and evaluate if the correct-
ness and completeness factors discussed in earlier chapters can be observed from the
benchmark generated by ProvMark. These test cases cover different combinations to
evaluate false-positive, false-negative and duplicate events which should demonstrate
the effectiveness of ProvMark result.
The expressiveness evaluation module of ProvMark provides an interface for feed-
ing the provenance benchmark and an executable binary file to test the existence of the
specific activity sequence represented by the provenance benchmark. It goes through a
slightly different process compared to the general provenance benchmark generation.
A brief description of the expressiveness evaluation process is shown in Figure 5.16.
As shown in Figure 5.16, the testing binary first goes through the recording subsys-
tem. In this stage, the testing binary will be executed multiple times and monitored by
the corresponding provenance systems. The recording subsystem of ProvMark man-
ages both the execution of the testing binary and the recording process of the prove-
nance system. The result of this stage is a set of provenance graphs from multiple
execution trials. These graphs are then passed to the transformation subsystem where
each of them will be transformed into Datalog format for further processing. Different
formats of graphs are transformed by different handlers. The resulting graphs in Dat-
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Test Case Testing binary description
EV#1 Binary that contains one set of the specific activity sequence
EV#2 Binary that contains multiple sets of the specific activity sequence
EV#3 Binary that contains a set of activity sequence that is slightly
different with the specific activity sequence (For example, open
and openat which opens an artefact by path or file handler)
EV#4 Binary that contains one set of specific activity sequence and one
set of activity sequence slightly different from the specific activity
sequence
EV#5 Binary that contains a completely different set of activity sequence
(For example, open and rename which does the completely
different actions)




























(1) Recording (4) Evaluation(3) Generalization(2) Transformation
Figure 5.16: ProvMark expressiveness evaluation overview
alog format are compared to each other and volatile and background property labels
will be filtered out as noise by the generalization subsystem. The result of this stage
is a single generalized graph representing the activity sequence of the testing binary.
The testing binary goes through the same process as the normal provenance bench-
mark generation process in the first three subsystems. Although generalization is not
necessary for the simple evaluation as we did not need to filter noise, the graphs will
go through the generalization subsystem to decrease the interference caused by the
noise and increasing the success matching rate. The only difference happens in the last
comparison subsystem as there is only one generalized graph in this process. The gen-
eralized graph for the testing binary will instead be compared to the given provenance
benchmark in a new evaluation subsystem. The evaluation subsystem will try to iden-
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tify if the activity represented by the provenance benchmark P does exist in the testing
binary. It is an isomorphic sub-graph matching problem. If the activity sequence rep-
resented by P does exist in the testing binary, the same structure should appear in the
generalized provenance graph G of the testing binary. As P only contains the specific
activity sequence and G may contain more activities, the numbers of elements in G
must be larger than or equal to the numbers of elements in P if the testing binary does
contains the specific activity sequence. Thus, if the activity sequence represented does
exist in the testing binary, P must form an isomorphic sub-graph relationship with G,
that is P must be isomorphic to G′ where G′ is a sub-graph of G. We use the same
isomorphic sub-graph code mentioned in the last chapter to discover if the isomorphic
sub-graph relationship does exist between P and G. The evaluation subsystem will
provide judgment according to the result of the answer set programming. If unsatis-
fiable is returned, it means that the isomorphic sub-graph relationship does not exist
between P and G and thus the evaluation subsystem concludes that the specific activ-
ity sequence does not exist in the testing binary, and vice versa. The final result is a
positive or negative judgment showing the existence of the specific activity sequence
in the testing binary.
There are two assumptions in this simple evaluation process. The first assump-
tion is the correct provenance system is chosen for the simple evaluation process. As
different provenance systems generated different provenance graphs and result in dif-
ferent provenance benchmark, the simple expressiveness evaluation needs to know the
correct provenance systems that generated the given provenance benchmark to have a
correct generalized graph for the evaluation subsystem to compare and judge on the
existence of the specific activity sequence. Wrong input may result in an undefined
result as there is no guarantee that the same set of provenance graph elements mean
the same thing for different provenance systems. The second assumption is the ab-
sence of obscure events. The simple expressiveness benchmarking evaluation needs to
match the same activity sequence. Obscure or redundant activities that make the activ-
ity sequence an invariant which still performs the same effect cannot be distinguished
by the evaluation module. Only the activity sequence with the same set of system call
event can be detected. The application for vetting sensitive behaviour from obscurity
or redundancy is considered as future works.
There is a special configuration threshold for the expressiveness evaluation process.
The threshold defaults to be zero and it represents the maximum edit distance value
between the provenance benchmark P and a sub-graph G′′ of a provenance graph G
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generalized from the multiple provenance graph generated by chosen provenance sys-
tems for the execution of the test binary. This threshold exists for error tolerance in
the generalization and comparison subsystem in the original provenance benchmark
generation process. In the generalization process, multiple graphs are compared to-
gether and volatile information is filtered out as noise. In this process, it is possible
that some noise did not change in several trials and remain in the generalized graph and
become impurity in the resulting benchmark. Thus, some level of impurity may exist
in both the generalized graph of the test binary or the benchmark itself. This impurity
may result in either an unsatisfiable result or an ambiguity in the evaluation process in
terms of failing to distinguish activity sequences that are similar to the target activity
sequence. Turning the threshold up allows a certain level of “similar” match but at the
same time decreases the accuracy of the match. User needs to find a balance between
unsatisfiable and ambiguous results by tuning the threshold to a suitable level. By in-
creasing the threshold, the flexibility on similar matching is increased while the level
of accuracy is decreased. This favours the completeness factor. On the other hand,
decreasing the threshold increases the accuracy but decreases the flexibility and allow
less impurity in the benchmark and the provenance graph generation for the testing
binary which favours the correctness factor.
As shown in Table 5.1, ProvMark has been tested with a limited set of system calls
on three chosen provenance systems, SPADE, OPUS, and CamFlow. All this testing
is done by generating a set of provenance benchmarks. These provenance benchmarks
are further feedback to the expressiveness evaluation module to see if they fulfil the
completeness and correctness factors at a basic level following the five different test
cases mentioned above. For test case EV#1, we are feeding the provenance benchmark
together with the original foreground program. For test case EV#2, we slightly modify
the original foreground program to repeat the same system call for 3 times. For the
remaining test cases, the slightly different set of specific activity sequence is obtained
by interchanging the system call with the other system call in the same family, for
example, interchanging open with openat or interchanging link with symlink.
For test case EV#3, we directly feed the original foreground program of the inter-
changeable system call with the provenance benchmark. That is, we are feeding the
provenance benchmark for open together with the original foreground program for
openat, etc. For test case EV#4, the testing binary is a combination of the chosen
system call and its interchangeable counterpart. That is, we are feeding the prove-
nance benchmark for link together with a foreground program that contains both the
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link and symlink system calls. Lastly, for test case EV#5, the foreground program
contains another system call that is not interchangeable. For example, we feed the
provenance benchmark of the open system call with the foreground program of the
rename system call.
We try to execute the test on some same provenance benchmark in each group for
each test case. Each test is repeated for five times and the numbers of correct judg-
ments are summarized in Table 5.5 to Table 5.7. We did not include the test for group
4 system calls using SPADE because SPADE did not have obvious provenance graph
generated for any system calls in group 4. From the result, we can see most of the
case give correct judgment where there is some random error exists in some of the
cases. One possible reason for those random failures is because of the random loss
of information in the provenance graph generation of the testing binary. Other possi-
ble reasons includes random graph matching errors during the generalization stage or
comparison stage for the benchmark generation process or the evaluation process.. In
general, this test result give a basic overview of the completeness and correctness of
the provenance benchmark and their corresponding provenance systems.
In our test cases, we are still using testing binaries with a very limited number
of system calls. Currently, we are only testing with small scale programs and aim to
demonstrate the expressiveness of the provenance benchmark and show the feasibility
of the ProvMark system. It is expected that the current expressiveness evaluation mod-
ule does not handle well for realistic binary or application for doing some real sensitive
activity vetting. In theory, some enhancement is needed to scale it up to realistic binary
or application execution which results in a much larger provenance graph for the eval-
uation. One possible enhancement is to formalize the patterns or transform the patterns
as query format to allow auto-discovery of the patterns. But this is left as one of the
future work and applications of ProvMark and its provenance benchmark results. Cur-
rently, the ProvMark implementation mentioned in this thesis is still concentrating on
the automation of the provenance benchmark generation and to provide a basic level
of expressiveness evaluation of the result. Further applications of the result, including
formal evaluations and validations of the provenance benchmark or automation testing
modules, are considered as future enhancement work for ProvMark. Some of them are
discussed in Section 5.3.4 and in later chapters.
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System call group System call chosen
# of correct judgment for test cases
EV#1 EV#2 EV#3 EV#4 EV#5
Group 1 open 5 5 5 5 5
Group 2 fork 5 5 4 4 5
Group 3 chmod 5 5 5 5 5
Table 5.5: Result for Test Cases in Table 5.4 (SPADE)
System call group System call chosen
# of correct judgment for test cases
EV#1 EV#2 EV#3 EV#4 EV#5
Group 1 open 5 5 4 4 5
Group 2 fork 4 5 5 5 5
Group 3 chmod 5 5 5 5 5
Group 4 pipe 5 4 5 5 5
Table 5.6: Result for Test Cases in Table 5.4 (OPUS)
System call group System call chosen
# of correct judgment for test cases
EV#1 EV#2 EV#3 EV#4 EV#5
Group 1 open 5 5 5 5 5
Group 2 fork 5 5 4 4 5
Group 3 chmod 5 5 5 5 5
Group 4 tee 5 4 5 4 5
Table 5.7: Result for Test Cases in Table 5.4 (CamFlow)
5.5.5 Summary
The main hypothesis of the ProvMark system is providing an automatic expressiveness
benchmarking which is easy to use, fast, extensible, flexible, useful and effective to
compare provenance generated by different tools and mechanisms. The comparison
helps to understand the capabilities of each tool in different scenarios and helps to
assess completeness and correctness problems of those tools. In the evaluation above,
we provide evidence for the hypothesis in multiple directions.
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5.6 Discussion
During the basic design stage of ProvMark, we have contacted and discussed with
the developers of the three provenance recording tools candidates, SPADE, OPUS and
CamFlow. We also continued to feedback our generated provenance benchmark re-
sults to them to check if the results met their expectations. One of the motivations we
have mentioned at the beginning is that the expressiveness benchmarking can help the
tool developers to check for problems or bugs in their tools when we provide some
provenance benchmark results that are out of their expectations. It did happen several
times in our early development stage that we located some of the problematic parts
in the tools themselves and notified the developers to fix them. Also, from the ba-
sic performance evaluation of ProvMark, we can see that the additional processing of
ProvMark is very lightweight. It shows acceptable performance despite the need to
solve multiple NP-complete isomorphic graph / sub-graph matching problems. This
demonstrates one of the achievements of ProvMark which shows that ProvMark pro-
vides a significant step towards the validation of such systems and should be a useful
tool for developing correctness or completeness criteria for them.
This basic design and methodology mentioned in this chapter is the first stage de-
velopment of ProvMark which aims to transform the basic functionality from the man-
ual approach to automatic. So we only focus on deterministic input in this stage of de-
velopment. We understand that most of the real usage is indeed non-deterministic, thus
we put the handling of non-determinism on our enhancement list. Non-determinism
(for example through concurrency or socket) introduces additional challenges: both
the foreground and background binaries might have several graph structures corre-
sponding to different schedules, and there may be a large number of different possible
combinations. We may need to run larger numbers of trials and develop new ways to
align the different structures to obtain reliable results or result sets. This is the top item
on our enhancement list.
Also, one of the important functions for the automated approach is the auto com-
parison and self-evaluation of the resulting provenance benchmark. We aim to provide
ProvMark as an automated tool which the end-user and tool developers can use as a
black box. Thus we also want to have an automatic comparison of the provenance
benchmark to generate results which should be easily understandable by the normal
end-users. In other ways, we should also ensure the result of ProvMark is indeed ac-
curate through self-evaluation to act as a cross-reference for tool developers to cross-
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check their tools. We have provided a basic form of self-evaluation (as mentioned in
subsection 5.5.4). We include some basic features for evaluating the generated bench-
mark to check for its correctness and completeness. The process checks if the bench-
mark results can help to identify the same pattern of system calls in other applications.
The full automatic comparison (extended from current self-evaluation function) for
both the developers and end-users are included in our enhancement list and are consid-
ered as future works.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discuss the basic design and methodology of ProvMark, the au-
tomated approach for the expressiveness benchmarking mentioned in chapter 3. We
choose three representative provenance recording tools which operate and gather in-
formation of runtime processes at a different level and make them generate provenance
graph results on a set of target system call action sequences. Then we handle the results
and produce benchmarks as output. The whole process works as a black box. Besides,
we have provided some basic evaluation of ProvMark in this chapter. The two major
enhancements of ProvMark mentioned above are the work we have proposed after the
first batch of development. The handling of non-determinism is done and included in
the next chapter, while the automated comparison and evaluation extended to form the
current simple self-evaluation is included in the future worklist.
Chapter 6
Non-determinism
In the last chapter, we presented the basic design, development and methodology
of ProvMark, the automated approach for the expressiveness benchmarking. This
is only the first stage of development. One of the enhancements mentioned is non-
deterministic event handling which aims to make ProvMark able to handle more dif-
ferent action sequences which are closer to real-world examples. In this chapter, we
will discuss non-determinism and how ProvMark handle non-deterministic sources of
information. We will discuss the design and methodology on top of the first stage of
development to handle non-determinism.
6.1 Motivation
6.1.1 Non-determinism in real-world example
Starting from chapter 3, we have continuously talked about expressiveness benchmark-
ing of provenance graph and provenance recording tools. We study how to go from a
manual approach to an automated approach and how to get an optimal solution for
graph comparison and matching by Answer Set Programming. All the experiments
and contents in our test case are focused on the smallest meaningful unit, system calls.
In the manual approach and the first stage development of ProvMark, we only consid-
ered deterministic events of system calls because they have less uncertainty and more
similar results in each trial run and require less effort to handle. But when we take
ProvMark into real-world usage, especially for some of our proposed uses in security
forensics or auditing which require to identify the existence of accountable components
of some sensitive action sequences, it is hard to avoid the non-deterministic character-
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istics in the action sequences. In current computing age, most of the real-world system
and action sequences adopt synchronized processing which increases the efficiency and
speed of the operations. This concurrent processing is an example of non-deterministic
events in which the process owner has no control over the interleaving between pro-
cesses or the execution order of system calls coming from different processes. This is
only one of the examples of non-deterministic events, there are many more different
types of non-determinism in real operating system processes. To cover these cases and
provide all-around automated expressiveness benchmarking for real-world examples,
we need to enhance ProvMark to handle non-determinism. To make ProvMark more
useful out of the experimental stage, one of the basic criteria is to add non-deterministic
monitoring support to ProvMark to allow it to handle more realistic cases on top of the
experimental cases. This creates a strong motivation to enhance ProvMark to make
it useful in real-world scenarios and provide more automation in the topic of expres-
siveness benchmarking. This enhancement makes ProvMark closer to what the tool
developers and end-users need.
6.1.2 Scale of non-deterministic event
In chapter 5, we mentioned that one of the motivations for building up the fully au-
tomated system ProvMark is the scale of the provenance graph and the labour inten-
siveness and the error rate of the manual approach. This is also one of the strong
motivations for handling non-deterministic events. In the deterministic situation, the
foreground graph and background graph generated in the intermediate stage should be
almost isomorphic to each other, this is one of the assumptions we made when we per-
formed the generalization stage to eliminate volatile data. So, as a result, there will be
only one generalized foreground graph and background graph after the generalization
step. The major reason is that deterministic events will always perform the system calls
involved in the same order. For non-deterministic situations, this is not the case. For
example, if our target action sequence involves one thread executing a read system
call and another thread executing a write system call in parallel, there may be two
versions of foreground graphs generated and the graphs in different versions are not
isomorphic to each other and as a result, the generalization process should generate
two generalized foreground graphs. The number of versions (or generalized graphs)
depends on the size of the non-deterministic portion in the benchmark program and in-
creases exponentially. For example, if the two threads execute two system calls each,
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the non-deterministic combination has six different versions. What is worse than that
is, it is hard to predict the distribution of the versions. This increasing size and scale
and uncertainty in non-deterministic event graph generation makes it hard to handle by
manual effort. As mentioned above, we cannot avoid these non-deterministic events
as they are very common in real-world execution. To make ProvMark more realistic
and useful, we have to add in the automated handling of non-deterministic events in
ProvMark to withstand the exponentially increasing scale of non-deterministic events.
6.1.3 Obfuscation and non-determinism
Another top motivation of the non-determinism handling enhancement comes from the
consideration of practical usage of ProvMark. As mentioned in the earlier chapters,
one of the practical uses of ProvMark for end-users is to identify the existence of
certain action sequences and to trace back the accountability of parties responsible
for certain actions. These may be related to some sensitive or malicious activities.
Sometimes the authors in these cases may try to add in some noise in these actions to
obfuscate some analysing and detection tools based on signatures. These obfuscated
action sequences may also involve non-deterministic events which may come from
random morphing, repeating actions or out of order execution. To capture the patterns
and benchmarks for these activities and to identify the existence of certain actions,
it is necessary to capture all combinations of the obfuscated events which means to
capture all possible variants of the non-determinism that either come from manual
change of action sequence or automated morphing. As it is not certain what will be fed
to ProvMark in each execution, we have no idea if the input contains non-deterministic
events at all. The best way is to treat all input as a potential non-determinism source
to capture all possible sequences. This motivates the need for ProvMark to handle
non-determinism.
6.2 Definitions
6.2.1 Determinism and non-determinism
In chapter 3-5, we are talking about the expressiveness benchmarking from the manual
approach to the automated approach, with the description of the obstacles of isomor-
phic (sub)graph comparison and the automated ProvMark. Along the way, we give
multiple examples of each of the processes, including sample benchmark graphs, sets
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of generalized foreground and background graphs and the sample benchmark results
for different Provenance Recording Tools. To limit the size and complexity of those
tests, we limited the benchmark programs to contain only minimum meaningful sys-
tem calls. Also, all of them are deterministic events. All non-deterministic system
call events or sequences have been filtered out in the testing. But, as mentioned in
the motivation above, the exclusion of non-deterministic events is not as realistic as
most of the real-world execution includes some level of non-deterministic events to
increase process efficiency and time. Thus we are enhancing ProvMark to handle non-
deterministic events in this chapter. But first, we need to define the difference between
determinism and non-determinism.
The expressiveness benchmarking process requires comparisons of background
graphs and foreground graphs to identify the additional elements that exist in the
foreground graph which represent the target action sequences enclosed in the bench-
mark program by the #ifdef TARGET CPP directive statement. In our context, we
are only considering the non-determinism within the target action sequences. So the
range of determinism and non-determinism only applies within the #ifdef TARGET
CPP directive boundaries. We define determinism or deterministic events within the
#ifdef TARGET CPP directive statement as the combination of system calls that are
always returning the same set of kernel action sequences with the same order in dif-
ferent runs, except for the volatile information including those process id and times-
tamps which could change across runs. We further define non-determinism or non-
deterministic events within the #ifdef TARGET CPP directive statement as the combi-
nation of system calls that are returning either different sets of kernel actions or same
set of kernel actions with different execution order across different runs. There is s
possibility that the non-deterministic events return the same set of kernel action se-
quences with the same order in different runs, but in general, if we execute the same
set of non-deterministic events multiple times, we are likely to observe several different
combinations or orders of the kernel action sequences. The repeating action sequences
may be used to determine the likeliness of the appearance of certain action sequences
in the non-determinism environment.
6.2.2 Non-deterministic events
As mentioned in the last subsection, non-deterministic events refer to some system
call combinations that may return different kernel action sequences across different
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runs. The major reason for the unpredictability either comes from the system calls
themselves or combinations of multiple system calls. There are multiple types of
non-deterministic system calls that can result in non-deterministic events they are
mainly classified into different categories. Concurrent system calls can handle mul-
tiple threads and processes but do not have much control over the execution order of
the multiple threads and processes. Socket system calls are those system calls han-
dling communication through network ports. Streaming system calls are another kind
of non-deterministic events that handle data transfer across different artefacts or even
in a distributed environment through networks. I/O system calls control the input and
output events and also data buffering which also belongs to the non-determinism fam-
ily. Last but not least, there are some adversaries make use of some randomized system
calls to create obfuscation to avoid showing the patterns of their attack or some other
sensitive activities. These system calls also belong to the family of non-deterministic
events. The detailed description of each type of non-deterministic event and their be-
haviour in ProvMark are discussed in the later section in this chapter.
6.2.3 Fingerprinting and activity tracing
In our usage of provenance tracing, one of the work is to identify the kernel execution
patterns for certain action sequences. The same set of action sequences may behave
in a non-deterministic manner in the kernel throughout multiple executions. Thus it is
not possible to generalize and compare the graphs directly because graphs generated
for different execution path may not contain isomorphic sub-graph between them. To
allow further processes and covering most of the patterns or benchmark for a specific
execution sequence, we need to distinguish the provenance graph and collect them into
groups of same execution paths before moving on to the later steps. To distinguish the
multiple sets of non-deterministic events in the provenance graph format, we need to
trace the activities involved in the kernel action sequences represented by the result-
ing provenance graph. In a Unix-like environment, there are many tracing tools at the
kernel level. We could also customize our module to do the job like CamFlow but that
would require the system to run on top of the customized kernel module and requires
kernel access to do so. We choose an easier approach to make use of the existing ac-
tivity tracer Ftrace [143, 47, 144]. Ftrace is a tracing utility built and residing in the
kernel. It is derived from two well-known tools, the latency tracer and the logdev
utility. They combine to help us monitor the activities and events (based on functions)
174 Chapter 6. Non-determinism
happening in the kernel and return debugging information of all executions and action
sequences. In addition to tracing activity sequences, it can also help to analyse laten-
cies and performance issues which are out of our scope. Similar to the LSM hook of
the CamFlow, Ftrace is a kernel utility which requires some module to pass the re-
sult back to the user level for processing. There are some user-level front-end tools
available to help the user communicate with Ftrace and receive the result from it. We
choose trace-cmd to act as the front-end of Ftrace which is a tool shipped with many
Linux distribution. It can configure, start and stop Ftrace event and function tracing
and retrieve results from the kernel. It will also process and filter the results according
to the configuration.
As we mentioned above, non-deterministic events will generate multiple sets of
kernel action sequences or similar sets with different orders. For example in Code
Snippet 6.1, we put two system calls in separate threads, both of the system calls will
be executed eventually, but the executing orders are non-deterministic for each trial
runs. Another example in Code Snippet 6.2, we apply randomization to conditional
branches, different system calls set are executed determined by the result of the ran-
domize source. Different system calls may be executed for each trial runs. It is also
possible for the same kernel action sequence with the same order to appear more than
one time across multiple runs. To handle different provenance graphs representing
different possible executions and to preserve the generalization features which aim
to remove volatile information, we need to distinguish graphs and groups the similar
graph together. We make use of the event tracing features of Ftrace to help us identify
and group the generated provenance graphs. As we know, Ftrace also aims to record
the actions sequences, events and functions that happened in the kernel level, so if the
same schedule happened twice, their Ftrace result should also be similar. In this case,
the Ftrace result can act as the fingerprint for a certain combination of kernel action
sequences and the related provenance graph generated for this combination. We only
need to match the fingerprints to group the generated provenance graphs. The process
to distinguish the generated provenance graphs by comparing their fingerprints (Ftrace
results) is defined as fingerprinting and it is the additional step added to ProvMark
between the recording subsystem and generalization subsystem. Although we can not
guarantee that all paths are executed in the trial executions, we at least can make sure
that the process of generalization, comparison and benchmark generation is only done
between provenance graphs representing the same execution paths. This action avoids
polluting the patterns and benchmarks with non-isomorphic (sub)graph pairs.
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1 # inc lude< f c n t l . h>
2 # inc lude<u n i s t d . h>
3 void main ( ) {
4 i f ( f o r k ( ) ) {
5 chmod ( ” t x t 1 . t x t ” , S IRUSR | S IWUSR ) ;
6 } e l s e {
7 chmod ( ” t x t 2 . t x t ” , S IRUSR | S IWUSR ) ;
8 }
9 }
Code Snippet 6.1: Example for non-determinism with different orders
1 # inc lude< f c n t l . h>
2 # inc lude<u n i s t d . h>
3 # inc lude<t ime . h>
4 void main ( ) {
5 s r a n d ( t ime ( 0 ) ) ;
6 i f ( r an d ()%2 == 0) {
7 chmod ( ” t x t 1 . t x t ” , S IRUSR | S IWUSR ) ;
8 } e l s e {
9 chmod ( ” t x t 2 . t x t ” , S IRUSR | S IWUSR ) ;
10 }
11 }
Code Snippet 6.2: Example for non-determinism with different system calls
6.2.4 Assumptions
As we aim to retrieve most of the possible schedule of the non-deterministic events,
those events should be our target actions. Thus, all of the non-deterministic events
should be enclosed by #ifdef TARGET CPP directive statement inside the benchmark
program. As a result, the non-determinism should only exist in the foreground graph
generation process because the background program used for generated background
graph does not contain parts enclosed by the #ifdef TARGET CPP directive statement
and thus does not contain non-determinism at all. Thus all the generated background
graph should have the same fingerprint. So we are only doing the fingerprinting on the
generated foreground graph. And because foreground graphs in different groups are
generalized separately, the resulting generalized foreground graphs are also compared
separately and as a result, we will receive multiple benchmarks which each of them
represent one of the possible action sequence combinations of the non-determinism.
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Although symbolic execution provides ways for seeking all possible execution
paths for non-deterministic inputs, it does not fit in most of the scenarios for our auto-
mated expressiveness benchmarking approach. One of the major motivations for our
automated approach is to identify the patterns for certain activity sequences and use
them as a reference for later detections. In this scenario, the later detection process
includes the execution of a new binary and compares the provenance trace with the
referencing patterns to identify if the given activity sequences exist in the new input
binary. This process aims to identify the patterns in some random input which the
system has never seen before. In most of the symbolic execution approach, the target
execution needs to go through some static analysis and certain levels of code intrusion
to hook some of the interpreters to the execution. These steps may need to be re-
peated multiple times to retrieve all possible paths and the time and resources needed
is directly proportional to the number of possible paths for the execution. These extra
requirements make it unsuitable for the automated provenance benchmarking approach
for two reasons. The first reason is the unpredictable time and resources needed for the
discovery of all possible paths. The second reason is we can never be certain that we
can access the source for the incoming binary executions thus it is no guarantee that
we can use the symbolic execution approach on every source and testing target. Thus
we are not using this approach in our automated benchmarking system, ProvMark.
In some of the cases, the execution of non-deterministic input will result in limited
combinations of possible outcomes. For example, if our target actions only contain
a read system call in one thread and a write system call in another thread, then the
resulting provenance graph can only have two possible combinations. They either con-
tain read then write or write then read. There are no additional executions that can
be deduced from this input. But, the counting of all possible combinations may not
be possible if the number of system calls increase or more complex non-deterministic
conditions are introduced. Also, as the non-deterministic event execution and sched-
ules are out of our control, there is a possibility that some combinations have far lower
chance to be triggered and we can never guarantee to execute all combinations of the
non-deterministic input. For easy processing of ProvMark, we assume that all groups
of graphs collected from the recording stage have covered all possible combinations of
the input. We do that by running multiple times more than the total number of combi-
nations. For example, we will execute 121̃6 trial runs for non-deterministic events that
have 4 combinations to covers all of the possible combinations. We then process the
graph generalization and benchmarking processing on top of this assumption.
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6.3 Sources of non-deterministic events
In this section, we classify possible non-deterministic events.
6.3.1 Concurrent and interleaved events
In the advancement of computer science, researchers are always aiming to increase ex-
ecution efficiency. One way to achieve the goal is the adoption of parallel computing
for concurrent units. This concurrency property allows different portions of the pro-
grams or framework to be executed in a partial order. The key point here is although
the portions may work out of order, the final result is still satisfying the original inten-
tion. So concurrency allows decomposing a single process into multiple processes and
execute them in parallel following only a partial order and result in the same outcome.
To achieve the outcome from concurrency, the sliced portions of the process must
interleave events. It means that the order of events in different portions of the process in
the parallel execution environments should not affect each other. If some events must
preserve some sort of order, they should be grouped into the same execution thread
or coordinated using semaphores or locks. Besides, concurrency allows processes to
share processor resources. It allows a single processor to handle more than one process
by continuously interleaving events from different processes. This flexibility increases
the number of active process in a limited amount of processors. The setting is related
to the property on concurrent execution. While the execution order in the same portion
of the program will be preserved, the process itself has no control of the interleaving of
different concurrent events. There is no guarantee of execution order between events
in different threads or processes in each run. It is completely up to the processor
mechanism to decide when to switch to another process and only the execution of
the events in the same thread are kept. This uncertainty of the execution order of
interleaving events creates non-determinism because in each run, although the events
in the same process may decompose into the same sets of execution threads, we never
have control of the execution order of events across different threads. This may result
in different provenance results. These provenance results may have the same set of
system calls captured, but they may be in a different order and this may affect the
structure of the resulting provenance graph. When we consider one of the use cases of
ProvMark is aiming to discover the existence of certain patterns in runtime, it requires
not only identifying certain system calls. The execution order of the system calls can
also be a key factor and thus we need to handle the non-determinism of events.
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6.3.2 Socket and network communication
In the last subsection, we mentioned about the most common kind of non-deterministic
events, which is the concurrent event. Another important type of event is distributed
processing, which includes socket and network communication. This kind of events
generally can communicate externally, like from the Internet, Intranet or distribution
environment. For example, the send system call family and the recv system call
family are aiming to communicate with external devices through the socket protocol.
In general, these system calls depend not only on the execution in the local environ-
ment, but they also depend on feedback from an external system. One of the major
considerations of communicating with external parties is there is no guarantee when
the communicating target will send its responses back to the local environment. And
it is also inconceivable to halt local execution and passively wait for the response.
Thus these socket and network communications are always working in asynchronous
mode and passively wait for the reply from external communicating partners. These
system calls will block themselves in the background after their core work in the lo-
cal environment, then they will reactivate when a response is received from external
communicating partners and complete the remaining tasks.
These socket and network-related system calls work in asynchronous mode and
the waiting time is non-deterministic because the local system has no way to control
artefacts outside of the system which can respond at any time in any order. They are
similar to concurrent execution. They do not have control over the execution order
when working in parallel with other activities, including other socket related system
calls. The only difference is, in general, concurrent execution, the programmer can
assign tasks to different execution threads. They cannot control the execution order
between the execution threads, but they still can control the order of event execution
in the same thread or process. In the case of socket system calls, even the owner
has no control over the moment that the reply returns from external partners, thus the
socket system call is forced to work concurrently and thus are guaranteed to be non-
deterministic by its property.
6.3.3 Piping and buffering
The next group relates to process communication and input/output events. This group
of events can be considered as a special case for the concurrent execution in a single
system, mentioned above in Section 6.3.1. The different is, buffering and piping are
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related to the resource management of the operating systems. The programmers or sys-
tem users can only suggest the operating systems to perform the actions but the systems
are not guaranteed to perform these actions immediately. In other words, the program-
mers or system users have not much control over this group of events. In general,
the operating systems will perform this group of events when necessary. The neces-
sity of the events is determined by the optimal plan. For example in current operating
systems, reading and writing to storage devices is expensive, thus many of the input
and output events (like read or write system calls) are buffered in the cache and
will only flush the data intermittently when the buffer is full or the processor is free to
perform the synchronization to a storage device. If the binaries do not have execution
order controlling statements like semaphore flagging that force some events to per-
form before other events, the users generally have no control on how the input/output
executes in the system, the execution sequences depend on the buffering settings and
the resource optimization strategy of the operating systems. Thus this property creates
a non-deterministic ordering of events which relates to the buffering mechanism and
resource management of the operating systems and affects the resulting provenance
graph.
In addition to buffering, in Unix-like operating systems, processes communicate
and pass information to each other during execution. It is possible to redirect input
and output through the pipe system call family. As mentioned above, processes can
be executed in parallel and thus the input and output redirection or process commu-
nication may not operate at the same time. It is possible that receiving processes are
inactive during the communication process and thus the order of execution is non-
deterministic as once again, the process itself has no control of the execution order
across processes. The different execution order of system calls in a different process
creates non-determinism in the resulting provenance graph. Considering processes
communication and data passing, it also makes use of the buffering mechanism to
temporarily store the intermediate results between the processes which add another
source for non-deterministic events.
6.3.4 Obfuscation and randomization
Last but not least, some man-made situations may cause non-deterministic events. One
case is process obfuscation. As mentioned at the very beginning, one of the use cases of
identifying certain action sequences is to detect the existence of malicious or sensitive
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actions. This is a kind of security analysis of the attackers’ behaviour by past activity
tracing. Those attackers may want to cover their traces and make it hard to identify
the existence of themselves and their actions. Thus they may include some dummy
activities or system calls manually in their activity traces to make their action sequence
traces different on each run. This is possible by adding some randomized obfuscation
into their actions. They can also add in some combinations of action sequences that
cancel each other out logically and achieve the same result. This can also be some
live modifying of binary and code which create non-determinism in the execution and
make the analysis harder.
Apart from purposeful obfuscation by attackers, randomization in legitimate pro-
grams may also create non-determinism. If some logic or action makes execution
choices based on randomized values, and the randomized source or seed is changed in
different trial runs, it is possible to create non-determinism, thus there is no guarantee
the same branches will be executed next time. This kind of non-determinism can be
minimized by minimizing the uses of the pseudo-randomized source. It can limit the
number of possible non-deterministic states but can never eliminate it as sometimes
the randomized source is uncontrollable. In general, randomization and obfuscation
create non-determinism which is controlled and originated from the program owner
itself, not the properties of some system calls.
6.4 ProvMark non-deterministic handling
In this section, the non-determinism handling mechanism is described in detail. In
general, non-determinism handling involves additional components added to the four
subsystems of ProvMark. The design aims to be general enough to allow ProvMark to
handle both deterministic and non-deterministic inputs using the same logic.
6.4.1 Tracing kernel actions
In the recording subsystem, ProvMark aims to use the chosen module to control the
Provenance Recording Tools to collect provenance for the background and foreground
program execution. The process will execute multiple times to collect a set of back-
ground graphs and a set of foreground graphs for the generalization process, which
aims to filter out volatile information like process ids and timestamps. As mentioned
above, the generalization process in Chapter 5 assumes the input is deterministic. If
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ProvMark is fed with non-deterministic input, there may be non-isomorphic pairs in
the set of foreground graphs because execution is non-deterministic and thus the result-
ing provenance for each trial run may result in different provenance graph structures.
This makes it impossible to generalize directly because we assumed the graphs are
similar to each other to identify the volatile information which is the varying part of
the similar graphs. To solve this problem, we need to first group similar sets of graphs
and generalize each of the groups separately.
The first thing we need to do is to identify which of the graphs represent the same
schedules of non-deterministic events. As we notice, if two trial runs follow the same
schedule, then they will have the same set of system calls and execution order. Thus
we can identify them by matching their system call order list. This could be retrieved
by monitoring the Linux Security Enhancement (Linux SE) in the kernel as each of
the system call execution need to go through Linux SE for permission checking before
execution. To decrease dependencies from writing customized kernel modules to do
the monitoring directly, we instead choose to use an existing kernel framework Ftrace
to handle the monitoring work. As mentioned in Section 6.2.3, Ftrace is a framework
shipped with the Linux kernel, aiming to monitor and trace functions and activities at
the kernel level. There is also a tool named trace-cmd that allows users to configure
Ftrace from user level and it will also pass back the result of Ftrace from the kernel to
user level. With this understanding, in each trial run of the foreground program, we
also use trace-cmd to start Ftrace alongside the provenance collecting tools to capture
the list of system calls for the execution of the foreground program. We also configure
the provenance collecting tools to ignore the system calls generated by the process of
controlling trace-cmd and any of its child processes to avoid additional provenance
from the trace-cmd utility and the Ftrace framework. After each trial run, we get a
system call schedule to match with each of the foreground provenance graphs. As we
assumed that all of the non-deterministic input is enclosed in CPP directives,
thus background graph is always deterministic and so all of them should have a very
similar set of system calls received from the trace-cmd components. This statement
should also be true for foreground graphs of deterministic input.
6.4.2 Fingerprinting action sequence
As mentioned above, each of the provenance graphs generated from the recording
subsystem will have a schedule attached to them which is collected from the Ftrace
182 Chapter 6. Non-determinism
framework and passes to the user by the trace-cmd utility. Although in our testing, we
are considering small sets of system calls initially, we eventually intend ProvMark for
real use on larger target action sequences. Large target action sequences not only pro-
duce larger provenance graphs for analysis but also contain a large number of system
calls to be executed. Thus, it will result in a very long schedule captured by Ftrace
and returned to the user. These schedules are matched to each of the graphs and we
are grouping the resulting provenance graphs in terms of the schedule. To minimize
time and increase efficiency, it is important to control the size of these schedules. It
is not good to compare the schedules directly as their size is directly proportional to
the number of system calls that exist in the execution. Besides, labelling graphs with a
long schedule is hard to read as it is also used manually to distinguish different bench-
mark schedules. To limit the size of the comparator, we generate a hash value for each
of the schedules. We first concatenate all the system call names in the schedule to form
a long string, then we generate a hash value for this long string to form the fingerprint
which is guaranteed to be a fixed size. This fingerprint is used directly as the key for
the graph it is attached to and replacing the long schedule. After this step, we get a
set of foreground provenance graphs and a set of background provenance graphs, each
with its fingerprint attached to it. As we assume that background program is always
deterministic, all the background provenance graphs should have the same fingerprint.
This can also help to filter out the minority with a different fingerprint which may
represent errors in the graph generation process for the background graphs set.
6.4.3 Group action sequences
The next step is to group the foreground graphs into similar groups and generalize the
graph sets separately. From the last step, we have already labelled each graph with a
fingerprint, which is the hash value generated from the system calls schedule for the
graph it represents. In this process, graphs with the same fingerprint will be grouped
because it means that they executed the same system calls in the same order. As we
are assuming all of the possible combinations of the non-deterministic events should
be executed, the total number of groups should be equal to the number of the possible
combinations. This statement is also true for deterministic events because the number
of possible combinations for deterministic input should be one. After the grouping of
the graphs, each group is passed on to the generalization subsystem to continue the
process, the fingerprint for each of the group should also be preserved.
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After the additional fingerprinting and group of graph done in the recording sub-
system, it needs to go through the remaining three subsystems. It will go through the
transformation subsystem first and transform each of the graphs into Datalog format
for the generalization and benchmark comparison steps. This step is not changed as the
transforming of graphs from one graph type to another graph type is always a one to
one mapping. The only thing that needs additional care is that the groups of the graphs
and the attached fingerprints should be preserved. The result for the first two subsys-
tems should return a set of background graphs and one to many sets of foreground
graphs.
6.4.4 Generate multiple benchmarks
The clear difference from the handling of deterministic events is that there are multiple
groups of graphs that need to go through the generalization and comparison process.
In the case of deterministic inputs, we assume that all graphs should be similar to each
other and thus can be generalized directly and compare the generalized background
and foreground graph directly to retrieve the provenance benchmark. In the case of
non-deterministic inputs, there are multiple sets of foreground graphs, only the graphs
in each set are similar to each other. Thus only the graphs in the same set will be gener-
alized together. As a result, there will also be multiple generalized foreground graphs.
Each generalized foreground graph is associated with a unique group fingerprint and
is compared to the background graph one by one to retrieve a provenance benchmark
pattern. At last, ProvMark generates a set of provenance benchmark graphs after pro-
cessing non-deterministic program input and each of the provenance benchmark results
are labelled by their fingerprint.
Recalling the usage and purpose of ProvMark and the expressiveness benchmark-
ing, we aim to identify the key elements of a provenance graph that represent the
target action sequences correctly and completely which can map the graph back to a
set of action sequences with one to one relationship. The resulting provenance bench-
mark represents the key elements to describe a certain action sequence for that specific
provenance recording tools, thus it acts as a benchmark for the tools. It can also be
used as a pattern to identify the existence of the action sequence in a runtime envi-
ronment if the same provenance collecting tools is used in the provenance collecting
phase. If we have these considerations in mind, it is not hard to understand why the
provenance benchmark generated for non-deterministic input programs are a set of
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benchmarks rather than a single benchmark. For non-deterministic input program, we
do not know which combination will execute in each trial. Thus we need to collect
all possible combinations of executions and map them one by one to the current trial.
If any of the benchmarks matched or exists in the new trials, we can still confirm the
existence of the matching of non-deterministic action sequences and we can even label
by their fingerprints. If the benchmark process covers all possible combinations, the
generation of the set of provenance patterns for each of the combinations should be
complete in describing all possible behaviour of the non-deterministic input program.
Thus it should cover all possible future runs and guarantee the identification of the
existence of execution for either of the combinations. This, however, is not guaranteed
in the current implementation because we still have no way to ensure all combinations
are covered. This remains a future enhancement for ProvMark.
6.5 ProvMark evaluation
This section provides a basic evaluation and comparison of ProvMark for working
on deterministic and non-deterministic action sequences. We compare the actual over-
head of the ProvMark components and subsystems for handling deterministic and non-
deterministic inputs. We also provide the result demonstration for non-deterministic
events to show a reference of how the result differs from handling deterministic events,
thus how has the performance been affected. Again, all the experiments are done in a
virtual machine with 1 virtual CPU and 4GB of virtual memory. The common oper-
ating system for the virtual machine is Ubuntu 16.04 which is set-up by a vagrant file
for each of the tools. Dependencies for all three provenance collecting tools, includ-
ing Neo4j and some needed Python libraries, are also installed automatically by the
vagrant engine according to the configuration in the vagrant files. All virtual machines
were hosted on an Intel i5-4570 3.2GHz with 8GB RAM running Scientific Linux 7.5.
These settings are the same as the performance evaluation for deterministic inputs.
6.5.1 Result for non-deterministic event
As described above, the major difference in handling deterministic events and non-
deterministic events is the number of benchmarks generated as the final result. In
general, for deterministic events, there is only one structure for each of the foreground
graphs and background graphs because all the activities and system calls should be
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the same for every trial run. Even the execution order should be the same. Thus the
resulting provenance always follows the same set of system calls in the same order
and results in the same graph structure. Then the generalization for the set of fore-
ground graphs and the set of background graphs can work directly and be compared
to each other to generate a single provenance benchmark result. In the presence of
non-determinism, there will be not much difference in the recording subsystem. Ftrace
works in parallel with the provenance recording tools to capture the system call lists
which are then hashed to form the fingerprints and mapped to the generated foreground
graphs. This action does not affect either the original process or the transformation
process because the number of graphs captured is similar, the only difference is that
the graphs will be divided into groups for separate generalization and benchmarking
processes. So the main overhead and performance difference will be in the gener-
alization and comparison subsystems. In general, the number of trials required for
non-determinism is much larger than determinism. This is mainly because there is
only one possible combination for determinism. In general non-deterministic input,
there are multiple paths for the execution and thus will have multiple groups of graphs
that need to be generalized separately. To perform generalization to filter out noises for
each of the groups, we need to retrieve multiple graphs for each of the possible execu-
tions. For non-deterministic input, there are at least two different execution schedules.
To cover all schedules, we need at least double or triple number of trials compared
to deterministic input which always contains one execution schedule. As a result, the
number of trials required for non-deterministic inputs is generally much larger than the
number of trials for determinism input. Although the number of trials required for non-
deterministic events is much larger, the performance of the first two subsystems will
not have much difference if they are comparing the same numbers of trial executions.
Code Snippet 6.3 shows a benchmark program with non-deterministic input. It
contains two threads, one thread performs two read events and the other thread per-
forms two write events. For this non-deterministic input, the total possible number of
schedules is 6. We labelled the two write events as W1 and W2 in order and the two
read events as R1 and R2 in order. Because the two write events and the two read events
are in the same thread respectively, W1 must be performed before W2 and R1 must be
performed before R2. Thus the only possible combinations are shown in Table 6.1.
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1 # i n c l u d e <t ime . h>
2 # i n c l u d e < s t d l i b . h>
3 # i n c l u d e < f c n t l . h>
4 # i n c l u d e <u n i s t d . h>
5 i n t main ( ) {
6 i n t i d =open ( ” t e s t . t x t ” , O RDWR ) ;
7 char buf [ 1 ] ;
8 # i f d e f PROGRAM
9 i f ( f o r k ( ) ) {
10 r e a d ( id , buf , 1 ) ; / / R1
11 r e a d ( id , buf , 1 ) ; / / R2
12 } e l s e {
13 w r i t e ( id , ”TEST” , 1 ) ; / / W1
14 w r i t e ( id , ”TEST” , 1 ) ; / / W2
15 }
16 # e n d i f
17 c l o s e ( i d ) ;
18 }
Code Snippet 6.3: Sample benchmark program for non-deterministic input
Path #1 W1→W2→ R1→ R2 Path #2 W1→ R1→W2→ R2
Path #3 W1→ R1→ R2→W2 Path #4 R1→ R2→W1→W2
Path #5 R1→W1→ R2→W2 Path #6 R1→W1→W2→ R2
Table 6.1: Possible execution path combinations of Code Snippet 6.3
If we execute the trial for enough trials, most of the combinations from the non-
deterministic input should be covered, but there is no any guarantee that all combi-
nations are covered because there may exist some less frequent combinations. From
the above example non-deterministic benchmark program, we can see that there are at
most 6 possible combinations, and Figure 6.1-6.6 shows the six different benchmarks
(generated by SPADE). Some of them are very similar to each other with a similar
structure of edges and vertices but demonstrate system call events in different orders.
As write system call will trigger version update of the files, thus different order of
the write system call does affect some edges as they are pointing out from a dif-
ferent version of the same file. When we compare each of them to the deterministic
benchmarks shown in the previous chapters, they are very similar. For conclusion,
the difference in non-deterministic input handling is the number of benchmark results.
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Each of the separate results represents a combination of the non-deterministic input and
















































































































































































Figure 6.4: Provenance benchmarks for Code Snippet 6.3 (Path #4)























































































Figure 6.6: Provenance benchmarks for Code Snippet 6.3 (Path #6)
6.5.2 Performance with non-deterministic event
Next, we report measurements of the recording time. This section aims to compare the
time performance difference when handling deterministic and non-deterministic input.
For the same reason mentioned in the last chapter, we only consider the overhead from
ProvMark, so we only evaluate the time performance on the transformation subsystem,
generalization subsystem and comparison subsystem.
In Figure 6.7–6.9, we summarize the time needed for ProvMark to execute three
sample benchmark programs using SPADE, OPUS, and CamFlow respectively. The
first two sample benchmark programs contain only system call read and write re-
spectively, which are deterministic input. The third sample benchmark program is the
one shown above in Code Snippet 6.3 which is a non-deterministic input. Note that the
x-axes are not all to the same scale: in particular, the transformation, generalization
and comparison times for OPUS are much higher than for the other tools. It is because
of the large overhead for transforming Neo4j graph data structure to Datalog format.
We purposely compare these three candidates to show the difference in performance
for deterministic and non-deterministic input with a similar set of system calls. The
bars in the graph are divided into three portions, representing the time needed for the
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three subsystems. Note that the x-axes are not all to the same scale: in particular, the
transformation, generalization and comparison times for OPUS are again much higher
than the other tools because of the large overhead for transforming Neo4j graph data
structure to Datalog format. Once again we are not considering the time for the record-
ing subsystem as it relies too much on the performance and settings for the provenance
recording tools themselves.
From the data in Figure 6.7–6.9, we can see that the time needed for the transfor-
mation stage is almost the same for deterministic and non-deterministic input. As we
mentioned above, if we run enough trial executions, most of the combinations should
be covered (but are not guaranteed). To maximize the coverage of all combinations,
we execute each of the candidates for 15 times, which is more than a double for the
possible path in the third non-determinism input. And thus they are only generating
15 provenance graphs as a total for either deterministic or non-deterministic input. Al-
though the generalization target for the non-deterministic input in each group will be
less, the total number of graph needed for transformation still equals to the number
of trial runs, thus it is expected that the time difference in this subsystem is almost
negligible.
The time required for the generalization stage depends mainly on the number of
elements (nodes, edges and properties) in the graph since this stage matches elements
in pairs of graphs to find an isomorphic pair. For deterministic input, the difficulty
and time required for each of the graph comparisons are constant as we are assuming
all the candidate graphs are isomorphic to each other (except for the process id and
timestamps information to be removed). It is not quite the same for non-deterministic
inputs because there are multiple groups of graphs and we only assume the element
graphs of each group are isomorphic to each other, there are no guarantees that graphs
from different groups will be similar. But this is acceptable because we are only com-
paring and generalizing graphs in the same group. The hardness and the time required
may not be constant because the sizes of the groups may vary. Also, additional time is
needed to fingerprint and group the graphs, thus, in general, the time required for the
generalization for non-deterministic input will be longer. This difference in the time is
more significant if the number of groups is larger.
The time required for the comparison stage is usually less than for generaliza-
tion in deterministic input because it only needs to compare two graphs (generalized
foreground and background graph) in any case. But this is not the case for non-
deterministic input. The number of comparisons needed in this last subsystem relates
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Figure 6.7: Timing results: SPADE+Graphviz
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Figure 6.8: Timing results: OPUS+Neo4J
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Figure 6.9: Timing results: CamFlow+ProvJson
to the number of possible schedules of the non-deterministic input program. For the
example above, we have 6 possible schedules and thus it requires 6 graph comparisons
in the comparison subsystem to generate 6 different benchmarks representing all of the
possible execution traces of this non-deterministic program. As it is far less than the
15 trial runs we executed on the recording subsystem, we can see that the time needed
for this subsystem is shorter than the time needed for the generalization step. But if we
are handling non-deterministic programs with many possible schedules, it is expected
to see the time required for the comparison subsystem be much longer than the time
needed for the generalization subsystems.
In general, we can conclude that the time needed for ProvMark’s transformation,
generalization, and comparison stages is acceptable compared with the time needed
for recording. The extra overhead for handling non-deterministic input programs is
still in an acceptable range. But the time needed depends on the number of possible
schedules of the non-deterministic program itself. The time overhead is exponentially
proportional to the number of possible combinations since we also need to increase
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the number of trial executions to have high confidence that all possible combinations
are covered. As mentioned in Section 2.6, some researchers propose some symbolic
execution method for finding all possible execution paths and the minimum threshold
for covering all schedules. Besides, we have once again monitored the memory usage
and found that ProvMark keeps its memory usage less than 75% on a 4GB virtual
machine, indicating once again memory was not a bottleneck even when handling
non-deterministic events.
6.5.3 Non-deterministic schedules coverage
One of the important consideration for the provenance benchmark generation of non-
deterministic input is the coverage of possible schedules. In general, if there are N
different schedules exists for a program binaries, it is not likely that all N schedules
will be covered by just executing N trials. It generally takes more execution trials to
cover all the schedules. We have done some basic evaluation of the coverage using
the program described in Code Snippet 6.3. As mentioned in Table 6.1, there are six
possible schedules for this program. We defined twenty test cases, each of the test
cases has different numbers of trial executions range from one trial to twenty trials.
Each of the test cases is executed for 10 times and result in 10 numbers of coverage
which are used to calculate the average coverage of schedules for each test cases. The
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Figure 6.10: Average schedule covered for executing Code Snippet 6.3
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From the chart shown in Figure 6.10, we can see the average schedules coverage
for executing for a different number of trials. The experiment is done by observing the
audit log to determine the order of the read/write event. This is possible because the
audit daemon will automatically assign event IDs to system calls in execution order,
thus observing the event IDs for the read/write event can determine the schedule for
this run. Although in the 10 repeat executions of 6 trials can sometimes cover all 6
schedules, it does not succeed in most of the case and makes the average coverage
lower than 3. In our experiment, even if we execute 20 trials, we still cannot guarantee
that all 6 trials have been covered. During our experiment, we success to cover all 6
schedules in 9 runs of the 10 trial executions test case, but there is 1 run that only cover
5 schedules for the 20 trial executions test case which make it not 100% coverage. Even
if the experiment does success covering all of the schedules, it is still not guarantee
that in the next execution, all schedules will be covered. We just assume in most of
the cases, most schedules should be covered and thus there is a provenance benchmark
generated for each of the possible schedules. Repeating the provenance generation
process or increasing the number of trials do help to increase the full coverage rate but
it has no guarantee for full coverage.
From the experiment above, it is understood that although in the worst-case sce-
nario, executing 20 trials still did not cover all schedules, it is still possible to cover
them with fewer trials in general. In average cases from the experiment, executing
two times the number of all possible schedules covers all possible schedules and ex-
ecuting three times the number of all possible schedules result in at least two runs
for each schedule. This refers to 12 trial executions and 18 trial executions in the ex-
periments. It is important to get at least two runs for each schedule to generalize the
graphs for each schedule to filter out noise in the resulting provenance benchmarks.
The result above is just intended to show an average experiment. There may be some
non-deterministic input which has branches that are taken less often than others. Al-
though on average, these kinds of unbalanced schedules should also be covered, it is
never guaranteed. Besides, the above experiment and result are assuming that the num-
ber of possible schedules is known before the process. There do exist some cases that
the non-deterministic input is not possible to analyse and thus we do not know the num-
ber of possible schedules in advance. For example, if we try to process binaries with
socket or distributed system calls, we have no idea when will the response from remote
components returns. In this case, we have no idea how many possible schedules exist.
Also, if the user feeds random binaries to ProvMark for provenance benchmark gener-
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ation or expressiveness evaluation, we do not have an idea of the number of possible
schedules. In these scenarios, we have no guarantee on full coverage of all schedules,
the only way to ensure more schedules are covered is to execute as much trial as we
could and at the same time without executing too long and affecting the performance
of the whole provenance benchmark generation process. The balance in performance
and schedules coverage is considered as one of the future enhancement of ProvMark.
Besides, using symbolic execution and other formal methods to ensure full schedule
execution is also considered as part of the future enhancement of ProvMark for better
handling of non-determinism.
6.5.4 Simple expressiveness evaluation for non-deterministic event
Following the discussion of the simple expressiveness evaluation in Section 5.5.4, we
continue to discuss the module in this section. We have already described the design
and implementation of the expressiveness evaluation module in Setion 5.5.4, we also
present some test and description on how to perform simple expressiveness evaluation
on provenance benchmark generated from deterministic events. In this chapter, we
discussed and implement an enhancement to ProvMark for handling non-deterministic
input. The expressiveness evaluation module has also been altered to allow simple ex-
pressiveness testing for non-deterministic provenance benchmark. A brief description








































Figure 6.11: Enhanced ProvMark expressiveness evaluation overview
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As shown in Figure 6.11, the enhanced process is very similar to the original design
for determinism. The testing binary once again goes through the recording subsystem
first. In this stage, the testing binary will be executed multiple times and monitored by
the corresponding provenance systems. The recording subsystem of ProvMark man-
ages both the execution of the testing binary and the recording process of the prove-
nance system. The result of this stage is a set of provenance graphs from multiple
execution trials. One difference for non-deterministic input is, those resulting prove-
nance graphs are grouped by fingerprints which follows what we mentioned above.
These graphs will then passed through the transformation subsystem and generaliza-
tion subsystem. The result will be multiple generalized graphs, one for each of the
groups. This process still works even if the provided testing binary is deterministic
which will only have one group of results (one generalized graph). Basically, similar
to the original design of the module, the testing binary goes through the same process
as the non-determinism provenance benchmark generation process for the first three
subsystems. Then all the generalized provenance graph in Datalog format will pass to
the same evaluation subsystem for the judgment. Also, the enhanced process will not
only take one provenance benchmark as input, but it will also take a directory which
contains all the provenance benchmarks generated. At the evaluation subsystem, in-
stead of judging by a one to one mapping and comparison, it will repeat multiple times
by cross comparing each of the generalized provenance graphs of the testing binary
and the set of provenance benchmarks. If only one part of the provenance bench-
mark identifies the same action sequence in one of the generalized graphs, we can
judge that the testing binary does contain activity sequence that is matching some of
the paths of a known non-deterministic activity sequence. Currently, this is the only
judgment possible for the evaluation module in handling non-deterministic input. We
cannot determine if the testing binary has the same non-deterministic activity sequence
described by the provenance benchmark. The major reason for this uncertainty is be-
cause we currently have no guarantee that all path in a non-deterministic input will be
executed accordingly. Thus we cannot prove that if the generalized graph set from the
testing binary or the provenance benchmark itself already covers all possibilities. This
is one of the shorthand for the simple expressiveness evaluation module on handling
non-deterministic input. The enhancement for the module remains a future work after
we could guarantee that all path in a non-deterministic input is covered.
We use a similar approach to test the simple expressiveness evaluation module
mentioned in Section 5.5.4. The only difference is we try to put in random system calls
6.5. ProvMark evaluation 195
inside non-deterministic branches to allow us easily distinguish the possible difference.
For example, in a program with a fork command, we put in a open system call in the
parent process and a rename in the child process. For test case EV#1 and EV#2,
it is the same as deterministic input, only that the system call instead of the process
generation is repeating for EV#2. For the remaining test cases, it is altered with the
same logic, that is altering the content within a process without touching the outermost
process forking that introduces non-determinism.
Once again we try to execute different combinations of system calls inside a multi-
ple process environment. The only difference is that we provide multiple benchmarks
for each of the non-deterministic schedules. As mentioned above, we can consider
the different non-deterministic schedules as deterministic path separately. A set of
provenance benchmark for a non-deterministic input only generates multiple sets of
provenance benchmark, each of them representing a schedule and the action sequence
for the same schedule is deterministic and remain the same across different trials. For
this reason, it does not matter whether the testing binary is deterministic or not. The
only thing needs to do is compare the benchmark to the provenance graph of the testing
binary one by one and determine if the testing binary match at least one benchmark. If
the testing binary is a deterministic input and a match is found, it means that the action
sequence in testing binary match one of the non-deterministic schedules. If the testing
binary is a non-deterministic input and at least one matches are found, it means that at
least one schedules of the testing binaries match the non-deterministic schedule. Both
cases provide a positive judgment for the existence of the target activity sequences. For
this reason, the expressiveness evaluation module for non-deterministic benchmark set
is no different when comparing to deterministic benchmark set except the numbers
of provenance benchmark used. The most important point is the above conclusion is
correct only when all schedules have been covered by the provenance benchmark set,
which we assumed.
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6.6 Discussion
At the end of Chapter 5, we mentioned the enhancements needed to make ProvMark
more realistic to be used. These enhancements include handling of non-determinism
which is a challenge because most of the non-deterministic source may produce dif-
ferent provenance graph with different combinations of nodes, edges and properties
or similar elements with different orders. In this chapter, we discuss our work on the
enhancement of ProvMark on non-determinism.
One major difference between deterministic input and non-deterministic input is
uncertainty. In most of the non-deterministic program, we can still deduce multiple
static paths of execution. Each path of execution will only generate one provenance
graph if the same path is executed multiple times. The uncertainty in non-determinism
is that we can never predict which schedule will be executed for each trial run. With
this understanding, we give up on the prediction and instead we generate a provenance
benchmark for each of the observed schedule. We group them by matching their fin-
gerprints that are generated by hashing their execution schedules from Ftrace which
should be static for each group. Thus, the problem of non-determinism has been sim-
plified to multiple deterministic problems after we group different provenance graphs
according to the actual schedules. As a result, we treat a non-deterministic input as
multiple deterministic inputs that generated from the same non-deterministic input
source. Thus the final result contains multiple provenance benchmarks, each of them
representing a schedule of the non-deterministic input.
With this understanding, the enhancement only needs to extract the schedule of
each provenance recording stage. Then ProvMark will use the schedule to fingerprint
and group the provenance graphs together. When comparing the steps for handling
deterministic and non-deterministic input, the only extra steps done are the additional
fingerprinting actions and the additional generalization and comparison for each of the
combinations. These additional steps in handling non-deterministic input allow us to
ensure enough samples of schedules are collected from the trials. This is important
when we need to ensure the completeness of the provenance benchmark for covering
all possible schedules for a specific non-deterministic target action sequence. The over-
head for non-deterministic inputs is mostly determined by the number of possible com-
binations of the non-deterministic source itself. This has been illustrated in the above
performance evaluation and comparison of the determinism and non-determinism.
Although it seems easy at first sight to cover all possible execution path schedules,
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it is not as easy as it seems to be. There are two challenges exist in the handling of
non-determinism and we have put them into future enhancement works. One of the
challenges is the coverage for all possible execution path schedules. Although on aver-
age all possible path schedules are covered if we repeat the execution for enough times,
we never have a guarantee about the full coverage as the execution is non-deterministic
and there could exist some paths that are never executed during the limited execution
trials. No matter how high the chance of full coverage, there still some probability that
some paths are not covered. Another challenge is the number of possible path sched-
ules may not be known during execution thus we have no idea if the result has already
covered all paths. These two challenges are currently not handled by ProvMark and are
considered as future work enhancement. One possible way to handle these problems
is to make use of symbolic execution to assist in executing all possible paths to ensure
full coverage of path schedules.
In reality, the handling of non-determinism is one of the biggest obstacles to using
ProvMark for security analysis and intrusion detection. Although our work does not
guarantee to cover all non-deterministic paths for a random execution, it does help to
generate benchmark patterns for identifying most of the possible paths of execution.
This can help to understand and discover possible paths of execution and analyse them
to understand what activity sequence has been executed in a runtime section. This
work provides an alternative for identifying malicious behaviour in certain execution
and provides ways.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we discuss the enhancement to ProvMark. This enhancement aims to
extend the functionality of ProvMark to handle more realistic situations by capturing
the action sequence behaviour for non-deterministic sources. We also provided some
demonstration of results for handling non-deterministic input and compare the perfor-
mance of ProvMark between deterministic and non-deterministic input. The prove-
nance recording process is still executed as a black box. This enhancement completes
one of the extensions of ProvMark proposed in Chapter 5.

Chapter 7
Future extension and work
This chapter discusses possible future work extending ProvMark and also identifies
some future work for applying ProvMark.
7.1 ProvMark overview
7.1.1 Current features
In general, the basic features for ProvMark are complete, all the source code is stored
in an open-sourced GitHub repository. ProvMark has four subsystems to handle dif-
ferent part of the benchmarking process. We currently have three modules for the first
subsystem which support SPADE, OPUS and CamFlow. We have three modules for
the second subsystem to transfer Neo4J, Graphviz graph, and Prov-JSON data into
Datalog format. Our whole work is tested and evaluated by these current modules.
Additional modules can be developed by modifying the given templates.
Using Answer Set Programming to solve our case of the graph isomorphism prob-
lem is one of the contributions of our work. We need to handle two different cases
of the graph isomorphism problem in the provenance benchmark generation process.
These two cases are slightly modified versions of (sub)graph isomorphism matching.
Currently, there are not many graph comparison algorithms proposed for graphs with
large numbers of property values. For this reason, we contribute to the literature by
applying existing edit distance algorithms and making use of an Answer Set Program-
ming solver to match small provenance graphs optimally. We have not yet expanded
the experiments to larger graphs, but our current usage of edit distance and an Answer
Set Programming solver is already a novel contribution to the graph communities.
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One of the main applications of ProvMark is providing ways for end-users to com-
pare the expressiveness of both the provenance tools and the generated provenance
information. We currently do not have support for comparing the benchmarks. The
only feature we have provided on top of the resulting benchmark is a simple expres-
siveness evaluation of the benchmark, which we discussed in both Section 5.5.4 and
Section 6.5.4. This feature allows users to provide the resulting benchmark back to
the system with another fresh binary and ProvMark will identify the existence of the
actions mentioned by the benchmark in that binary. This is a basic version for be-
havioural analysis and intrusion detection approach that motivates this whole work.
Other usage and applications are discussed in Section 5.3.4.
7.1.2 Limitations
The current version of ProvMark only supports three provenance systems. Although
it should be easy to extend to more tools, the progress is not included in this work.
Besides, the resulting benchmarks are raw in shape. It may be hard for users with
no system experience to understand some of the components included in the resulting
benchmarking. Also, although the development of ProvMark allows it to be automated
in most cases, it still requires some settings and correct preparation of input to get
results. There are already some batch tools implemented to decrease manual configu-
ration, but there is still some level of manual operations needed for ProvMark.
Besides, the full coverage for all non-determinism execution path schedules is not
guaranteed. In the current version of ProvMark, no matter how many trials of execution
has been included in the recording subsystem, there is no guarantee that all execution
path schedules have been covered because the execution is random. Also, as ProvMark
is working as a black box, there is sometimes not possible to determine how many
possible path schedules exist for a non-deterministic input source. Thus it is no way
to guarantee that all possible path schedules have been covered. This result in possible
non-complete coverage of provenance benchmark for all possible activity sequences
exists in a binary. The insurance of complete path schedules coverage is proposed as




7.2.1 Current features extension
In chapter 3-5, the basic features of the expressiveness benchmarking have been re-
ported. The text includes the preliminary trial of the manual benchmarking approach,
the obstacle of the (sub)graph isomorphism problems that need to be overcome, and
the system design and implementation of the automated system, ProvMark. Follow-
ing the discussion in Chapter 5, the basic features aim to solve the easy problems for
demonstrating the feasibility of such an approach. We suggest several enhancements
at the end of that chapter where some of them are already implemented. These en-
hancements include the handling of non-deterministic events mentioned in Chapter 6,
which makes ProvMark more realistic. The main reason is most of the executions and
operations nowadays include a certain level of concurrency and non-determinism.
Another enhancement is the simple expressiveness evaluation of those provenance
benchmark generated by ProvMark. This has been mentioned in both Section 5.5.4
and Section 6.5.4. The major work done is providing a simple evaluation for the Prov-
Mark operation on both deterministic and non-deterministic source. In this evalua-
tion, we aim to provide the user with a certain level of automation for understanding
the expressiveness of those generated benchmark and the systems behind them. By
feeding the generated provenance benchmark patterns of a specific activity sequence
with some random application or binaries that does or does not contain that activ-
ity sequences, ProvMark will try to use the benchmark to match the activities in the
binaries. The result can show the correctness and completeness of the generated prove-
nance benchmark. An acceptable level of correctness and completeness should make
ProvMark possible to identify the existence of those activities correctly. This can test
both the capabilities of ProvMark and help end-users to identify the expressiveness
of the provenance systems which are responsible for generating that benchmark. In
general, the enhancement provides consolidation for a fully automated evaluation of
ProvMark and the generated benchmark and act as a base for further applications and
usages we mentioned in Section 5.3.4.
7.2.2 Future Work
One possible enhancement is increasing automation of ProvMark. Currently, the de-
sign of ProvMark still requires a certain level of manual input and configuration. Also,
202 Chapter 7. Future extension and work
it requires work to make use of the provenance benchmark result at last. Although
there are already a simple evaluation and automatic testing of the existence of cer-
tain activity sequences, there are still many locations that required manual effort. The
disadvantages of manual effort include the need for the user to understand the tools,
inputs, and configuration to use it. It may be obvious for tool developers but compli-
cated for end-users. Our tool aims to provide an easy comparison of the capabilities
of provenance systems on different uses, these comparisons are done by judging the
generated provenance benchmarks. The problem is that some of the users do not have
the skillset for understanding and comparing kernel events and activities that exist in
the benchmark. Thus one possible future direction is to extend ProvMark to additional
use cases by abstracting the input and result. ProvMark can provide a user interface
allowing users to choose their desired applications and configurations they want. As a
result, ProvMark will automatically choose suitable training data set and provenance
system to generate benchmarks, then it will also compare benchmarks according to
pre-defined criteria and rank the provenance systems for the user to identify which
tools are more capable for their specific applications. This enhancement of ProvMark
lowers the entrance requirement for using ProvMark, which makes it more useful for
all groups of end-users. Work on this enhancement could include collecting the spec-
ifications and requirements for different uses as result analysis criteria. Also, it may
include collecting suitable training data for benchmark generation.
Another possible enhancement is improving support for the tool developers. As
suggested, one of the expected applications for ProvMark is the support of regression
testing and debugging for those provenance systems developers. By viewing the bench-
mark result, the developer can identify some unexpected behaviour and trace back to
the place of bugs or errors. Sometimes the developer may try to check if a code modi-
fication affects other components accidentally. It may be time-consuming for checking
all of the benchmark results because the resulting set of benchmarks may cover a large
set of different activities sequences. For this reason, ProvMark can be enhanced by
storing the benchmark results for full testing of the tools as a snapshot. Then next time
when the developers require another full testing, they can simply choose the options
for regression testing. ProvMark will then rerun the full testing set and generate a
new set of provenance benchmark results. The new set of benchmark results will be
automatically compared with the stored snapshot from the last execution and identify
any differences in the two benchmark sets. The developers can then view the differ-
ences and determine whether there are unexpected modifications of the behaviour of
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their tools. This additional regression testing option is a possible future work that al-
lows easy testing for provenance systems developers and could make ProvMark more
automatic and useful.
Lastly, one of the improvement and enhancement lies in the insurance of complete
path schedules coverage of non-deterministic source input. In the current settings of
ProvMark, there is no way to guarantee that all possible execution path schedules are
covered by the execution trials and thus the generation provenance benchmarks set is
not guaranteed to identify all possible activity sequences of a non-deterministic input.
The enhancement of this direction aims to look in method, including symbolic execu-
tion approach to discover both the number of possible execution path schedules exist
in a binary and to ensure that all possible path schedules have been executed for at
least twice within the limited number of trial executions. The two goals make it pos-
sible for ProvMark to generate provenance benchmarks that cover all possible activity
sequences exist in different execution path schedules from a non-deterministic source.
The above are possible suggestions for future enhancements of ProvMark to aid the
provenance research communities. They allow users to choose a suitable provenance
system. It also allows developers to fix and enhance their provenance systems with
fewer errors. For conclusion, these enhancements make ProvMark more automatic
and user-friendly by abstracting certain layers and provide user interfaces for users




This thesis surveyed the state of art for data provenance and provenance systems and
analysed the capabilities of provenance systems in different settings. We analysed
provenance systems and their collection of data provenance in terms of graphs. These
data provenance graphs help users to understand how the current state of components
was attained. Besides, they also answer the question of who is responsible for each of
the changes and where did it go through. These applications of data provenance make
it useful in many situations that require understanding and analysing what is happening
in the system for certain executions.
Our work aims to provide a unified way of comparing the expressiveness of prove-
nance systems and the data provenance generated by them. The expressiveness is
measured based on the completeness and correctness of the resulting provenance in-
formation. In other words, we aim to provide an analysis of the quality of the data
provenance to see if they provide sufficient information to identify activities and to
distinguish two different activities. There are many applications for data provenance
and each of them requires different levels of information, thus the same set of prove-
nance benchmark may have different expressiveness measurement for different appli-
cations. Our work provides a mean of comparing the data provenance and its source
provenance system.
From the study, we see that the provenance benchmark results of the same system
calls are described differently by different provenance tools. It shows the different per-
spectives of the provenance tools on viewing the same activities. Some of the tools
provide a more complete result describing the event and this allows greater usability in
tracing the source and accountable parties for the action. Other tools provide more de-
tails about the version changes of an artefact which allows tracing the modification his-
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tory of an artefact to search for problematic moves. The provenance benchmarks help
the user to identify the usability of the provenance systems by showing their strength
in their provenance representation. Also, they demonstrate the completeness of de-
tails in the provenance for specific needs. In general, by analysing and comparing the
provenance benchmarks of provenance systems, the compatibility of the systems on
different identifiable applications can be understood. This is one of the preliminary
motivation and contribution by our automatic expressiveness benchmarking approach.
Our work contributes to the literature by providing a fully automated system, Prov-
Mark, that generates expressiveness benchmarks for provenance systems. The user
can treat ProvMark as a black box. They just need to provide source code with certain
annotations showing the target actions, together with the configurations to ProvMark.
ProvMark will then generate a set of benchmarks for the specific activities using the
chosen provenance systems. If additional provenance systems need to be benchmarked
which are not supported by ProvMark, the tool developers can modify the templates
and insert them into ProvMark as modules. This helps to make ProvMark more flexible
in supporting benchmarking for more provenance systems.
One important user group for our benchmarking is the developers of provenance
systems. As we understand, developing provenance systems is hard work. It is even
harder to verify if the system works correctly in all situations. This is because in most
cases, the data sets and graphs handled by a provenance system are large and it is im-
possible to check the details one by one. Also, if a developer wants to have a fast check
after an update to confirm the changes did not affect other parts of the system, they may
need to check for many possibilities and it is inefficient. ProvMark can help to gen-
erate benchmarks for their systems to check if they function as expected because the
benchmark only contains the key activities without background and unrelated informa-
tion. Also, the benchmark results can be stored and compared with the new benchmark
results when updates to the provenance system are done to check for changes. This is
a form of providing regression testing functionality for provenance systems.
Another important user group is the users of those provenance systems. Some-
times, it is daunting to see many choices of provenance systems that claim they can
solve a variety of problems. As a result, it is hard to choose which one is most suitable
for a certain application. It is inefficient to try out the tools one by one and ProvMark
can provide a simpler overview of the quality of the provenance generation process for
specific applications. By comparing the expressiveness of those benchmarks generated
by ProvMark, the users can have a more intuitive understanding of the capabilities of
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the tools for any specific purpose.
Lastly, an important motivation for ProvMark is to study the behaviour patterns
for sensitive or malicious actions. Using ProvMark to generate benchmarks of spe-
cific malicious activity sequences can help to understand the key patterns for specific
malicious actions. As most of the unrelated operations are removed in the resulting
benchmark, it helps us to eliminate some of the obfuscation in those malicious activ-
ities and provide a key pattern for what this activity looks like. This helps to vet the
existence of this activity if the pattern is discovered once again in later execution. Also,
the characteristics of data provenance allow tracing back to the origin of a piece of data,
which provides a complete chain of evidence for proving certain actions and activities
that are being executed at runtime. Besides, the accountable parties and components
are also captured through the process and will also exist in the final benchmark. This
provides an alternative way for behavioural analysis and intrusion detection based on
patterns. Also, it provides ways to identify accountable parties for malicious or sen-
sitive actions. In the current implementation of ProvMark, we provide the basis for
the expressiveness evaluation. It can currently identify if the certain activity sequences
exist in a random testing binary by comparing the provenance benchmark to the prove-
nance graph of the testing binary directly. The current feature is limited to identify
the same sequence without obfuscation and randomization. Future enhancement of
ProvMark aims to provide more automation and tracing support to the evaluation
In conclusion, this work provides a fully automated system for benchmarking the
expressiveness of provenance systems and their generated data provenance, which con-
tributes to research in the field of data provenance and security analysis. It also allows
general end-users to take advantage of the characteristics of data provenance by choos-
ing a suitable provenance system for their uses.
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